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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to study the political changes in Oman from 1970 with the focus 
on the transition towards democracy. The core issue is the change from the policy of the 
previous sultan, who banned the participation of the nation and oppressed it. This led the 
country to civil war, isolation and the end of the regime. The current sultan, who 
launched a coup against his father in 1970, adopted various changes in areas such as the 
economy, politics and infrastructure, and allowed the people to run the country. The 
important changes were the process of democratisation in Oman, which is discussed in 
the context both of democratic theory, and change in the South. The thesis will offer an 
overview of democratic political theory, an account of political change in the South in 
general, and in the Middle East region in particular. The focus on Oman will seek to 
answer three questions: when did the process of democratisation begin; why was it 
begun, and how has it been managed? The core of the argument will look at the creation 
of formal institutions of democracy, such as the Majlis Ash-Shura (Consultative 
Council), and the State Council, and informal institutions, such as the media, the 
Chamber of Commerce, the Businessmen's Council, Sablat Alarab (the Arab Council 
Web Site), and the role of leading individuals in the democratic debate. These changes 
led the current sultan to receive internal and extemallegitimacy. Omani citizens are now 
aware of the development in other parts of the world and they will force the current 
sultan to add further changes. He should respond positively in order to remain in power. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
"Democracy is often touted as diminishing the likelihood of war, protecting 
human freedom, and facilitating economic growth. It might be going too far 
to say democracy is all things to all people, but it is fair to say that there is a 
strong propensity to associate democracy with a wide array of activities and 
outcomes that people value." 1 
1.1 Defining the Problem 
The Sultanate of Oman is a small Arab country in the Arabian Peninsula with a 
population of some 2.3 million which is about one-third of the population of 
Switzerland2. Though founded as a tribal dynasty some centuries back, Oman remained 
very backward in social, economic and political development up to the 1970s. Long 
known for inter-tribal warfare often complicated by religious animosities, the country 
remained in obscurity except for the series of foreign invasions due mostly to the very 
strategic position of the country. In the hot politics of the Middle East, Oman has never 
been a big player like Iran, Iraq or Israel. Oman also hardly figured in the vast anti-
colonial liberation struggles of many non-western countries against colonial rule. When 
1 Shapiro I., and Gordon, H., Democracy's Value, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.1. 
2 http://www.yahooligans.com/reference/factbook/s:zipopula.html.[l-12-2002]. 
12 
the Islamic revolution gripped Iran, and its effects spilled over to the Middle East, and 
the Muslim world, Oman was hardly shaken. On the face of it, Oman would simply pass 
unnoticed as a typical South country suffering from the lack of education, malnutrition, 
poverty of the masses, diseases, and an authoritarian monarchy as a curse upon the 
people. Oman thus apparently seems an unlikely case for serious academic and political 
scientific attention. 
And yet, Oman deserves serious academic and scientific attention for the following 
reasons. First, from the early 1970s, Oman began to change in a big way, so much that, 
in about three decades' time, it is no longer a typical country of the 'South', and an 
insignificant minor player in Middle Eastern politics. In fact, the political and 
constitutional changes that took shape in the early 1970s were the culmination of a series 
of mass rebellions (most notably the Dhofar rebellion in 1964-75) against the old 
regime, and the consequent political disorder that visited the country. The most 
interesting aspect of the changes in Oman is that while the country, backed by the 
sudden discovery of oil wealth, has grown at a rapid speed, this growth, socially and 
economically speaking, has not upset the political order. That is, Oman has experienced 
economic growth in the midst of political order and stability. This is all the more 
remarkable given the change-over from the old Sultan to his son Sultan Qaboos in a 
palace coup in 1970. In short, Oman's case of political changes goes against the thesis of 
Huntington (1968)3 that economic growth brings about political disorder and instability. 
In Oman's case, that did not happen. The interesting feature of the Oman's case is that 
3 Huntington, S., Political Order in Changing Society, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. 
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the new Sultan himself has introduced a lot of constitutional and political changes in 
order to adapt to a changing world. 
Second, the political changes, including the change-over from the old regime to the new 
one, were necessary for the very survival of the monarchy itself. The Dhofar rebellion 
since the mid-1960s was giving enough signals to the old regime. If the previous Sultan 
had remained in power, Oman would have collapsed. The take-over by the present 
Sultan averted serious damage to the sovereignty of the state, as the new leader learned 
carefully from the mistakes of the previous one. Therefore, the case of Oman is a pointer 
to the students of political Science that timely political changes, undertaken at whatever 
cost, may be necessary to ensure the sovereignty and identity of the state. Third, 
compared to other Muslim countries in the world, and particularly in the Middle East, 
Oman's prospects for democracy are greater because of the predominance of the Ibadhi 
tradition of Islam in Oman. This Ibadhi tradition is more hospitable to democracy, 
based, as it is, on principles which are proto-democratic. 
Fourth, Oman's strategic location at the Straits of Hormuz in the Arabian Peninsula calls 
for serious attention since about 75% world oil passes through this area. It is for this 
reason that Oman has been caught in the web of international and regional rivalries, and 
was a victim of imperial domination. That Oman today plays a greater role as peace 
broker in the Middle East is also mostly due to this. 
Fifth, Oman may be small in size and population, but not in importance, because the 
new Sultan has taken the country out of its age-old isolation, and got it engaged in many 
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bilateral, multilateral and international relations and associations, which have served as a 
basis for its internal legitimacy, even as a monarchy. 
Finally, what Oman has achieved has mostly been due to the leadership of the Sultan 
Qaboos, whose ascent to the throne coincided with the breakthrough of income from oil. 
Beyond doubt, oil strengthens the present regime. Without oil, the country would 
certainly face difficulties and barriers toward stability. As a result of this important 
income, Qaboos was able to build a strong army and to fulfil his promises to his citizens 
especially in the following areas. Firstly, during the last thirty three years Oman, has 
seen remarkable development in different sectors. Secondly, the new sultan absorbed 
former opponents into his regime and involved all Omanis in the government and 
building of the state, by a process of consultation through formal and informal 
institutions. This means the sultan's success can be attributed to two strategies, 
development and consultation. 
The accession of Sultan Qaboos marked a watershed in the history of Oman and the pace 
of change during the last thirty years has been simply overwhelming. First, reconciling 
the developments in the economic field with the social, political and cultural aspirations 
of the people has been a major concern of the government. Second, with oil products 
serving as a beneficial resource to kick start the economy's path toward development, 
attempts have been made to diversify Oman's activities in order to ensure the security of 
the Sultanate in the post oil era. Third, more significantly, the government has also 
moved cautiously toward institutionalizing a more representative form of government 
without endangering the supreme authority of Sultan Qaboos. On assuming charge of 
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ruling Oman on and from 23 July 1970, Sultan Qaboos resolved to rejuvenate Omani 
society, as well as to pursue the policy of 'infitah' (openness), a task which was very 
daunting in view of the largely fragmented country. Achieving unity and modernization 
in conditions of political instability and social disorder was difficult indeed. 
Despite the fact that Oman has a long history, its modem history began only after 1970, 
a period during which most countries of the world saw remarkable development. But the 
rapid development in Oman has strengthened the legitimacy of the recent government. 
Sultan Qaboos faced external interference in support of his opponents but, through 
external help, Oman was able to end the internal war. 
It should be remembered that the demands of the people grow according to their 
progress. People now are more educated, and influenced by Western culture which is 
based on the principles of democracy and human rights. Furthermore, Omanis are aware 
of progress in other countries, through sophisticated communications media such as the 
Internet and the satellite T.V. Thus it can be expected that they will pressure the 
government for further democracy. 
The Middle East is undergoing dramatic changes. No one can isolate Oman and the 
Omani nation from the Middle East, because Oman still shares with the nations of the 
region a number of features and values, such as the Arabic language, Islam, geography, 
history, tribal structure and so on. This means any discussion about Oman should be in 
the context of discussion of the Middle East. The changes that occurred in Oman were 
linked to the wide changes in the Middle East as a whole. 
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1.2 Existing Knowledge on the Subject 
Although historians have written about the existence of Oman, and its various traditions 
including Ibadhism and the Imamate, it was since the coup in 1970 and the rise of a new 
regime under Sultan Qaboos that Oman began to receive serious academic attention. In 
particular there is no study of the transition towards democracy in Oman during this 
period. 
John Townsend's "Oman, Making of a Modern State" (1977)4 was in a sense the pioneer 
as an analysis of the post-1970 period. He not only discussed the coup of 1970 but also 
the various factors leading to the coup. He discussed also the regime of Sa'id ibn 
Taymur and his methods of rule. The internal and external challenges to the rule of 
Sultan Qaboos have also been paid some attention, together with the action undertaken 
to meet such challenges. The civil war in the Dhofar region has been dealt with by the 
author as an important factor. Townsend has also discussed the development of 
Ministerial Government in Oman. 
J. E. Peterson's "Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an Emerging 
State" (1978)5 was the next major step that provided a detailed account of the history of 
Oman, its people and culture, the growth of the ruling dynasty, the coup of 1970 and the 
nature of new administration. The most appealing aspect of the book is its detailed 
4 Townsend, J., Oman Making of a Modern State, London, Croom Helm Ltd, 1977. 
5 Peterson, 1., Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an Emerging State, London, 
Croom Helm Ltd, 1978. 
17 
discussion of the external influences on the evolving politics in Oman. Noting the 
situation of Oman before 1970, Peterson rightly wrote: 
"The twentieth century has largely been a time of isolation of Oman. 
Suffering from fragmentation and economic stagnation, the country's 
contacts with the outside world have been few and far between, consisting 
in the main of occasional steamer calls at Matrah and radio broadcasts 
monitored on the few sets available locally". (p.136) 
Peterson has also pointed out that: 
"since Oman's involvement in the outside world, its problems have also 
increased. Oman's relations with its ideological opponents in the Arab 
world were not easy. For example, although Oman became "liberalised 
substantially, it was still plagued by rebels backed by Arab regimes whose 
ideological stance remained far to the left of the Sultanates". (p.154) 
also Peterson argued that: 
''the gradual evolution of opposition to the Sultanate along the ideological 
spectrum from religious xenophobia to radical Marxism-Leninism gave 
notice to the Sultanate that change was absolutely necessary". (p.154) 
John C. Wilkinson's "The Imamate Tradition of Oman" (1987)6 was a very interesting 
study of Oman's social history and culture centring around the country's Imamate 
tradition. The various issues dealt with in the book are the geographical structures and 
regional identities of various regions of the country, the complex tribal structures and 
6. Wilkinson, J. , The Imamate Tradition of Oman, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
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systems of property rights, clan patterns, and more importantly, the tribal state tradition, 
the Ibadhi renaissance, and the end of the Imamate. According to Wilkinson, the 
Imamate was always a more or less dynastic institution, "the religious legitimisation of a 
clan or family to hold a tribal state together"{p.9). Although, the book ends when 
Qaboos overthrew his father in 1970 in a coup, this is an indispensable reading for 
understanding Oman's journey into the modem world after 1970. 
Wendell Phillips' "Oman, A History" (1967)7, was a historical account of Oman which, 
however, provided a lot of background information to the evolving politics in the state 
since the late 1960s. For instance, he discussed the Al-Busaid dynasty and their relations 
with East Africa. Then he discussed the troubles over Buraimi, the disputes between the 
sultans and the Imams and, finally, the civil war in the Green Mountains between 
supporters of the Imam and the Sultan. Although published before the new regime took 
over, this is an important book for understanding post-1970 Oman. 
Morris, J., "Sultan in Oman"g is an interesting account of the oil disputes between Oman 
and Saudi Arabia and the role that the country's elites played at that time to defend the 
country. The elites' role was ably analysed against the backdrop of Oman's tradition of 
Imams and tribes. 
7 Phillips, W., Oman, A History, London, Longmans, Green and Co Ltd, 1967. 
8 Morris, J., Sultan in Oman, London, Faber and Faber, 1957. 
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Carol J. Riphenburg's "Oman, Political Development in a Changing World" (1998)9 is a 
very serious academic account of the political development in Oman in the context of 
the country's history, culture, civil society, economic development and foreign policy. 
The author has, to begin with, highlighted the special role of Oman's geography in the 
development of its politics and economics in the sense that its strategic geographic 
location has allowed it to develop quite separately from the rest of the peninsula. Like 
other authors on Oman before, he also point out the problem of the isolation of Oman. 
After a short and synoptic history of Oman under the rule of various empires, 
Riphenburg shows how, very rapidly after assuming power. Sultan Qaboos brought his 
country into the twentieth century, despite limited oil revenues by Gulf standards. The 
basic observation of the author is worth-mentioning here: 
"Oman has made tremendous strides toward modernization in a remarkably 
short time. Today, it encounters the challenge of privatizing and diversifying 
the economy in the face of declining oil revenues, reducing the country's 
reliance on expatriate labour, and responding to the demands of a new 
generation unfamiliar with the austerity of former generations. Raised to 
adulthood in an oil-rich state, these Omanis have been able to take for 
granted the entitlements oil has provided. Consequently, the major political 
issue confronting the new regime is how to deal with the politics of rising 
expectations in a climate of diminishing resources". (p 2) 
9 Riphenburg, C., Oman Political Development in a Changing World, London, Praeger, 1998. 
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Joseph A. Kechichian's "Oman and the World" (1995)10 focuses on the foreign policy 
aspects of the new regime, although the interconnections between the domestic and the 
foreign environments are also pointed out. This book explores in detail how Oman has 
come out of its time-honoured isolation, and got involved in so many bilateral, 
multilateral and international organisations and associations. It also discusses the 
growing assertions of Omani leadership in both regional and international peace-making. 
Kechichian has identified the sources of Oman's independent foreign policy in an 
interdependent world, and pointed out the strategic role of the same in resolving many 
regional disputes. This has served to enhance the country's prestige outside and added to 
the domestic legitimacy of the ruler. The most fascinating aspect of the foreign policy of 
Oman is that although its foreign policy was articulated in classic Cold War tenns, 
Sultan Qaboos adapted it to the changing Middle Eastern and international environment 
of the 1980s. The reason why this was possible, according to the author, was that the 
country's foreign policy was guided by an awareness of the country's capabilities 11. 
Hamoud Al-Harassi, in his Master's Dissertation, "The Sultanate of Oman's Foreign 
Policy: Analysis and Explanation of Oman's Independent Approach Since 1970" 
(1994)12 provides an overview of Omani foreign policy in the setting of the Arab World. 
He examines the principles of Oman's foreign policy, its role in the region and studies 
the causes for Oman's more independent policy compared with other Arab countries. He 
10 Kechichian, J ., Oman and the World, USA, Santa Monica, CA, Rand 1995. 
11 Ibid. pI. 
12 AI-Harassi, H., The Sultanate of Oman's Foreign Policy Analysis And Explanation of Oman's 
Independent Approach Since 1970, Unpublished MA Dissertation, University of Salford, 1994. 
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also provides historical background about Oman; the role of foreign powers in the 
country, the Omani empire in East Africa and, briefly, about the present ruling family. 
Abdullah Omar Aideed's, "Omani Foreign Policy in The Post-Cold War Era" (1996)13 
examines the transformation from a backward- looking nation into a modem dynamic 
state. He describes the recent Sultan as pragmatic. His analysis is in four parts. These are 
A- The projection of conventional Omani foreign policy. 
B- The Imamate, the rise of Sultan Qaboos ibn Sa'id and the consolidation of 
Omani foreign policy. 
C- Implementation of Omani foreign policy. 
D- Future challenges confronting Omani foreign policy. 
Patricia Risso's "Oman & Muscat" (1986)14 gives a general background about the Ibadhi 
sect. She said the Ibadhi considered themselves to be the original inhabitants and thus 
the authentic independent continuity of Islam. Unlike Sunni who recognise themselves 
as orthodox, she argued that Ibadhi recognise themselves as 'Motazilah' which means 
'liberal'. However, Risso confuses Ibadhi and Motazilah. Motazilah is another sect in 
Islam. They separated themselves from the Shias and Sunni but they were not Ibadhi. 
The Motazilah accept that every point relating to Islam is subject to discussion. Risso 
gave an overview of Oman before 1970, but most of her discussion was about Sa'id ibn 
Taymur. She discussed about the Omani regions such as Sharqiah and Dahira. 
13 Aideed, A., Omani Foreign Policy in The Post-Cold War Era Unpublished Master Dissertation, 
University of Westminster, 1996. 
14 Risso, P., Oman & Muscat, London, Croom Helm,1986. 
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Clements' "Oman, the Reborn Land" (1980)15 covers social background, the reign of 
Sa'id ibn Taymur, the development in Oman during the current Sultan, the Dhofar war, 
education and youth, and the future of Oman. 
The local literature is dominated by two authors, Al_Salmi16 and Ibn Ruzaiq17. At the 
same time, some English writers who visited or worked in Oman during the period of 
Sa'id ibn Taymur provide important information. For example, Fred Halliday, in his 
book, "Arabia Without Sultans,,18 provided a very good analysis of the personality of 
Sultan Sa'id ibn Taymur, which is an important source for this thesis. 
"The Omani culture of election", Bi 'ah, was discussed in a book written by Hussein 
Gubbash (1997/9 who presented a very clear and mature debate about the electoral 
system in the past in Oman. 
William R. Polk's ''The Arab World Today" (1991io offers an overview of the political 
changes in the Arab World especially the period since the occupation of Palestine, the 
15 Clements, F., Oman, the Reborn Land, London and New York, Longman, 1980. 
16 AI-Salmi, A., Tuhfat AI-Aian Beserat Ahl Oman, (The Omani History), Oman, Muktabt A-Imam 
Noor AI-Deen AI-Salmi, 2000. 
17 Ibn Ruzaiq, H., Al-Futh Al-Mumubeen fy SeeretAl-Sadah Al-Buaideen (The History of AI-Busaid 
dynasty), Ministry of the National Heritage, Amoon Lil-Tagleed Wal-Tibah, Egypt, 1984. 
18 Halliday, F., Arabia Without Sultans, London, Penguin Books, 1974. 
19 Gabbash., H, Oman AI-Democratiah Ali-Slamiah; Taqaleed Al-Imamah Wal-Tareekh Al-Siasy 
Al-Hadeeth, (1500-1970), (Oman Islamic Democracy, The Traditional ofImams and the Modem 
Political History, 1500 - 1970), Beirut Dar AI-Gadeed, 1997. 
23 
mandates policy toward Jordan, the relation between Arabia and Egypt, Libya, Sudan 
and the problem in Palestine. This background gives clear view of the arab world. 
Michael Field's "Inside the Arab World" (1994)21 is not specifically about Oman, but, as 
the title itself suggests, about the profound changes taking place inside the Arab world 
Oman included. The book discusses the most common issues affecting the Arab world: 
Islam and democracy, regional conflicts, corruption, the impact of the structural reform 
of the global agencies, the vexed issue of peace in the Middle East, and the relationship 
of the Arab world and the west. The most compelling picture in the Arab world, 
according to the author, has been the issue of change. As he said: 
"In the last ten years there has been a growing feeling in the Arab world that 
there must be change. The realisation by the people of the failures of their 
governments has led to an intellectual fennent, within the region and outside 
of it". (p.173) 
In fact, the above observation applies equally to the case of Oman which understood 
rather early that social, economic and political changes were a must if the country was to 
survive as a sovereign unit. The old Sultan Sa'id thought that by completely isolating 
Oman from the rest of the world he could manage not to change. How wrong he was! 
The new Sultan Qaboos well understood the spirit of the times, and the fact that Oman 
20 Polk, W., The Arab World Today, Washington, Harvard University Press, 1991. 
21 Field., M., Inside The Arab World, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1994. 
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could no longer resist the changes that the Arab world was already experiencing. The 
great merit of the book, then, is that it provides the right context, as above, within which 
to locate the case study of changing Oman. 
Yezid Saygh and Avi Shlaim's (eds) "The Cold War and the Middle East" (1997i2 
contains a host of papers dealing with the Cold War and its impact on the politics in the 
Middle East. The Cold War was the dominant international conflict in world politics for 
about half a century from the late 1940s to the late 1980s. Fred Halliday, an authority on 
the subject defined the Cold War, in his chapter in the book, as: 
" ... a competition between two rival social and national systems, each of 
which sought to represent itself as the solution to the problems of the world 
and each of which believed it could prevail over the other, in the long-term 
competition". (p.6) 
Since the Cold War was a global conflict. The Middle East was also affected by it, and 
the patterns of conflicts inside the Middle East were deeply affected by its dynamics. 
The great merit of the book is that it locates the political changes in the Middle East 
against the backdrop of the Cold War, and its aftermath. If the Cold War affected the 
patterns of conflicts in the Middle East, the end of the Cold War now defines the 
contours of the shifts that are taking place in many countries in the region including 
Oman. With the decline of the Socialist model of development, the countries are now 
22 Saygh, Y., and SWaim A., (eds) The Cold War and the Middle East, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997. 
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freely taking to the free-market and liberalised economy. The book also posits the issue 
of democracy in the Middle East in the right perspective: 
"That the USSR did not promote democracy in the Middle East is hardly 
surprising. America's failure to promote democracy and pluralism or even 
basic human rights in the Middle East is much more difficult to reconcile 
with her official ideology. Some American leaders extol Israel as a shining 
example of democracy in a sea of authoritarianism, but no American 
President, with the exception of Jimmy Carter, actually tried to promote 
democracy and human rights in the rest of the region". (p.291). 
To understand the experience of democracy from wider perspective, the researcher has 
devoted part of this study to the concept of democracy and its arrival in the world. There 
has been wide discussion in this field, but particularly useful were "Models of 
Democracy" by Held (2000)23, "Democracy" by Dunn (1993)24, "Defining and 
Measuring Democracy" by Beetham (1994)25 and "Democracy in the Third World" by 
Pinkney in (1993)26. These and other books paved the way of better understanding and 
evaluation of the features of democracy that began to appear in Oman from 1981. David 
Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh and Paul Lewis' "Democratisation" (1997?7 
does an excellent survey of the democratic developments in the Middle East along with 
other areas of the world. 
23 Held, D., Models of Democracy, Oxford, Polity Press, Second Edition, 2000. 
24 Dunn, 1., Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995. 
25 Beetham, D., Defining and Measuring Democracy, London, Sage Publications Ltd, 1994. 
26 Pinkney, R. Democracy in the Third World, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1993. 
27 Goldblatt, D., Kiloh, M., Lewis,P., Democratisation, Cambridge Polity Press, 1997. 
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Simon Bromley in his chapter on 'Middle East Exceptionalism-myth or reality' has 
discussed the problem of democracy in the Middle East in terms of a set of factors. First, 
he identifies a set of countries which are revolutionary nationalist, modernizing and 
authoritarian (e.g., Egypt, Iraq and Syria) which are different in social structure and 
historical patterns of development, yet share common obstacles to democratization. 
Second, there are some small states (such as Jordan and Lebanon) which do not have 
significant landed classes and access to oil, and in which the state plays a limited role. 
These countries thus allow more scope for pluralism in the political sphere. Third, there 
are some purely 'rentier states' (Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States) which are not based 
on agrarian development, but have access to oil wealth, and which have developed 
mostly on the basis of that wealth (rather than through strong movements by socio-
economic forces). These states have a limited social basis, and have very little space for 
the emergence of forms of independent political representation. In such countries, the 
ruling tribes have been turned into monarchies and authoritarian monarchical rule 
remains the norm. 
The third point above may not be entirely true at least for the case of Oman because the 
Omani rule today is not a case of hard authoritarianism as it was before 1970. However, 
one would agree with the overall conclusion that the Middle East has witnessed limited 
democratisation, and there are few, if any, liberal democracies in the region. 
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1.3 Our Departure 
Most of the studies surveyed above have dealt with various aspects of the changes that 
have taken in Oman since 1970 but the single most important issue of, on the one hand, 
political change and its interaction with social and economic development, and, on the 
other hand, legitimacy for the monarchy, has remained neglected. This study seeks to 
rectify the neglect and to fill in the gap in knowledge. The component parts of the 
argument are as follows. 
First, the notion of political change, as we use it in this study, is one of incremental 
political change, especially since the enthronement of Sultan Qaboos. Although the new 
Sultan came to power through a bloodless coup, this was not a revolutionary change. To 
begin with, the political structure of the country remained the same. However, the 
change-over from the old Sultan to his son was a major political event given the 
circumstances surrounding it. The set of political changes introduced by the new Sultan 
had a piecemeal character, but were most effective. Thus, for the new regime, 'political 
change' has served as an effective survival strategy. This study seeks to unravel the 
politics of political change in Oman, something nobody has done before. 
Second, the interaction between political changes and socio-economic development is 
very important, and the new regime has seen to it that the political change is not 
delinked from social and economic changes. The basic idea is that the people need a 
share of the oil wealth and at the same time want to see changes in the old method of 
ruling. A combination of the two has made for the best strategy for the new ruler. 
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1.4 The Aim of the Thesis 
In the light of the above basic argument of mine, this thesis seeks, concretely, to analyse 
and to assess the political changes in Oman between 1970 to the current time. The aims 
of this thesis are thus: 
To discuss the strategy of abuse and repression which was practised during the 
period ofSa'id ibn Taymur. 
To explore the main changes introduced by the new regime. 
To evaluate to what extent has democracy been achieved so far. 
To examine if the development helped the current regime to receive internal 
legitimacy. 
To explore whether the changes in the Middle East compelled Oman to change. 
To explain and analyse the main changes in the Omani foreign affairs. 
To explore the prospective changes that Oman needs in order to be able to 
remain stable in the future. 
1.5 The Importance of the Study 
This study looks at Oman from a perspective not used before. Its focuses on 
democratisation and its effects on policy, as well as the Omanis' relation to the changing 
Middle East. It attempts to provide suggestions as to what route Oman should take in the 
future, in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the present regime to maintain social and 
political stability 
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1.6 Methods and Sources 
In writing this thesis, the researcher has followed a number of methods of collecting 
data. The most important source of data is of course the official sources which include 
various reports of the various departments of the government especially those dealing 
with social and economic development, health and medical care. The researcher has also 
used the sources of the Arab League, and the other diplomatic sources facilitated by the 
diplomatic position of the researcher. As a Diplomat himself the researcher has taken 
part in various high level conferences of the Arab League (1993), and the Damascus 
Declaration (1995), the Tehran Conference on the Relations Between Iran and the Other 
Gulf States, (1996), and the Conference in Oman on Confidence Building Measures 
among the Gulf States (1999). The researcher as a Diplomat was the second most 
important organiser (entrusted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oman) to organise the 
Omani Ambassadors' Conference in Oman in 2000. Additionally, the researcher was 
also given the responsibility to look after Arab Affairs, and afterwards European Affairs 
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oman. All these activities helped the researcher to 
gain first hand knowledge about many aspects of the country's domestic and foreign 
policy. The other major source consulted in writing this thesis are the books written by 
foreign scholars and Omani researchers, both of which have been found to be helpful. 
Articles in journals and on the internet, written on Oman, have also been used for 
writing this thesis. 
On the empirical side, the researcher has interviewed a host of high level government 
officials, diplomats, and high level officials of the private sectors to ascertain their views 
on various aspects of the political changes taking place in Oman. The interviews were 
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open-ended so that they could express their views freely and frankly. The many visits 
made from Britain to Oman in the last couple years by the researcher have enabled him 
to conduct the interviews, as well as to collect more materials for the thesis. 
The other source of infonnation for this research has been Omani newspapers, both 
printed and electronic. The researcher has also consulted some dissertations available for 
the purpose. 
1. 7 Organization of the Study 
The basic argument of the thesis has been developed in tenns of the following chapters. 
This first chapter introduces the problem of the study in the appropriate intellectual, 
social and cultural context, which includes the definition of the study, existing 
knowledge on the subject and the limitations of the same, my departure from the existing 
knowledge, my argument, sources and methods. 
The second chapter is titled "Democracy and Democratisation". It is shown here that 
democracy has become a dominant political feature of the late 20th century. In some 
countries in the South, development has accompanied democratization. In this global 
journey toward democracy, the unique experience of Oman has been highlighted. Oman 
has experienced social and economic change without the major social and political 
disorder that Huntington (1968)28 would have us believe is inevitable. At the same time 
Oman has been introducing a modicum of constitutional and political changes that may 
be taken, on a liberal estimate, to be moves toward democracy. 
28 Huntington, S., op.cit. 1968. 
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The democratisation process did not just begin at the end of the Cold War. In some 
cases, states in the South-such as in Uganda and Lebanon- had democratic institutions 
but then experienced civil war, and the decline of democracy. It is also the case that 
during the Cold War, both the USA and the USSR intervened in states in the South, 
supporting dictators or communist parties. At the end of the Cold War, also, there is an 
argument that some states in the South felt they were forced to democratise, or lose 
western investment, yet for democracy to be genuine, people must want it. One of the 
more difficult areas in the South has been with regimes that only introduced democracy 
in order to stay in power, using fixed elections to do this. In these circumstances, people 
have no faith in democracy and it becomes harder to make it work. 
The third chapter is concerned with "Political Changes in The Middle East and their 
Implications for the Sultanate of Oman". Political change in Oman will be located in the 
context of political changes in the Middle East as well as the Third World. The Middle 
East also has begun to move toward a kind of democracy, but not in the same way as the 
rest of the third world. The Arab Israeli conflict, with the Monarchies in the Middle East 
and the Iranian Revolution all will be briefly considered in this chapter. It will be argued 
in this chapter that the Omani regime of Qaboos has not been impervious to political 
changes in the region and the world, and he has articulated a political strategy of 
survival on the basis of a modicum of political changes without which Oman perhaps 
might have disintegrated and been divided. 
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The fourth chapter, "Introducing Oman: History and Society", deals with Oman's 
history, culture and society in order to locate the study in the right context. It explains 
the history of the Sultanate of Oman and the social background to the political changes 
in the country, notably Oman's backwardness, geographical location, demography and 
social structure. This shows also the linkages between society and the political changes 
in Oman taking place after 1970 on the basis of the argument that the political changes 
were not simply imposed from above without any social support. In fact, Oman has had 
a different historical experience from other Arab states, having once been a powerful 
empire in the Indian Ocean. It has also had different relations with Iran, Pakistan and 
India, both in the past and in recent years, from those of other Arab states. 
Chapter five is about ''The Interaction of Economic and Political Development". Most 
writers neglect to discuss the economic effect of political change in Oman. 
Domestically, citizens concentrate on infrastructure, development and the prosperity. 
For example, the priorities for the Omani citizens are hospitals, roads, and subsidies for 
agriculture and fisheries. The election of a representative in the Legislative Council is of 
secondary interest and people keep silent if the government meets most of their 
demands. The internal development strategy gives the regime internal legitimacy. 
Chapter Five will also give an overview of the situation in Oman before 1970, and at the 
present time. Oman has seen various changes and improvement in areas such as the 
social sphere, economy, national income, employment, health, education, fisheries, and 
agriculture. However, modernization has brought with it an increase in crime. 
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The sixth chapter "Oman: Progress towards Democracy" focuses on the difference 
between the Omani experience and that of the rest of the Middle East. Oman is 
influenced by the Ibadhi tradition, of elections and accountability. This chapter seeks to 
answer three questions: when did the process of democratisation begin; why was it 
begun, and how has it been managed? The core of the thesis will look at the creation of 
formal institutions of democracy, such as the Mujlis Ash-Shura (Consultative Council), 
and the State Council, and informal institutions, such as the media, the Chamber of 
Commerce, and the role of leading individuals in democratic debate. 
Chapter seven is entitled "Foreign Policy and Searches for Legitimacy". The survival of 
any regime mostly depends on external and internal legitimacy. Sultan Qaboos has 
succeeded in enhancing his international legitimacy. Oman has established relations with 
other countries and organizations. Mostly, rulers use external legitimacy to assist the 
internal legitimacy. This chapter contains on analysis and explanation of Oman's foreign 
policy before 1970, the objective of the subsequent change, how relations with foreign 
countries are maintained, who makes policy, what are the basic policies of the country 
and the changes in foreign policy in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. Oman now plays an 
important role in solving the problems in the Middle East; it is one of the founders of the 
Indian Ocean Association and it was in 1990 a temporary member of the Security 
Council. The basic argument in this chapter is how widespread involvement of Oman in 
its external relations has served well as a basis of domestic legitimacy for the political 
changes introduced in the country, and the renewed support for the monarchy in this 
time of democratic change world over. 
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Chapter Eight, "Conclusion" first summanses the findings of the thesis, and then 
attempts to evaluate their implications for further political development in Oman and the 
prospects of such changes in the country's move toward a still more open and 
democratic regime. 
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CHABTERTWO 
DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATISATION 
"The principles and practices of democracy continue to spread even more 
widely, and it is hard to imagine that there is a comer of the globe into 
which they will not eventually penetrate,,29 
2. 1 Introduction 
The process of democratisation, which began in the South after the end of the Cold War, 
seems to have been based on the assumption that 'West is best'. That is, the Western 
European tradition of democracy is the only model of democracy that exists and it 
should be exported to the whole world. There are many benefits of European democracy, 
but not everything in this tradition - such as elections and accountability- are unique to 
Europe, for they can be found in other cultures. 
The chapter will give a definition of democracy, then the experience of democracy in the 
West and in the world, and the processes of democratisation will be discussed. Also, 
there will be a critical consideration of the values of democracy. The aim of such an 
overview and analysis is to give a clear account of the concept of democracy from a 
theoretical and practical point of view. 
29 Shapiro, I and Macedo, S. "Introduction" to "Designing Democratic Institutions", Nomos, XLII, 2000, p.l. 
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2.2 Defining Democracy 
The word democracy is familiar to most of the people in the world. But the concept is 
misunderstood. Since the time of the Greeks, the meaning of democracy has changed 
greatly. Etymologically, democracy means rule of the people. Abraham Lincoln, the 
former American President defmed democracy in the 19th century as a system of 
government of the people by the people and for the people3o• Philosophers and political 
thinkers before and after Lincoln have not agreed on the exact meaning of democracy. 
There are certain criteria that must be satisfied if a political system can be defined as 
democratic. These are: 1) the people have significant influence on the government 
through political institutions: 2) there is no serious discrimination in access to social and 
political rights: 3) there is a certain element of freedom of speech and access to the 
media; and: 4) the government has a good record of human rights. A state can move 
down the democratic route quickly or slowly. In fact democracy is not static; all 
democratic countries have developed in their own way. 
The world has seen a dramatic movement toward democratisation since the end of the 
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now, more than seventy percent of the 
population of the world have elected Parliaments31 • Democracy seems to have gained an 
almost universal victo~2. 
30 Yorovesky, I, Introduction to the basic elements of Democracy, 
htt:/ /usinfo.stategov / Arabic/ democracy/democracy l.htm [17-2-2003]. 
31 Norton, P., in Norton P., and Ahmmed N., "Making Sense of Diversity", The Journal of Legislative 
Studies, 4 (4) 1998 P. 183. 
32 Blaug, R., and Schwarzmante1, 1., Democracy: A Reader, Edinburgh University Press, 2000, p. 1. 
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Almost every regime now claims that it practises some sort of democratic system. Such 
countries use the term for gaining prestige, to create an appearance of legitimacy for 
their subjects and for external observers - in other words to keep themselves in power33. 
But the fact is that democracy is not a tool, as countries claim. It is a universal value. 
Some analysts have set up a number of conditions to judge whether this or that regime is 
practising real democracy. According to Kedouri these involve: free and fair elections, 
in which all the people participate, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom 
of speech and freedom of information34. Three further conditions, in his view, are 
development of social institutions, insurance regarding human needs and developmental 
training in democracy 5 • 
2.3 Democracy 
2.3.1 Democracy in Ancient Greece 
European democracy as a political concept originated in ancient Greece in the fifth 
century Be. In Greek, the word demokratos is a combination of two words: demos, 
which means people and kratos, which means rule36. Thus, democracy means the rule of 
a country by the people. 
The general claim of Greek democracy was that it gave equality to all in making 
decisions which affected all. Decision-making was in the hands of the people, who made 
their own laws, and debated decisions before voting on them. For example, it was the 
33 Held, D., Models of Democracy., Oxford, Polity Press, Second Edition, 2000, p. 3. 
34 Kedouri, E., Democracy and Arab Political Culture, London: Frank Cass, 1994. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Dahl,R, On Democracy, Yale University, 1998, p. 11. 
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right of a democratic citizen to take part in decisions on such issues as war and peace. 
However, the meaning of the word 'democracy' may be ambiguous and involves broad 
scope for debate37• It creates a dilemma in a number of aspects, such as the exact identity 
of the people and the nature of their rule. The word people should in theory, mean all the 
people, but in reality, there were many people in ancient Greece who were excluded, 
because they did not have full rights as citizens. These included women, slaves, and 
people who were not of Greek origin. Perhaps only around ten percent of the total 
population were given the opportunity to express their opinions, while the other ninety 
percent were ignored. These ten percent ruled, although in theory state and society were 
supposed to be one and there were no subjects as such38• 
A summary of democracy in Greece is provided by Held (2000). He points out that its 
citizens had direct participation in legislative and judicial functions. The assembly of its 
citizens had sovereign power, which included all the common affairs of the city. There 
were multiple methods of selection of candidates for public office: " directly, by 
election, not rational discussion". Ordinary citizens and public officials were not 
differentiated in terms of special privileges. With the exception of positions connected to 
war, the same office could not be held more than twice by the same individual, and 
terms of office were short. Finally, payment was received for public service39• 
37 Dunn, 1., Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993 p. 19. 
38 Held, D., Democracy and the Global Order, Cambridge, Polity press, 1995, P.6. 
39 Held, op. cit. 2000, p. 17. 
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From the study of Greece, it emerges that the aim of democracy is to foster three main 
values: justice, sharing of power and solving problems through dialogue, not violence. 
The establishment of peace allowed science and the arts to flourish, as is testified by the 
proliferation of new inventions. Sward argues that the phenomenon of democracy 
continues to be valid, as it is the basis for political equality, popular control, 
inclusiveness, freedom, constitutional rule and competition 40. In real life, there are 
imbalances in nature, in power struggles and in economic terms (the haves and the have-
nots). Democratic government should aim to treat citizens equally, and push forward 
important political issues such as self-determination. In Athens, the power of some clans 
or tribes was dissipated if the majority asked for change. Peasant peoples were given a 
voice, and the freedom to elect their candidates through competitive methods. This early 
form of democracy can be relevant to a country like Oman moving in a democratic 
direction. 
2.3.2 The West 
Between the collapse of Greek civilisation and the modem world, little or no attention 
was given to democracy as a political ideal. It did not playa major role in the Roman 
Empire, or in Europe, in the period of Christian rule that was dominated by monarchy, 
and a close relation between the Church and the State. Up until 1760, no significant 
regime in the world had a democratic system41 • 
40 Betham, D,.(eds.) Defining and Measuring Democracy, London, Sage Publications Ltd, 1994,. p.8. 
41 Goldblatt, D., Democracy in the Long Nineteenth Century; 1760 -1919, in Potter, Goldblatt, D., 
Kiloh, M., Lewis,P., Democratisation. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, P.46. 
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A new period of democracy began to occur with the development of the European 
economy, and its growing dominance around the globe. New wealthy classes emerged to 
rival traditional hierarchies42• 
In the case of Britain, after the political upheavals of the Eighteenth Century, the 
monarchy lost power, and Parliament became sovereign, but decisions were still the 
privilege of a wealthy elite. Only slowly was the electoral franchise extended. Not until 
1918 did all men over 21 have the vote, and not until 1929 was the vote extended to all 
women of the same age. Only from that time may Great Britain be said to have had 
universal liberal democracy 43. 
The French revolution began in 1789 with the slogan "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity". 
This revolution, which led to violence and terror, resulted from the monarchy being 
unable to cope with the requirements and expenses of modem government. The French 
established equality of social groups, bringing into existence a single popular nation44• 
The democratic element in the French revolution of the eighteenth century created great 
fear among the European monarchies, as did the revolution in America. In the latter, a 
constitution was established in 1789, thirteen years after independence had been 
declared from the rule of Great Britain. The focal point of the constitution was 
42 Bronner, S., Twentieth Century Political Theory: A Reader, London, Routledge, 1997, pp. 2-3. 
43 Ibid, pp. 50-51. 
44 Ibid, pp.51-52. 
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Democracy, but in the beginning, as in Britain, the franchise was limited45. The 
American civil war which lasted five years (1861- 65) led to the end of slavery in the 
South and "curtailed the development of an explicitly anti-democratic coalition of 
Northern and Southern elites46". The most difficult problem in the USA was integration 
of black African people in the political agenda. A triumph was achieved for the African 
American and minority groups of women through the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Voting Right Act of 1965. The latter Act meant that America had finally become a 
liberal democracy47. 
2.3.3 The Development of Democracy: 
Generally speaking, monarchies in different parts of the world were reluctant to 
relinquish any of their powers to the populace. But in the 19th and 20th centuries, social 
and economic changes resulted in a considerable amount of conflict, with the dominant 
social orders challenged by rival ideologies, such as Communism and Fascism. In the 
20th century in particular, democracy emerged as the most efficient and fair system of 
government, even though there are still debates about the nature of democracy, and even 
though there is no perfect democratic government in the world48. 
In general it can be said that the development of democracy in the 20th and 21 st centuries 
has paralleled the development of the modem state. Only from the 1970s did democratic 
regimes start to gain ground in the world, although even in 1975, around sixty eight 
45 Ibid, pp.48-50. 
46 Ibid, p. 50. 
47 Goldblatt, D., op.cit. 1997, pp. 48-50. 
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percent of countries remained authoritarian. This figure dropped to around twenty-six 
percent by the end of 199549• The remainder mostly have some features of democracy. 
The transformation spread from Southern Europe in the 70s, to South America and Asia 
in the 80s (with the sole exception of India which has been a democracy since 1950) 
then to Sub-Saharan Africa. Eastern Europe, including Russia was transformed in the 
late 80s and at the beginning of the 90s 50. 
It should be noted that the concept of democracy does not relate to a tribe or other small 
units. It is only associated with nation states51 , and issues of democracy concern the 
quality of government, the amount of freedom people should have in the state, and how 
much political participation should be allowed. 
Mostly, it is only in a democratic state that people can openly criticise the government. 
Every means is used, but the media are the most important. People use the media to 
express their ideas52, and find enough space to do so there. People in industrial and 
developed countries tend to have better opportunities to pursue their causes than in poor 
countries. The reason is that opposition groups can reach the media more easily and 
attack the ruling party. 
49 Potter, D., Framework for Analyses in Potter, D., Goloblatt, D., Kiloh, M., Lewis, P., 
Democratisation" Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, p.9. 
50 Ibid, p. 10. 
51 Anthony, M., The Transformation of Democracy, Cambridge, Polity press with the Open 
University, 1997, p.5. 
52 Budge, L., Introduction, in Budge and Mckay Ceds, Developing Democracy, Comparative 
Research, London, Sage, 1994, p.2. 
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States with Communist systems have claimed to be democratic, but for the most part, it 
is under a capitalist economy that democracy has become most developed. However, 
democracy is also about informal processes, and hence greater attention should be paid 
to the way democratising states allow freedom in the informal sector. 
The democratic system became an important feature after the First World War. In that 
time, the Ottoman Empire, Germany, and the Austri - Hungarian Empire collapsed. The 
American president Woodrow Wilson was keen to establish a safe democracy, not only 
in his state but also in the entire world. His country's view of democracy included the 
right of active participation, national self-determination and a parliamentary government 
with a constitution53• 
However, the reality was different. Most of the governments in the inter-war period were 
military or authoritarian. For example, Mussolini took power in Italy in 1922, Salazar in 
Portugal in 1929, King Alexander in Yugoslavia in 1929, Hitler in Germany in 1933 and 
Franco in Spain in 193954• Instead of stability being achieved, the world entered the 
Second World War. 
The consequences of the Second World War reorganised the map of the World. The 
world divided into two main systems, the Eastern bloc, led by the Soviet Union and 
Western countries (the United States of America, the Western European countries and 
53 Kegley, C., and Wittkopf, E., World Politics: Trend and Transformation, Thomson Wadsworth, 
United, USA, 2004, p. 198. 
54 Bessel, R, The Crisis of Modem Democracy, 1919- 45, in Potter, Goloblatt, D., Kiloh, M., Lewis,P., 
Democratisation, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997, p.71. 
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their allies). The Cold War was a difficult era because every other part of the world was 
subject to intervention, either by the Soviet Union or the United Sates of America. This 
led to tensions, because the independence of nations was compromised. A dramatic 
change occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s as a result of the revolution in Eastern and 
Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
The actual change started from the beginning of the 1980s with Poland and then 
Hungary shifting from communism towards a democratic regime55. The cornerstone of 
the change was Gorbachev's reform, coupled with the Tiananmen Square incident in 
China in 1989, which affected levels of trust in communist ideology. Finally, the 
unification of Germany was a great triumph for democracy. 
The end of the Cold War was a triumph for liberal democratic ideology with its 
universal suffrage and free market economy. 
"From Latin America to Eastern Europe, from the Soviet Union to the 
Middle East and Asia, strong governments have been falling over the last 
two decades. And they have not given way in all cases to stable liberal 
democracies. Liberal democracy remains the only coherent political 
aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe"56. 
Power is distributed in democracies, through formal institutions, such as elected bodies 
at local and national level and maybe also at the state or at regional level (as in Germany 
55 Held, D., op.cit., 2000, p.276. 
56 Giddies, A., op.cit.1994, pl06. 
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or the USA). Liberal democracy is associated with a pluralist system and is characterised 
by multiple political parties competing for votes in free and fair elections. Once elected, 
representatives are accountable to the electorate. Elected bodies can also, force public 
and private institutions - for example, in the military or in commerce - to account for 
their actions in public. Accountability is one way in which the public can maintain a 
bureaucracy free of corruption. 
A liberal democracy will usually protect the rights of private institutions that are part of 
civil society to be free from government interference. It will also guarantee its citizens 
the right of freedom of assembly, freedom of movement and freedom of speech within 
the law. 
Another feature of liberal democracy is its respect for minorities and human rights 
generally. Liberal democracies usually practise free market capitalism in their 
economies. This means that the greater proportion of wealth in society is owned by 
private individuals. The role of the state is to provide a stable currency, a legal system in 
which people can live in peace, and defence of the realm. It also means engaging in 
international diplomacy to promote and develop international trade57• 
Liberal Democracy involves two features: liberty which means a free market and the 
regulation of the state and democracy which means the rule of majority. These two may, 
on the face of it, be incompatible. But they are found to be co-existing in the capitalist 
57 Deegan, H., Third Worlds: The Politics of the Middle East and Africa, London, Routledge, 1996. 
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states. Capitalism requues state intervention to be kept to the mInImum, while 
democracy is supposed to protect all people. 
2.3.4 Democracy in the South58 
Democracy in the South became common as the Cold War came to an end, and military 
regimes, or other forms of dictatorship, were no longer supported by either the West or 
the East. 
Throughout the Cold War, states in the South had been vulnerable to the competition for 
influence between the USA and the USSR. It meant that repressive regimes were 
supported by the USA, for example in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, even 
though the USA as a democracy claimed to support democratic values. 
At the end of the Cold War, states with repressive regimes were no longer able to claim 
that dictatorship was necessary to prevent the spread of communism. Also, because 
many of these states were poor, it was believed that democracy would remove 
corruption in government, and would lead to economic liberalisation and the promotion 
of free markets and a private sector economy. People would be free to make their own 
decisions; they would not be dominated by government, but participate in its selection 
58 Since the end of the cold war the division of the world in to three worlds has been replaced by a split 
between North and South. The latter includes the continents of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
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and decision-making. A higher economic standard of living was the intention of the 
structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and the World Bank59• 
The end of the Cold War has seen an increase in democratically elected governments. In 
Africa, 25 out of 41 states have a government chosen by competitive elections6o, while 
governments have also been elected in Asia and Latin America. In mainland China, 
however, the democratic movement has failed to make any impact. 
But the transition to democracy has not been easy, and in some states, continuing 
economic and social problems have resulted in domestic unrest, as has been the case in 
the Sudan, Jordan, Venezuela and Tunisia. In other states where governments are 
elected, such as Egypt, the elections do not appear to be free and fair. The same party is 
always elected, and domestic unrest continues61 • In the case of Egypt, and other states in 
the South, the end of the Cold War and the transition to democracy has not had any 
effect on long standing disputes based on religious, regional, or class differences. These 
usually exist where people believe they have been excluded from the political process. 
Dictators who obtain the support of a minority claim that they have a democratic regime; 
they identify those people who support them and marginalise the others62• 
59 Robinson, M., Strengthening Civil Society in Africa: The role of Foreign Political Aid, IDS Bulletin, 
26, (2, April.,1995). 
60 Pinkney, R. op.cit. , 1993. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Doulas, L., Radical Democracy, Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1996, pp15-16. 
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The replacement of military authority by democratic rule could cause instability for a 
country. The country might experience violence. For example, in October 1998, most 
experts thought that President Abd-Urrahman Wahid would bring political and 
economic reform to Indonesia. But instead of that, the country sank into a political and 
economic crisis, causing the stock market to slump. Furthermore, religious and separatist 
problems have displaced a million people and killed thousands of the population, 
threatening the nation's fragile unity. Wahid was accused of two corruption scandals, 
and religious violence between Christians and Muslims erupted, as well as ethnic 
struggles with migrant communities63 • 
One of the dominant claims in the democratisation process is that the existence of 
democracy is more likely to prevent war from taking place. The democratic peace 
theory has argued that there are no serious examples of democracies waging war on each 
other. However, states in the South are still vulnerable to external intervention during 
the process of democratisation. Such intervention may be threatening in nature, perhaps 
in states which are the targets of religious or political opposition movements, whose 
intervention is designed to cause problems for what is seen as an illegitimate regime. 
Afghanistan in recent years has been a state in which external powers intervened for 
their own interests, causing chaos inside the country. The Taliban was supported by 
some countries, while the Hikmatyars were supported by others. But foreign intervention 
sometimes helps countries to achieve development, as in the cases of South Korea and 
Taiwan. American support for the survival of both in the face of potential communist 
63 BBC Analysis: Indonesia's problems, [29-5- 2001]. 
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take-over allowed both economic development and eventual democratisation. Without 
enough wealth Taiwan and South Korea would not have gone towards democracy. 
Through massive military and economic support they achieved stable development. As a 
result, a democratic system succeeded in these two countries through external 
intervention. 
Nearly all African countries share one feature: they were colonies, with the exception of 
Liberia. At one time or another Britain, Portugal, Belgium, Spain, Holland and Germany 
occupied and ruled over African countries. In order to share the land, these empires 
imposed boundaries on the continent which created cultural and linguistic difference 
within the new states when impendence came64. These new states also faced economic 
struggles, and did not have a good chance to develop as real democracies. Elites mostly 
controlled the state. For example, the previous president of Zaire was recognised as the 
wealthiest president in the world, but most of the population were desperately poor65. 
Wiseman, providing statistics about the situation in some African countries, reported in 
the year 1997 that in a number of African countries the GNP per person was less than 
$100. In Mozambique and Angola, infant mortality was around thirty percent. Also, in 
Central Africa, only 10% of the population had access to clean water. In addition, 
females have fewer privileges than males in African countries. Furthermore, those 
countries which are rich in natural resources, such as Sierra Leone, have bad 
administration, and those which lack natural resources, such as Lesotho, see their 
64 Wiseman, J., The Rise and Fall of Democracy in Sub- Saharan Africa, in Potter, Goloblatt, D., Kiloh, 
M., Lewis,P., Democratisation, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997, pp.273-274. 
65 Ibid, p. 274 
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indigenous labours emigrate to other states.66 In addition to cultural and economic 
problems, African countries have ideological and class problems. They have been 
vulnerable to interference by both Marxists and capitalists. The rulers of these countries 
face competition from outside, which may lead to weakness. Greed often takes priority 
over the country's interests. Political order or development become secondary67. 
Globalisation tends to maintain elites in power in the South, owing to their privileged 
position in both politics and the economy. The result is that elections may be used to 
reinforce their status, rather than create a genuine democracy reflecting the interests of 
the people as a whole. Kenya is an example of a state where elections are held but its 
record of fulfilling the wishes of the people is not good68. Indonesia during the Suharto 
period was another example. It may be the case that apparent democratisation in the 
South is 'rewarded' by the North in the form of foreign aid or investment opportunities. 
Some countries in the South often suffered from border disputes after independence. 
This was a good excuse for the rulers to empower the military and delay the practice of 
real democracy. For example, after independence in the 19th century, most countries in 
Latin America were taken up with border disputes69• Although in the 1970s South 
American countries celebrated one hundred years of independence. Up to that time, with 
the exceptions of Costa Rica and Venezuela, all of them were under military regimes. 
66 Ibid, p.275. 
67 Ibid, pp.275-276. 
68 Chabal. P., "A Few Considerations on Democracy", International Affairs, 74 (2) April, 1998, pp. 289-303. 
69 Potter, op .cit. pp.174 -194. 
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The change to democracy started in the late 1970s and by the 1990s, democratic systems 
had become the norm in these countries 70. 
Asian countries grasped independence only after the Second World War, and their 
experience was totally different from South America's. These countries had differing 
types of culture, religions and languages. Also, some Asian countries were communist, 
and this situation delayed the chance to practise democracy. Those practising real 
democracy were few, for example India, Japan, and South Korea. 
India is recognised as the largest democratic country in the world. It was one of the 
earliest countries in the South to adopt the system. After independence from Great 
Britain in 1947, India announced itself in 1950 to be a sovereign democratic republic. 
The most important element of democracy in India is that it has a free press and basic 
citizen's rights. These are written in the constitution and protected by the courts7l . 
However, India is criticised for not having social equality. For example, there are a few 
people who are very rich, while the majority are poor. Furthermore, only a minority is 
educated, and its corruption is infamous. On the other hand, real reform can be found in 
the style of life in India, which means the future of this country might progress. For 
example, since the 1990s, the country has begun privatisation projects. This step was 
important for the government. Nowadays average development in India is over 6% per 
year. Furthermore, the green revolution in Punjab province has brought wealth for this 
70 Cammack, Po, Democracy and Dictatorship in Latin America, 1930- 80 in Potter, Goldblatt, Do, Kiloh, 
Mo, Lewis, Po, Democratisation Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997, pp.152-173o 
71 Rundall, Vo, Why Have the Political trajectories of India and China Been Different? in Potter, 
Goloblatt, D., Kiloh, M., Lewis, Po, Democratisation., Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, pp.195-216o 
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region. Regional groups are now less demanding of independence. The BJP (Bharatiya 
Janata Party) cannot win a majority of votes. It needs an alliance with other parties. 
People in the South, for example, do not vote for this party. This means the BJP must 
listen to other voices. Indians have emphasised the enhancement of the political sphere 
other than the economic situation. An accountable and honest government is a 
precondition for greater prosperity and social equality. Democratic participation in India 
is relatively high. More than 60% of the Indian population participate in elections. In 
comparison, less than fifty percent of the population of the UK who had the right to vote 
participated in the last general election 72 • 
2.4 Democratisation 
For Potter, democratisation "refers to political changes movmg m a democratic 
direction,,73. There are countries which have experienced fast movement and others 
which are slow. Movement inside one country is variable across a number of aspects, 
such as from low accountability to high, from low competitiveness in elections to high, 
and from low protection of civil and political rights to high protection of civil and 
political rights 74. Any movement, because of a complexity of factors, is bound to involve 
risks. There are, therefore, opposing views regarding the wisdom of moving quickly. 
There are those who are worried about countries which have started to move quickly 
towards democracy. They believe that difficult times will be faced in the future. The 
experience of some countries, such as the former Soviet Union, African countries and 
72 John F. "Hindu Nationalist Party Expected to Make big Gain in India Election", New York Times, 
http://www.mtholyoke.edulacadlintrellbjp.htm [6-12-2003]. 
73 Potter., op.cit. 1997, p3. 
74 Ibid, pp. 3-10. 
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some countries in the Middle East, demonstrate that the democratic process is difficult to 
achieve75• Other writers and politicians insist that all systems in the world should switch 
rapidly to democracy, believing that it will solve all problems and bring peace to the 
entire world. As regards the type of change, there are various options and outcomes, 
liberal democracy, partial democracy, or a more controlled type of regime. These 
outcomes might be dependent on either the will of the voting population or on the 
strength of the incumbent government. Whatever the case, the examples given above 
may be characterised as follows. Liberal democracy involves accountability, free and 
fair competition, civil and political rights and association autonomy76. Examples of 
liberal democratic countries are Western European countries and the United States of 
America. A partial democracy might involve limited accountability of government to its 
citizens through elections, unfree and unfair competitive elections, rights to freedom of 
expression curtailed and associational autonomy (ie: civil society) more or less 
compromised77• Israel, for example, expelled some of the Palestinian population and 
bans them from establishing their own country, and India has had its problems with 
Punjab, Assam and Kashmir. 
There are extreme cases of authoritarian governments who claim to be democracies, but 
are not accountable through elections, who allow no competition in elections, who place 
restrictions on individuals' civil and political rights, and where autonomous associations 
75 Burnell and Calvert, op.cit. 1999. 
76 Potter, op.cit. 1997, pp. 3-10. 
77 Ibid, pp. 4-5. 
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and organisations critical of the state are virtually non-existent, Salvador, North Korea, 
Cuba, China and Iraq during the previous regime are examples 78 . 
Historically, the demand for democracy came as a result of bourgeois revolutions, for 
example in France, Britain and in the United States. The process often starts with 
revolution or a conflict between the ruling group and those who ask for change. So a 
country might enter into a civil war or a major confrontation might occur with the head 
of state, forcing him or her to step down and give way to a democratic regime. This is 
what happened in Serbia in the year 2000. 
The revolutions that have taken place world over may be of many types and forms: 
bourgeois democratic (France in 1789), or an authoritarian type of bourgeois revolution, 
(e.g, Germany in the late 1870s under Bismarck and Japan in the nineteenth century), or 
a peasant revolution from below (e.g., China in 1949)79. As in the latter case, not all 
revolutions lead to democracy. The aim of revolution is to change the distribution of 
power, possibly in a democratic direction. 
Since 1998, the world has witnessed remarkable developments in democratic processes. 
For example, constitutions have changed to enhance existing democratic systems and 
reforms have taken place in the judiciaries, in civil liberties, in development in the 
media, with the introduction of referenda and multiple parties, with more competitive 
78 Ibid, p. 7. 
79 Goldblatt, D., op. cit. 1997, P.19. 
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elections, debates in parliament, and with politicians subject to greater accountability8o. 
This means that democratisation as a process is expanding and developing for the better 
in some countries, and especially in the West. 
2.5 Democracy and its Critics 
Democracy has not been without its critics. The argument that people should be allowed 
to take part in decision making has not been popular among many armed forces in 
developing states, while in emergencies or crises, it is rare for a President or a Prime 
Minister to delay making a decision in order to consult the people. Also, even in the 
mature democracies of Western Europe, the theory and practice of democracy is always 
being discussed, to see how it can adapt to the social and economic changes that are 
always taking place8l . 
Democracy can be criticised as suffering from the following weaknesses. To begin with, 
democracy is an unsettled process, in the sense that it is always subject to change. 
Moreover, even in Western democracies, there is a debate on how democracy can cope 
with change82. Secondly, there are varieties of democracy in the world. In some states 
the head of state is an elected president, while in other democracies, the head of state 
may be an unelected monarch without power, which is in the hands of an elected prime 
minister. 
80 Kedouri, E., op.cit, 1994. 
81 Hirst, P., and Khilnani, S, Reinventing Democracy, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996, p.l. 
82 Ibid p.1. 
56 
Thirdly, the aim of democracy is to achieve stability through justice, but democratic 
countries rely on the capitalist system, with the result that there are individuals in some 
countries who own millions, while other individuals are homeless. This might create 
instability. It also indicates the failure of democracy to provide social justice, as the elite 
fights to maintain power against the lesser classes. In most countries, stability comes 
from a sound economy, whether democratic or not83 • For example, on the one hand the 
UAB is ruled by an unelected leadership but it practises economic stability. On the other 
hand, Nigeria has an elected government but it faces instability. In Western countries 
social programmes have been developed to enhance the life of have-nots. For example, 
there have been social programmes for more than 100 years in the UK. This means such 
programmes come together with democracy. They increase the beneficiaries of the 
system and mean that the democratisation process is being undertaken to benefit the 
whole population and not just an elite84• 
Unless issues of inequality are addressed, states in the South can experience many 
problems as they try to create a democracy. It is not always clear if becoming a 
democracy will solve problems, such as conflicts among ethnic and/or religious groups, 
or economic problems such as high unemployment. Finally, writers such as Rosenau 
argue that people are only free at the time when they choose their representatives85 . 
83 Shapiro, I. and Hacker- Cordon, C. Democracy's Value, Cambridge: University Press, 1999, p,l. 
84 Discussion with Grove, E,. the Supervisor, [21- 5- 2003]. 
85 cited in Bentam, op.cit.l995. 
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A comparison of the processes of democratisation in the developed world and the South 
is a useful analytical tool. Democratisation in the North coincided with social and 
economic change, whereas in the South, democratisation has succeeded years of 
authoritarian rule. In the North, democracy is based on a consensus of interests that 
people support. The fonnal institutions of democracy in the North have changed and 
developed to meet people's expectations. However, in the South, democracy has arrived 
in states where there are diverse interests. These may be regional, ethnic or tribal, each 
with a particular political representation. Dissatisfaction is a feature when no political 
party is large enough to fonn a government. The end result, as Kohli (1993) writes, is 
that too much democracy too soon can produce instability and a return to authoritarian 
rule. Algeria is an example. 
A further problem of fonnal democracy is that democratisation in the South often 
produces elections which give political power to an elite who practise authoritarian rule. 
This stands in contrast to Qader's (1993) belief, that genuine democratisation entails a 
shift in the basis of state power, from a dominant elite who have an interest in the 
preservation of the state, to popular forces for whom the national state must serve both 
as a focus for their own identities, and as a source of basic material needs. 
Democratisation may represent a crisis of the state86• Other critics of democratisation in 
the South have argued that fonnal institutions such as political parties and parliaments 
86 Qadir, S et ai, "Sustainable Democracy: Formalism vs Substance", Third World Quarterly, 14 
(3).1993,415- 438. 
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are tools used by elite to keep the public 'quiescent and out of the decision-making 
process' 87. 
The arguments that consider informal democratic processes say that democratisation in 
the South will not succeed if it does not focus on issues such as human rights and the 
distribution of wealth88• In other words, this approach to democratisation involves the 
progressive redistribution of assets, and equal access to services such as education. The 
opportunity to cast a vote in regular general elections does not transform the lives of 
people unless it is accompanied by such a redistribution of resources. The problem with 
this approach is that it assumes that either elements of formal democracy - for example 
individual politicians or parties - may campaign on these issues, or such demands will 
come from the people themselves. The reality is that in many states in the South there 
are problems of poor economic resources, poor education and transport facilities. By 
themselves, people are too weak and disorganised to force change in these areas. 
However, external actors such as non-governmental organisations may try to persuade 
new democracies to take up human rights issues and the re-distribution of wealth 89. 
Democracy is a western concept exported to Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern 
Europe. Democracy represents the best of Western culture, customs and tradition. This 
creates struggles within those non Western countries which adopt a democratic system. 
87 Gills, B. and Rocamora, J., "Low intensity democracy", Third World Quarterly, 13 (3), 1992, pp. 501-523. 
88 Ibid. pp. 501-523. 
89 Ayoob, M., 'Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective', in Keith Krause and Michael, 
Critical Security Studies; Concept and Cases, UK, VeL Press, 1997, pp.121-146. 
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Problems appear in various areas, such as economy, culture, ideology, ethnicity, politics, 
social activities, the legitimacy of governments and sophisticated institutions. 
2.6 The British Experience 
A study of the British Parliament may shed light on the strengths and the weaknesses in 
Omani democratic development. Over several centuries, an authoritarian and hereditary 
system developed into one that is widely regarded as one of the most mature 
democracies in the world. 
At the beginning, in 1254, there was only the House of Lords in England. Since then, the 
House of Commons has established itself and indeed become dominant. While 
Parliament used to respond to the demands of the king, the Prime Minister now has the 
key role in Parliament9o• Until the Seventeenth Century the monarchy was the dominant 
executive power and Parliament was under its grip, its role being to advise the monarch 
and provide it with resources. In England after 1603, King James and King Charles tried 
to rule without Parliament, which eventually led to civil war. The forces of Parliament 
executed the monarch, but just over ten years later the monarchy was restored. In 1688-
89, in the Glorious Revolution (a peaceful revolution), the independent power of the 
monarchy was permantly curbed, paving the way for the rise of constitutional monarchy 
and eventually democracy in England91 • Voting for Parliament was far from universal. 
The voting franchise varied from place to place. In the beginning of the 19th century, the 
franchise was standardised, although still related to control of a significant amount of 
property. In 1867, the number of people eligible to vote was increased and in 1884, 
90 Norton, P., Does Parliament Matter? New York, HarvesterWheatsheaf, 1993, p.l3. 
91 Ibid. p.16. 
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every male householder was given the right to vote, but the number remained quite 
limited92• 
The prime minister is not fonnally elected. The people elect his party and his party 
chooses him. The royal prerogative powers such as the decision to go to war are 
exercised by the government without necessarily consulting Parliament (although this is 
becoming more customary). If a party has a majority in the House of Commons, then it 
can notionally exercise absolute power (although constitutional custom, in effect, limits it). 
2.6.1 The Role of the Head of the State 
The monarch was originally the head of both the state and the government. Now, the 
Prime Minister leads the government, as head of the majority party. The prime minister 
is not directly elected by the people but is defined by being able to count on a majority 
in the House of Commons to carry on the government's business. The largest opposing 
party is officially recognised as the 'loyal opposition'. 
2.6.2 The Role of the Ministers 
Formally, ministers act under the crown but they do not need the permission of the 
monarch on issues such as declaring war; it is the prime minister and cabinet who makes 
such declarations. For example, the prime minister ordered the task force to re take the 
Falkland Islands from Argentina in 1992. The Gulf War of 1991, was also launched on 
a decision from the cabinet. Thus, it was the people's representatives who decided, not 
the monarch. 
92 Ibid. p 17. 
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Ministers are members of Parliament The senior ministers form the cabinet, which is 
collectively responsible for major decisions. Although the cabinet is composed of the 
queen's ministers, she has no role in their chose or actions .The queen only enters the 
Parliament once a year, when she delivers a speech written by the government. She 
meets ministers when they are appointed and leave. She also holds weekly meeting with 
the Prime Minister in which he briefs her about what is happening. She can advise and 
warn, but no more, and there is no compulsion to take the advice or warning. 
2.6.3 The Role of the Parliament (the House of Lords and the House of Commons): 
The House of Commons consists of 659 elected members representing various districts 
around the country. Those support or oppose the government's business, take part in 
debates, ask questions of ministers, and sometimes sponsor their own private member's 
legislation. 
In the past, members of the House of Lords inherited the position from their fathers. 
From 1958, members could be created through what are called life peerages. In 1998 
there were 700 members. People are appointed on the basis of experience, for example 
leading academics. Some of them have a party affiliation. They are appointed in 
recognition of their achievement93 • The House of Lords is in transition. Hereditary, peers 
are disappearing. There is debate between supporters of an all- nominated house and one 
with some election. This raises constitutional issues as the House of Commons is 
superior, because it is elected. In 1911 the House of Lords lost its right to vero 
legislation and now it can delay decisions for a maximum of one year. 
93 Norton, lecturer at Hull University and Lords in House of Lords Interview [1-8-2002]. 
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It can be said that the British system used to be monarchical, autocratic and 
authoritarian, but it has evolved into a democratic system. The power of the monarch 
and aristocrats has been reduced. Britain thus represents a good case study as a country 
which inherited a non democratic system and evolved into a system in which everyone 
has one vote and both the monarch and aristocrats have lost their power. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Democracy and democratisation emerged at the end of the 20th century as the dominant 
forces in the world. The end of the Cold War was seen as the end of communism as a 
theory and in practice, leaving only liberal democracy as the future for the world. But 
the fact is that the democratisation in the South has not followed naturally, even when 
dictators or military governments lost the support of either the USSR or the USA. And, 
although the USA and Europe have sometimes tried to link economic aid to 
democratisation, the real experience of democracy has been mixed. 
In general there has been a development of the concept of democracy, in different parts 
of the world in terms of theoretical and practical aspects. Every country has different 
experiences. Furthermore, sometimes there is an internal demand for democracy, as 
happened in most European countries; sometimes there was an external interference, as 
happened in Japan and a number of Eastern European and Asian countries, or combined 
internal and external pressure as in South Africa. But the more stable movement derives 
from internal demands. 
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The survival of democracy in both developed and developing countries depends on 
issues such as economic and political circumstances. Rapid democratisation might create 
a struggle in the developing countries. In EUrope, where the countries are already 
established their constitutions are mature and wealth and development are achieved, 
democracy moves into a comfort zone. However, in the South, which endures ethnic 
conflict, international interference and economic problems while states are still being 
built, rapid democracy makes for more violence and instability. Therefore, from 
previous experience, dictators have a greater chance of success in the South. Democracy 
may bring sacrifices and new problems. Instead of political triumph, economic disaster 
might ensue. Debates amongst people with different interests might not reach a solution. 
The important values of democracy are not grasped. 
Despite the fact that there is no unique type of democracy, the experience of states in 
different parts of the world shows that democracy is an evolving process. At the level of 
formal democracy, there has been a growth in political parties, and elections have taken 
place across Africa and Asia. But informal democratic institutions are often weak, and 
many states in the South continue to face problems of the division between rich and poor 
and religious or ethnic or tribal differences. 
The Middle East is one region that has not experienced widespread democracy, but some 
states have begun to democratise, either along lines familiar from the European tradition, 
or in their own way, as is the case in Oman. The Middle East is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SULTANATE OF OMAN 
"We regard ourselves as Members of the Third W orId, proud of our 
membership of our Arab brotherhood of Nations". 94 
3.1 Introduction 
The political changes that have taken place in Oman since the late 1960s and the early 
1970s should be understood in the appropriate context of the Middle East, of which 
Oman is a part, to which it has responded historically, and with which it interacts 
immediately. The constitutional changes in Oman came late and the country was already 
undergoing the impact of political change in the shape of various rebellions and 
secessionist movements. Thus, Oman could not remain immune to the forces of Arab 
nationalism and socialism, of which the Dhofar rebellion in the late 1960s was a part. 
The winds of change in the neighbouring states in the Middle East could not be resisted 
by the state in Oman. 
This chapter thus has three-fold objectives. First, it provides a broad outline of the social 
and cultural context of the Middle East, and the location of Oman within that context. 
94 Qaboos, S., The Royal Speeches of H. M. Sultan Qaboos ibn Said 1970 - 1995, MinistIy of 
InfOJmation, Oman Newspaper House, 1995, pp.84-85. 
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Second, it discusses the political changes, both revolutionary and regime stabilising, that 
the Middle East, as a whole, has undergone recently. Third it introduces, in broad 
outline, the political regimes in the region. This chapter is based on the assumption that 
the various political changes introduced in the region were actually the survival 
strategies of the rulers in the face of various dislocating challenges in the region and the 
world. 
3.2 Social and Cultural Context 
The Middle East is composed of mostly the Arab states, plus Turkey, Iran and Israel. 
Although there are a number of similarities in the Middle East, inside this area there are 
also contradictions, which make the experience of this area unique. In the following 
section there will be an overview of the main similarities and dissimilarities in the 
Middle East, such as history, language, religion, tribal structure and other fundamental 
facts. 
3.2.1 ffistory 
During the 20th century and into the 21 st, the Middle East has remained unstable95 . The 
first generation of the last century fought for independence from various Empires to 
establish one Arab State in the Middle East. At the beginning many Arabs supported 
Britain against Turkey (The Ottoman Empire 1552-1918) in order to end its occupation, 
95 Bulqazeez, A., fy Alnahdah alarabiah awamil Awkhfaq alhkargiah waldakhliah, (The Arabic 
resonance; the tools which led to the failure of internal and external issues), in Shoon Arabiah, the Arab 
League press, December 2000, No 104 pp. 28-47. 
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but then they themselves were placed under new empires. Britain and France shared the 
After the departure of colonial rule, this area faced bilateral disputes over borders, for 
example, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and the UAB and Iran97. Furthermore, the Arab-
Israeli conflict affected the stability in the Middle East. During the Cold War years the 
division between the two blocs led the area to further division. Other destabilising 
factors have been the Iran-Iraq rivalry and Iraqi ambitions against Kuwait, as well as the 
internal problems inside states such as Bahrain and Sudan, the civil war in Lebanon, the 
events of 11 th September, 2001 and the war on Iraq98. 
3.2.2 Arabic language 
The essential feature which links the inhabitants of the Middle East is the Arabic 
language. There are twenty two Arabic speaking countries. All of the Arab states are 
members of the Arab league. With the exception of Somalia and Djibouti, all Arabic 
people communicate in Arabic. 
In addition to language, religion, and a common way of thinking unite the Arabs. 
Certainly, not every Arab is Muslim, but the Arab region is the centre of the Islamic 
world99. An Arab citizen from Morocco and an Arab citizen from Oman can learn the 
96 Polk, W., op.cit. 1991. 
97 Sick, C., and Lawrence, The Persian Gulf At The Millennium Essay in Politics, Economy, 
Security, Religion, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1997, pp.231-248. 
98 Polk, W., op.cit. 1991. 
99 Field, M, op.cit, 1994, p.8. 
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same lessons in the same institution or watch the same Arabic historical programme on 
TV. Both of them might say to themselves, "Ah, that invention, those buildings, that 
victory, that civilisation, were the works of my ancestors"lOO. 
3.2.3 Islam 
Islam represents the identity of the people in the Middle East. The majority of the people 
in the Middle East are Muslim, but there are some minorities, such as Christians, Jews, 
and even HinduslOl . Islam is used by the politicians as a strong means to achieve their 
interests. Among Muslim society there are three main sects. These are Sunni, Shias and 
Khwarage. The division between them dates back to the beginning of the Islamic State. 
Ali was the central figure at the origin of the Shia-Sunni split, which occurred in the 
decades immediately following the death of the Prophet. 
In Chapter 4 of the thesis, we will discuss the birth of the Ibadhi sect, which belongs to 
the Khwarage. This sect has had strong influence in Oman and some areas in North 
Africa such as Tunisia and Algeria. In Oman, the sect has defmed Omani society and 
policy since the seventh century. In contrast, the Sunnis and the Shias are influential in 
other parts of the Middle East. The major crisis for the Islamic faith occurred after the 
death of Ali. While the Sunni considered that Ali was the fourth Khalifah in the Islamic 
world, following on from Abu Bakr (632-634), Umar (634-644) and Othman (644-656), 
the Shias believed that Ali was the only true successor of Prophet Mohammed102. 
100 ibid, op.cit, p.8 
101 Hindus can be found in the Gulf States as Oman and Bahrain for example. 
102 Amin, H., The Origins ofthe SunniiShia split in Islam, http://www.islamfortoday.comlshia.htm. 
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Historically, Ali succeeded Othman who was murdered. However, he was opposed by a 
number of Muslims such as Aisha, the wife of the Prophet and daughter of Abu Bakr. 
They asked him to punish those who killed Othman. The main enemy was Mu'awiya, the 
governor of Damascus and cousin of Othman. A civil war ensued, which ended with the 
assassination of Ali and Mu 'awiya' s self proclamation of himself as the Khalifah 103. The 
differences between the Shias and Sunni started from that time. 
From 750 until 1258, the Shias were privileged in the Islamic world because they 
received governmental support from the Abbasid family, until the time that Baghdad 
was defeated by the Mongols in 1258. When the Turks (Ottomans) came to power, they 
fought the Shias to reduce their influence104• 
In recent times, a Shia dominated state exists only in Iran. The other parts of the Islamic 
world are represented by Sunni governments, and Shias are marginalised. However, 
there are some countries in the Middle East, such as Lebanon, Oman and Kuwait, where 
Shias are well integrated into society through representative systems. 
During the period of Saddam Hussein, both Shias and Suuni in Iraq faced repression 
from the government because of their beliefs. The situation there currently is vague. The 
relations between the two sects will depend on the new government. Gulf States with 
minority Shia populations were apprehensive of the spread of the Islamic Revolution 
from Iran. It should be noted that before the Iranian Revolution, there was little 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
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discrimination against Shias in the Gulf. Indeed, Bahrain has recently introduced 
positive measures safeguarding the interests of Shias, despite being a Sunni majority 
state. A fundamental problem, however, is that Shias do not respect Sunni governments. 
They believe that the Imam, who is destined to arrive, should rule the Islamic world 105. 
Nevertheless, Shias generally have supported Arab governments since the Second World 
War. For example, Hisb-Allah fights Israel in South Lebanon, and most Shias in Kuwait 
refused to support Iran in the first Gulf War. 
Generally speaking, the cause of the differences between Muslims did not arrive from 
the interpretation of Islamic legislation; it was from disputes over Sahabah - those who 
met Prophet Mohammed then started to run the Islamic states- and the views of famous 
scholars such as Alshafi, Abuhanifah and Malik. The problem is that Muslims believe 
these people are laws in themselves, and none of the groups want to negotiate about their 
ideas. Anyone will criticise any idea that comes from the sect he regards as hostile106• 
Unlike other sects, the good point in the Ibhadi is that people are considered as tools to 
convey truth and knowledge. In the Ibadhi sect one mostly meets respect for sahabah 
and scholars, but there is wide criticism of their ideas 107. 
In the current circumstances, the US is poised against the Iranian state, the only Shia 
state in the world. Hence, by default, Sunnis in the Middle East are favoured by the US 
105 Abu-Murshed, W., Bumamag Al-Hiah Al-Arabiah (Arab life program), Aljazeera.net [11-2-2002]. 
106 Al-Nahi, H Conflicts Between sects and its Effect on the Prosperity of the Arabic and Islamic 
civilisation" The crisis over Islamic sects" Conference Amman, 11-14-2-1998. 
107 Al-Harthy, S., scholar oflbadhi history, Interview [30-5-2003]. 
70 
vis-a.-vis Shias. This creates problems for the Shia sect, putting them under further 
pressure. The American policy is not a result of any particular aversion toward the Shia 
community, but because of their enmity against the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which is 
supported by the Shias. 
The difference between the Shias and the Sunnis is a continued source of tension in the 
states of the Middle East. These tensions might be a cause of future conflict and are a 
threat to the regional peace and stability. However, democracy sustains and nurtures 
itself from discussion, debate and differing opinions. On a positive note, the experience 
of these differences might lead to an enhanced understanding of diverse points of view 
and might go on to strengthen the democratic institutions and processes in the Middle 
East. 
Whereas internal difference dominated Islamic history in the middle ages, the modem 
age led to a redefmition of Islam vis-a.-vis others, especially the west. During the 20th 
century, most of the Middle East was under external influence, especially French and 
British. The opposition to colonial rule was framed under the ideology of nationalism 
and not under the ideology of Islam. 
Hence, the renewed emphasis on Islamic ideology in the second half of the 20th century 
could be placed in a broader context of decolonisation, identity crisis, and demands for 
social and political changes. This overemphasis on Islamic ideology might tum out to be 
a midwife for modernity in the Middle East. In the long term, we might be able to 
evaluate the benign effects and rather the inevitability of Islamisation in 20th century in 
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the Middle East. Much, however, depends on the ability of the elites to recognise this 
fact, and to make sincere efforts at reconciling modernity with the region's balance of 
social, cultural, political and economic features. 
3.2.4 Islam and Democracy 
Some argue that Islam and democracy cannot work with each other108• Holders of this 
view argue that even if Muslims participate in elections, their aim is to gain power and 
then use it in an authoritarian way109. Some describe Islam as 'a new enemy of the 
West' after the collapse of the Soviet UnionllO• Moreover, some argue that political 
Islam is an attack on modem society and an attempt to return to what is traditional111 . 
However, it can be understood from the Quran, that Islam is in favour of peace and 
consultation, and that it encourages the people to hold their governments to account112. 
Al-Shura in Islam means consultation with other people to obtain their opinion. It can 
include every aspect of life, such as social issues, business, work, politics, government 
and even defence 113 . 
Critics of Islamic politics usually say that it is not democratic, but it can be argued that 
in the Islamic system of belief, there are elements of democracy. The Quran recognises 
108 Huntington, S "The Clash of Civilisations" Foreign Affairs, 1993 
109 Salame, G, "Islam and the West", Foreign Policy, Vol. 90, p22-27. (1993). 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Holy Quran, verse Ash-Shura No38 
113 AI-Ansari, A, op.cit, p.49 
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Muslims as one community, and reqmres them to have a consultation processes 
"Whatever you are given (here) is (but) a convenience of his life: but that which is 
with God is better and more lasting: (it is) for those who believe and put their trust 
in their Lord; (36). Those who avoid the greater crimes and shameful deeds, and 
when they are angry even then forgive (37). Those who hearken to their Lord, and 
establish regular prayer; who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation who 
spent out of what we bestow on them for sustenance(38)1l5 
This consultation process can cover a wide range of issues and not just political ones. 
The Quran says on another occasion 
" It is part of the mercy of God that thou deal gently with them. Wert thou severe 
or harsh - hearted, they would have broken away from about thee: so pass over 
(their faults), and ask for (God's) forgiveness for them, and consult them in affairs 
(of moment). Then, when thou hast taken a decision put thu trust in God. For God 
loves those who put their trust (in Him)116 
These verses stress that the leader should consult his citizens and not taking personal 
decision. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Cited from Al-Rawahy, A.,The Concept of Al-Shura in Oman, The Journey Continues, paper 
provided to the Anglo - Omani Society, London, 27- 4- 1995 . p2 Ayat 36 -38 Surat Al-Shura. 
116 Ibid. Ayat 159 Surat AI-Imran. 
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The confusion that surrounds this debate is due to the ignorance of people in the West 
regarding Islamic principles. The media do not always present the truth about the beliefs 
and practices of Islam, but look at politics in an Islamic state and draw their conclusions 
from that. Islam has developed into a civilisation that has, within it, some variations. So 
it is not possible to look at how Islam is practised in one country, for example, Egypt 
and then say this is true of all Islam. This is an important point because the Ibadhi 
Muslims of Oman, since the 2nd century after the Higirah (the Prophet Muhammad's 
move from Mecca to Medina: ie eighth Century AD), have a view of Shura, which has 
enabled the country to develop formal democratic institutions. Islam and democracy are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather, a way can be found to reconcile Islamic 
principles and politics in a modem state. 
When Prophet Mohammed took power in Medina in 622, he announced the 
establishment of an Islamic constitution. This provided protection to the individuals and 
communities and set out rules for relations with other groups. The protection of freedom 
and rights were the core principles. Then he built the fIrst mosque. The Prophet 
consulted the local people on several issues such as the economy, social activities and 
politics. People had the right of freedom of speech. 
Ali, the fourth khalifah in Islam, asked Prophet Mohammed what Muslims should do if 
they faced a problem and there was no discussion about it in the holy Quran or from the 
prophet. The Prophet answered that people should gather and consult among themselves. 
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He added there should be a unanimous opinion. 117 One witness, Sahaby said, 'I have not 
seen anyone consult with his people as Prophet Mohammed did' The Prophet said on 
another occasion that the concept of Al-Shura (consultation) was a mercy to the 
peoplellS . 
The Majlis (common room) of the Prophet included poor people who used to be slaves, 
plus the elites, without any discrimination. When the Muslims refused to delay the 
pilgrimage to Mecca until a better time. The Prophet felt that the Muslims could not face 
the power of the people in Mecca. His wife Urn Salamah told him to start the practical 
steps to end the pilgrimage, then the Muslims would follow him. When he did that, all 
the Muslims imitated him. This example, gives a clue that consultation in Islam includes 
women. In times of war, the prophet consulted his soldiers about the best way to achieve 
victory against the enemy. The battles of Badr, Ahud, Al-Khandaq, Hudibiah, Al-Taif 
and the treatment of the prisoners of H wazen, 119 were all decided by consultation in this 
way. 
The next four Khalifahs who took power in the Islamic state came through election. This 
point was discussed in chapter six of the thesis. In his first speech, Abu-Baker said, 'If I 
run the community well, please give me your support. Otherwise, you have the right to 
abandon me'. In this point he mentioned the importance of consultation, and admitted 
117 Radwan, A., p20-21, see also AI-Ansary, A., AI-Shura in its effects on Democracy Critical Study, 
Beirut, 1980, p. 65. 
118 AI-Rawahy, op.cit, p2. 
119 AI-Ansari, op.cit pp.71-75. 
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that people should choose the leader and depose him 120. Omar also consulted the people 
on various matters. For example, he met the people in the mosque and delivered regular 
speeches. Then he received the comments of the people. He established a consultative 
Council which included mature people and then he established another Council for 
discussing the daily progress with his govemorsl21. The problem started when Mu'awiya 
came to the power. He changed the system of the rule to inheritance instead of election 
(biah). He announced that his son Yazeed would be his successor. Most people in the 
Islamic world rejected this step. However, the Khalifah used his power to thwart any 
attempt to replace him 122. Some argue that this step created corruption, abuse of human 
rights, use of force, discrimination and the appropriation of the nations by the ruling 
familyl23. The main demand of the opponents during the Amu'awiy period was to return 
back to the system of AI-Shura. In their period, consultation was confined to the arts, 
knowledge and general sociologyl24. During that time, the revolution of the Ibadhi 
people started in secret in Basra and this paved the way for the announcement of the 
elected Ibadhi state in Oman. (See chapter 6). 
From the verses of the Holy Quran, the practice of Prophet Mohammed and the other 
main figures in Islam, such as Abu-Baker, Omar, Othman and Ali, is possible to the 
aims of Al-Shura in Islam. Firstly, it helps the leaders and the people to arrive at the best 
view. When people enter debates, the leader will be able to take the best opinion. This 
120 AI-Ansari, A. op.cit. p.79. 
121 Ibid pp.88- 95. 
122 Atwan, H., Al-Shura in Amoy period, Mountain press, 1990 pp.51-56. 
123 Ibid pp.83-89. 
124 AI-Ansary, A., Al-Shura and its effect on Democracy, Critical study, Buirut, p.67. 
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will reduce the risk of mistakes. Secondly, it protects the rights of the people. Through 
consultation, people will be able to express their opinion in speeches and open debates, 
no matter who originated the idea. The important point was who would be able to 
provide the most useful suggestion. Thirdly, it brings the people together, to work as one 
group. Through dialogue and the exchange of opinion, people will feel they are united. 
Fourthly, it guarantees equality between the people. No one alone has the rights to force 
others accept his idea. All people have the same rights in the state. Fifthly, it trains 
people to develop their reasoning to provide mature views. This will promote citizens' 
ability to develop the country and to defend it from foreign interference. 
Nevertheless, some extremist Muslims also refuse democracy, because they argue that 
religion does not influence the politics of "godless" democratic countries. 125 For an 
Islamist, religion cannot be limited strictly to the realm of personal faith and private life: 
Islam has things to say about society and what it sees as the just political order that have 
strong implications for contemporary politics. Unlike Christianity, Islam was concerned 
with politics and governance from the start: the Muslim rule that developed in the 
lifetime of the Prophet required attention to principles of community life, justice, 
administration, relations with non-Muslims, defence and foreign policy. A vision of 
what constitutes good governance, law and a just society were among the principal new 
ideas 126. The Prophet came not to protect the status quo, but to reform and change. 
125 Khan., "Islam and Democracy: The Struggle Continues" by CSID Board Member http://www.islam-
democracy.orglkhan _ art _islam-and-democracy.shtml [3 March, 2002). 
126 http://www.observer.co.uk/worldview/story/O.11581 ,845725,00.html [27,5,2003]. 
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Women, for instance, were given legal status (where they had none before) and concrete 
legal protection within society. 
Osamah ibn Laden made sense to a number of Muslims when he started to remind the 
world about the right of Palestinians and the innocent Iraqi people who suffered from the 
sanctions imposed by the United States of America and the West. There was a 
widespread frustration among within the Arab world on American policy on these issue. 
But this does not reflect the ideology of Islam toward democracy. It only reflects the 
failure of American democracy to deal with other countries in a democratic fashion. 
The democratic expenence of India suggests that a Muslim community can 
meaningfully participate in the affairs of state. The constitution provides the basic right 
to all religions to follow, disseminate and preach their beliefs 127. In terms of 
demographic structure, the Muslims are a sizeable population in India. There are 
approximately one hundred million Muslims in India and they are recognised in all 
democratic institutions128• So no single party can compromise on the right of minority. 
Two of India's former presidents were Muslims, and even the senior leadership of the 
ultra right BJP includes Muslims, for example, Sikander Bakht, the former External 
Affairs Minister and President of BJP. Indeed, the head of India's nuclear and missile 
programme who became the president of India Dr Abul Kalam Azad, who commands 
the respect and admiration of his fellow countrymen, is also a Muslim 129. However, 
127 http://alfa.nic.inlconstlpreamble.html the Constitution of India [13-5-2003]. 
128 www.1onelyplanet.comldestinations/indian-subcontinenetlindialculture.htm [27-5-2003]. 
129 www.iniancongress.org/HTMihistoriy/presidens/maulanan_abul_kalam_azad.htm [24,5,2003]. 
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incidents like the destruction of Babri Mosque by fundamentalists and riots in certain 
cities raise doubts about the ability of the democratic state to accommodate the 
aspirations of minorities in India 130. 
There was a remarkable transition in the Middle East toward the features of democracy 
especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Oman was one of these countries. Islam in itself is 
not an ideology that abuses, ignores or coerces other societies. Islam calls for honesty, 
promotes non-interference in the beliefs of others, justice, for leaders to be held to 
account and for the election of leaders. Unlike Christianity, however, Islam insists on 
establishing strong armed forces in the Muslim countries. Islam says that through power, 
countries achieve peace by defeating enemies. Some westerners link what has happened 
in history with some aggressive leader. They think that Islamic philosophy is pro-war. 
The fact is that it is not allowed to kill anyone in Islam, as to do so is like killing all 
human beings on the earth 131. Even in war, it is prohibited to kill children, women and 
innocent people. Samuel Huntington was mistaken when he criticised Islam, saying that 
Islam took the place of democracy in the Islamic world 132. The problem is that since 
Islamic parties in the Islamic countries have more chance to win in elections, the recent 
leaders in the Middle East have found that democracy threatens their power, so 
consequently, these authoritarian leaders started adverse propaganda against their 
opposition. 
130 www.shashitharoor.comlarticleslhindulhostages.html [20,5,2003]. 
131 Holy Quran, Amaidah, No. 32 P.1l3 . 
132 Abootalebi, A., http://www.biu.ac.illSOClbesaJrneriaJjournalll999/issuelljv3n1a2.html Meria 
Journal Vol,3 Nl, 1993[5,2,2003. 
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The anti-democratic reputation of Islamist regImes should not be over estimated. 
Through the Islamic revolution, Iran is becoming a democratic country. Furthermore, 
Sudan, when it changed to Islamic ideology, started to practise democracy. Islamic 
movements have acquired a good reputation in the Islamic countries. They have paid 
attention to building institutions, and provided health, education and social services for 
the people. For example, during the earthquake in Egypt in 1992, the media covered the 
generous help that was provided by the Islamists, but the Egyptian government worked 
very slowly. 
The fact is that the practices of democracy are of two- fold, from inside as well as 
outside. Firstly, those who had privileges and were afraid of losing their power created 
obstacles in the path of change. Secondly, Islamic ideology is strongly criticised by 
many people in the West. They do not accept an Islamic democracy, not because Islam 
is bad, but because popular opinion if allowed to be expressed through democracy, will 
be hostile toward Israel, which is backed by the West. No Muslim will compromise with 
Israel on the status of Jerusalem. 
3.2.5 Tribes 
Most arabs are composed of different tribes. Members of a tribe trace their descent to 
one father through the male line. For security reasons, most people marry within their 
tribes. But sometimes, tribe members can marry people from other tribes to achieve 
alliance or political interests 133. The role of the tribe covers most of the requirements of 
the people such as politics, economy, defence, society and ideology. The leader of the 
133 Al-Nahi, H., Tribes and Political activities, Iraqi Tribes Conference, December 10-12 2002, London UK. 
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tribe is called the Sheikh. Muslims continue the pratice, which predates Islam, of 
electing the Sheikh who represents them in terms of debates, conflicts and economic 
interests. Besides the Sheikh, there are a number of consultants who are known for their 
maturity and knowledge of the interests of the tribe. There are a number of Councils 
which were known very well in Arabic history, such as the Common Council (majalis 
Al-Mala). Members of these Councils took the internal decisions of the tribe. Also, in 
Mecca there was an Assembly house (Dar Al-Nidwah). Furthermore, there was the 
Alliance Association (Hilf Al-Fodool), the aim of which was to discuss how the people 
of Mecca could best achieve justice among the people134• People in Oman, for example, 
elect an important person, one who is wise, rich or the oldest one in the family to be a 
leader of the tribe. Then he will be the strongest person in the tribe and can exert 
authority over others. If he is weak, however, others might end his role and replace him 
with another Sheikh. The position is usually inherited by the old Sheikh's son, unless he 
does not want to be Sheikh or he is not mature enough. Then the people in the tribe will 
elect a new leader, but usually a relative of the previous Sheikh. Inside tribes there might 
be an alliance to achieve further security and serve economic interests. We can cite, for 
instance, the recent case in Oman relating to the division between the Hinawi and the 
Ghaferi groups. Inside every group a number of tribes are allied. In both North Yemen 
and the interior of Oman there existed long-standing confederations; yet even there, 
membership of such groups varies. Most conflicts were between sub-sections and did 
not involve all the members of the confederation at anyone time. 
134 Rushwan, A., the Omani experience in Al-Shura, AI-Shurgah, Dar al-khaleeg, 1999 p.l9-21. 
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"Inter tribal feuding was a dominant feature of the area and one which prevented 
emergence of larger political units of economic co-operation" 135. 
When the former imperial rulers left the area, a number of Sheikhs became leaders of the 
new emerging states such as the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar. Others became very 
rich as a result of the previous privilege or the wealth that they inherited. In Oman, for 
example, a number of Sheikhs such as those of the Al-Harthy, Al-Khalily and Al-Hin'ay 
tribes became influential because they inherited land, which has become increasingly 
valuable. 
3.2.6 Democracy in the Middle East 
Paradoxically, a casual glance at the political history of the Middle East shows the co-
existence of various brands of authoritarian regimes and debate about the forms and 
utility of democracy. Perhaps the heavy burden of authoritarian regimes has encouraged 
calls for democracy in the region. Compared to many non-Arab third world countries, 
the question of democracy in the Middle East has assumed some special importance, not 
simply because of the survival of tribal, religious and community-based societies in the 
region (many post-colonial societies of Asia are not different from the Arabs in this 
respect), but because of the sudden oil-wealth of the nations in the region. Michael L. 
Ross has argued that oil impedes the development of democracy in the Middle East. 136 
Elie Kedouri expressed pessimism about the prospect of democracy in the region: 
135 Halliday, F., op.cit. 1974, pp.38-39. 
136 Ross, M. L. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?", World Politics, 53 (3), April 2001, pp. 325-62. 
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"The notion of popular sovereignty as the foundation of governmental legitimacy, 
the idea of representation, or elections, of popular suffrage, of political 
institutions being regulated by laws laid down by a parliamentary assembly, of 
these laws being guarded and upheld by an independent judiciary, the ideas of the 
security of the state, of society being composed of a multitude of self-activating 
groups and associations---all of these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political 
tradition". 137 
Kedouri's view was perhaps extreme and Euro-centric. Historically, the progress of 
democracy's march in the West was not smooth, and it had to wage centuries of struggle 
against hierarchy, religious superstitions, various traditional prejudices and feudalism. 
Also in many post-colonial countries, ridden with old traditions, customs, social 
divisions and prejudices, democracy has been sustained, and itself become a 
modernizing force. 
The practical world of political changes in the Middle East, at least for the last few 
decades, does not suggest too pessimistic a scenario. As has been aptly summed up by 
Michael Field: 
"The whole logic of the governments' reforms [in the Middle East], of 
course, is practical. The Arab heads of state have not been reading the work 
of the great political thinkers and been converted to the principle of 
democracy. They are reforming because they have to. Yet in the minds of 
all of them to different degrees there is also an acceptance that moves 
137 Kedouri, E., 1994, op.cit. pp. 5-6. 
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towards democracy are in keeping with the spirit of the times, that they are 
right and that they are unavoidable. Their pragmatism is blended with a 
genuine but cautious interest in managing the evolution of a new form of 
government for their countries". 138 
The Arab world has not been averse to democracy. Many countries in the Arab world 
have been experimenting with different brands of democracy. But the cornerstone of 
their moves towards democracy has been what Field has reported on the basis of 
intimate knowledge of the Arab world of politics: 
"The idea that democratic change in the Arab world should come slowly is 
the cornerstone of the policies of all reforming governments at present.,,139 
Since most of the countries in the Middle East are Islamic, and Islam has a great 
influence on life and culture of the people, a significant hindrance to the spread of 
democracy in the Middle East has come from Islam. Hence, the democracy debates in 
the Middle East have also reflected the relationship between Islam and democracy, two 
apparently opposed world-views and paradigms. Mark Tessler (2002) however found in 
his work in Egypt in 1992 that religious orientations had a bearing on male and female 
attitudes in only about 25% Of his respondents. This demonstrate that there are should 
138 Field, M. Inside the Arab World, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 272. For 
further details, see "Steps Towards Democracy", and "Society and Democracy" pp. 271-312. 
139 Ibid., P. 312. 
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not over estimate 1 40. This demonstrates one should not over-estimate the influence of 
Islam in preventing democratisation in the Middle East. 
The above suggests that democracy in the Middle East, including Oman, is not just a 
matter of some institutional practices indulged in by the rulers, but also a matter of 
serious theoretical discussion. It is an axiom in political science that every political 
practice is informed by theory. So, the question of democracy in Oman should be 
handled at the level of both theory and practice. The theoretical discussion of democracy 
is important for properly locating practices of democracy. A theoretical discussion of 
democracy also helps in assessment of democratic practice. 
3.2.7 Social and Economic Context 
The other feature of the Middle East is that most of these countries are developing 
countries. They were under colonialism when most of the people were illiterate, received 
low income and suffered from diseases. The development of any society needs good 
income and a market to absorb the income. Absence of these prerequisites delayed the 
development in the Arab world141 • But things have of late been changing. With oil 
reserves and partial democratisation involving some degree of resource distribution 
which started thirty years ago, most of the countries in the region are showing signs of 
140 For details, see Tessler, M. "Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: Impact of Religious 
Orientations On Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries", Comparative Politics, 34 (3), 
April 2002., pp. 337-55. 
141 AI-Qaisy, F., Majlis AI-Wihadah Alarabiah, (The Arab United Council) Arabic Affairs, Cairo, the 
Arab League press, March 2001, pp. 113- 128. 
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social refonns142• The total external debt of the Arab states was around 144 billion 
dollars in the year 2000. This amount was a decrease from around 159 billion dollars in 
the year 1995. Nevertheless, some countries such as Oman, Tunis and Lebanon 
experienced an increase in total debt 143 • 
3.3 Political Changes in the Middle East 
In this section we will provide an overview of the political changes in the Middle East. 
The area suffered deeply from western colonialism. When the colonial masters left, and 
decolonization began, new problems evolved. The new emerging states faced internal, 
bilateral and external problems. 
3.3.1 Colonial Period 
The Middle East passed through different periods in the 20th century. At the beginning 
of the century and into the 1950s, imperialism dominated the region. First the Ottoman 
Empire, and then the British and French Empires came and went, leaving behind a 
succession of independent states 144. During the nineteenth century, the Arab Middle East 
was under immense colonial influence. While the peripheral areas, like North Africa and 
Arabia, were under direct occupation, rival powers fought to control the central Arab 
regions, which were oppressed by the Ottoman Empire. The First World War helped to 
clarify the relations between imperial powers. The Ottoman Empire was destroyed, the 
Russian revolution took place, Germany was stripped of its imperial influence, and Italy, 
142 www.aljzeera.netJin-depthlarabic_ depts/2002/4/4-30-1.htm p.2. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Hourani., A., The Ottoman Background of the Modern Middle East, University of Essex, 
Longman Group, Ltd, 1969" P 1- 18. 
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though victorious, was too weak to win any additional influence immediately. Only 
Britain and France remained to divide the conquered lands between them. The USA, 
though it did not gain any territory, succeeded in getting access to the oil resources of 
the region 145. 
3.3.2 Decolonization 
The Second World War led to the decolonization of the Middle East. Egypt, Syria, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Libya were born under the rule of the classes that cooperated 
with the West. The various forms of imperialism accentuated the differences within the 
Middle East that were rooted in the history of the region. 146 In many of these states, such 
as Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Iraq, the formal institutions of democracy were established, 
such as political parties and representative parliaments. In all cases, however, these 
states became authoritarian. 
Elsewhere in the region, notably in the Arabian Peninsula, modem states were built by 
the leading Sheikhs of the local tribes, who often established their rule with the 
assistance of British political, financial and military support. This was the case in 
Kuwait, Bahrain, and what is known today as the United Arab Emirates 147. Three 
exceptions to this were Hejaz and Nejd (in what is now Saudi Arabia), Yemen, and 
Oman. 
145 Halliday F., op.cit. 
146 Ibid, pp.19-21. 
147 Zhalan, Z, The Making of the Modern Gulf States, London, Heinemann, 1989. 
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At the time of the Great Arab Revolt (1914), Britain was allied to the Hashemite rulers 
of Mecca and Medinal48• In the years that followed the end of the War, however, the 
Nejd ruler, Abdulaziz ibn Saud, became a powerful military and political figure, and in 
1925 occupied the Holy Places, eventually creating the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 
1932149• The British, who did not get involved in any activities that concerned the Holy 
Places of Islam, were only concerned that whoever ruled in western Arabia should not 
be hostile to the British Empire. 
In Yemen, British interests were concentrated in Aden, which was used as a supply port 
for commercial and military traffic going to India. Relations with the Zaydi Imam were 
relatively good, but Yemen was already established as a centralized state at this time. In 
Oman, also, the existence of a centralized state did not raise the questions of authority or 
state-building that existed elsewhere in the region 150. 
From the 1920s onwards, the British and the French imperial possessions in the Middle 
East began to change. Liberalisation in Egypt took the form of the British conceding 
independence in the 1920s, even though they continued to have influence over policy 
makers. In Iraq, the League of Nations Mandate was ended in 1932 and it became an 
148 Nutting, A., The Arabs; A Narrative llistory From Mohammed to the Present, New York, 
American Library, 1965, pp.266-276. 
149 Golschmidt, A., Concise llistory of the Middle East, Boulder, Co, Westview Press, 1999, p.209. 
150 Dunbabin, 1., The Post- Imperial Age: The Great Powers And The Wider World, New York, 
Longman, 1994, p.366. 
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independent Kingdom under King Faisal151 • However, here also, the British continued to 
hold office in the Iraqi government. During the Second World War, supporters of 
Germany in the region, notably in Iran and Iraq fought the British, while the liberation of 
France in 1944 led to independence for Syria and Lebanon. Jordan became an 
independent Kingdom in 1946, while Palestine suffered a completely different fate, 
losing much of its Arab identity when the State of Israel was declared in 1948, causing 
four wars that have played a major role in delaying democratisation in the region152• 
In the period referred to above, the newly independent states in the Middle East were 
close to the European empires, and many of the rulers had been landowners, merchants, 
and military officers under Ottoman rule. They owed their position of wealth and 
authority to their co-operation with the west, and thus became the target of the attacks by 
Arab Nationalists in the 1950s153 • 
151 Haji, S., The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963; Capital, Power and Ideology, New York, State 
University of New York 1997, p32. 
152 Amin, S., The Arab Nation, Nationalism and Class Struggles, London, Billing Sons Ltd, 1978, p. 47 
153 The following declarations made by the Dhofar Liberation Front in 9 June 1965 show the strong links 
between Omani opponents and the Arabic nationalism in that time. "The government of the stooge Sa'id 
ibn Taymur has enlisted the services of an army of Shu'ubi mercenaries to frustrate the goals of Arab 
Liberalisation in this country; but the DLF will be like blazing fire against it in every part of the country. 
This same spiteful Su'ubi (foreign, non-Arab- ed.) army has managed to obstruct the aims of the 
revolution in Oman; however, the Free Will which derives its strength from the will of God is bound to 
overcome. We vow to God that we shall teach this army a lesson it will never forget- the same lesson 
taught to the imperialist armies in Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Yemen". " Arab fighting masses! The Dhofar 
Lberation Front - presently leading the struggle in Dhofar against imperialism and its agents- firmly 
believes in the unity of the Arab nation and in the unity of the struggle of all Arabs from the Ocean to the 
Gulf. This belief necessarily derives us to seek militant unity with other Arab revolutionary organisations 
in the Gulf and in South Yemen. That is why the DLF calls upon such organisations to support it in its just 
struggle and provide it with all the moral and material help they can afford until it achieve its aim and 
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Arab nationalists took the view that the separation of the Arab world into separate states 
by the Europeans had been a mistake. They believed that Arabs could be unified because 
of their common language, and cultural similarities. The role of Islam was a problem, 
because while the nationalists recognized the importance of religion, they were often in 
competition with Islamic groups -such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt- and were 
not interested in creating a religious state. They believed that the state should take a 
stronger role in creating a more just and equal society, and that it should develop a more 
independent foreign policy. With regard to the last point, Gamal Abdul Nasser was a key 
player in the creation of the non-aligned Movement, even though in the late 1950s, he 
began to develop close relations with the USSRI54• 
The two decades after 1950 marked a significant change in the Middle East. It 
transformed itself from the role of marginal importance in the world economy to one of 
strategic importance. The oil reserves made the Middle East a region of key importance 
in the world capitalist economy. The rise of an anti-imperialist movement was another 
main phenomenon of this period. Though the rulers of the Middle East tried to locate 
themselves within this new global capitalist order, the anti-imperialist movement sought 
to destroy capitalism altogether. I55 
defeats its enemies, the enemies of Arab Nationalism" Cited from Conference Declarations of the Front, 
Document of the National Struggle in Oman and the Arabian Gulf, (X.709119058. London, British 
Library, 1974) pp.7-9. 
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The fonnal instruments of democracy that had been created by the West were not seen 
as the best instruments of change. In the 1950s, the nationalists, in order to break the 
links with the West, and the British, began a period of revolution in the Middle East, 
particularly in Egypt in 1953, and Iraq in 1958156• Unsuccessful attempts were also made 
to overthrow the monarchy in Jordan in the 1950S157• 
In tenns of democratisation, the problem with the period of Arab nationalism was that it 
led to the creation of strong, authoritarian regimes that did not believe in pluralism. So, 
even though Gamal Abdul Nasser created a political party, the Arab National Union, his 
aim was to use this party to bring together all Egyptians under one organisation. In fact, 
in the period from 1958 to 1962, Nasser joined with Syria to fonn the United Arab 
Republic, on the ground that the shared interests of the Arab people would create one 
Arab nation. In fact, problems existed between the leadership in Egypt and Syria, and 
the experiment ended in 1962. But while fonnal democratic elements in Egypt existed, 
in practice, the state became completely dominated by the figure of Nasser, who was 
also influential across the Arab world 158. 
After the defeat of the Arab armies in the war with Israel in 1967, and the death of 
Nasser, Arab nationalism lost its dominance. Anwar As-Sadat, Nasser's successor, 
tenninated Egypt's relations with the USSR, and developed close relations with the 
156 Dunbabin, J., 1994, p. 273. 
157 Ibid. p. 300. 
158 Ibid. 
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West, and the USA in particular159• Arab nationalism was still a powerful force in Syria 
and Iraq, but these states did not have much influence in the region at the time. 
Elsewhere in the regIOn, the expenence was quite different. The changes and the 
revolutions that happened in the area between Egypt and Iraq hardly affected the 
Arabian Peninsula, other than the threat to Kuwait in 1961 and the nationalist revolution 
in Yemen which began in 1962. The monarchies that were established did not come 
under threat. Indeed, because of the social and economic developments that began to 
take place as the oil industry was started, the existing regimes were able to strengthen 
themselves. 
In Oman, the story was slightly different. Although there was oil and the European and 
the American companies wanted to develop the industry there, the monarch, Sa'id ibn 
Taymur, was opposed to long-term capital investment and the social and economic 
changes this would bring. As Oman, geographically, looks out over the Indian Ocean 
more than into the peninsula (because of the 'Empty Quarter' or Rub al-Khali), it was 
not the focus of interest of politically by other Arab states, other than its immediate 
neighbours. For much of the 20th century, Oman was isolated and poor, while the 
central authority of the Al-Bu Sa'id dynasty under Sa'id ibn Taymur was weak160• In 
that time Britain for economic reasons backed the Sultan with who it had a long standing 
relationship against the Imam of the inertia who though might be subj ect to external 
influence. This was in some way attempting set back for a democracy in the country as it 
159 Fraser, The Arab- Israeli Conflict, London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995, pp.95-96 
160 Zahlan., op.cit. 1989. 
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destroyed the pro to democratic feature of the ideational system In recent years, 
however, Oman has developed closer ties to its neighbours and other Arab states. 
3.4 Political Regime Types in the Middle East 
After decolonization, nationalism became the main feature in the Middle East. People 
strove for political and economic reforms. However, in 1967 nationalism failed to 
achieve the demands of the nation, and then people turned toward a new ideology. The 
Islamic movement became the new hope for the people. The middle classes were not 
happy because they realized the governments were not able to govern. Governments 
tried to involve the elites in their system, but the middle classes were ignored, so they 
supported the Islamic movements. Examples can be seen in a number of countries in the 
Middle East such as Algeria, Iran, Egypt and Yemen: 
3.4.1 The Middle East Monarchies 
The period of Arab nationalism in the Middle East saw many states break their 
connections to the West, and become authoritarian states. Democracy was very weak, or 
formal democracy was used to create one party, so that elections were only for that 
party. Also, the nationalists often intervened in the monarchies of the region, hoping to 
unify the whole Arab world under one republic. In fact, most of the monarchies survived 
this period, and have been more stable. The monarchies of Arabia have been stable 
because of the use of oil wealth in development. 
The monarchies have been built on traditional forms of legitimacy, in which an existing 
hierarchy of family, clan, and tribal loyalties shape the political life of the state. With the 
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exception of Jordan and Morocco, the Middle Eastern monarchies have become oil-rich 
states. In the cases of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, these developments began in the 1930s: 
the other Gulf kingdoms developed their petroleum industries at a later date161 . 
In the monarchies, power is concentrated at the top of the state, among the ruling family. 
These states have been described as 'Rentier states', referring to a relationship with the 
purchasers of petroleum in which the state acquires the greater part of its revenue from 
oil profits. These profits are then used, other than for personal purposes, to modernise 
the state in terms of its physical and social infrastructure. This means the population is 
provided with a wide variety of services and benefits without having to pay direct taxes, 
while the government is relieved of the tensions that exist between government and 
taxpayers and any political demands that might be made on the basis of 'no taxation 
without representation'. In the Gulf kingdoms, civil society has not really developed, 
and this is one reason why democracy has not become a part of the political culture 162. 
However, there are cases where democracy is, or is becoming a part of, the political 
culture, such as Jordan and Yemen. 
3.4.1.1 Jordan 
Although it was an authoritarian system, the Ottoman Empire began to introduce 
political reforms, including elections to regional assemblies, in the late 19th and early 
161 AI-Busaid, B,. The Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Interview [15,12,2002]. 
162 Korany, op.cit. 1994, pp. 511-513. 
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20th centuries 163. During the period of the British Mandate (1921-1946), political parties 
were allowed, and a legislative Council regularly elected. However, the Council had 
little practical power and no authority. Nevertheless, the late Ottoman and British 
legacy has been to introduce the idea of democratic elections into Jordan's political 
I 164 B cu ture . etween 1948 and 1967, when Jerusalem and the West Bank were under 
Jordanian sovereignty, a single parliament was created to represent both areas. When 
Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967, King Hussein suspended the parliament. A 
return to democracy began in 1988, when King Hussein cut Jordan's constitutional 
relationship with the West Bank. Following riots in the summer of 1989, King Hussein 
reintroduced elections, and reconvened parliament, which has been elected every four 
years since then. To some degree also, the media have been liberalised, though attempts 
to interfere with the freedom of journalists has been widely criticised. 
With regard to the formal democratisation, political parties in Jordan must be legally 
registered. They must represent the citizens of Jordan, and not receive funding from 
sources outside the country. There is a strong Islamic representation in parliament, but 
in recent elections the lack of unity between the Islamic parties, and the nationalist 
parties, weakened the authority of parliamentl65 • This has maintained King Hussein's 
and his son King Abdullah's decisive role in decision making. 
3.4.1.2 Yemen 
163 Abu Jaber, K., 'The Legislature of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: A State in Political 
Development 'The Muslim World, 59, (1969) pp. 220-250. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Dunn, J., Democracy, op.cit., 1995. 
95 
In 1962, a nationalist revolution in the Yemen overthrew the rule of the Zaydi Imam. In 
the civil war which followed, nationalist revolutionaries received military support from 
Egypt, while supporters of the Imam received support from Saudi Arabia and Jordan. 
The civil war led to the division in Yemen between the North, which was associated 
with Saudi Arabia and the USA, and the South, which grew closer to the USSRI66. 
In May 1990, the North and the South unified, declaring their intention to become a 
democratic state by 1993167. However, following unification, Yemen suffered from the 
diplomatic position that it took during the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Almost a million 
migrant workers were expelled from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. The collective 
leadership that had ruled since 1990 broke down in April 1994. Conflict took place 
between the two leaders of the North and South in which the winner was Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, the president of the North. The former leader of the South, Al-Bid, went into exile 
to Oman. 
Despite the fact that in Yemen the government is elected, and has one of the largest 
circulations of newspapers and great press freedom in the region, in practical terms, 
elections have kept the northern elites in power. According to the 1996 formal Yemeni 
statement, the numbers of the population of Yemen are around 16, 500,000. Around 4, 
500,000 participate in the voting in the year 1997168. 
166 Dunbabin, J., op.cit, 1994, pp360- 361. 
167 Dunn, J., op.cit, 1995. 
168 Gabash, op.cit. 2001. 
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3.4.1.4 Bahrain 
Bahraini people come from three ethnic groups: the ruling family (Al- Khaifah) who are 
of the Sunni sect, their allied tribes, Hawalah, who are sunni as well, and the Shia who 
represent the majority of the population169• 
Bahrain has a deep experience in democracy in its modem political life compared to 
other Gulf States. This factor enlightens and encourages other Gulf countries to imitate 
Bahrain especially in terms of cultural and social issues. The beginning of the twentieth 
century brought to Bahraini people the foundations of the moderate Bahraini culture. 
The state strengthened its own political identity, and established modem education in 
1919. At that time, Bahrain was the only state in the Gulf that possessed a school. This 
school was called Ahidayah. Abdalwhab Alzebani established the first political reform 
movement in 192317°. This reform movement concentrated on two major points: firstly, 
the establishment of the As-Shura Council, secondly, achieving national sovereignty by 
decreasing the involvement of Great Britain III the internal issues of Bahrain. 
Unfortunately, this movement was restricted to a small group which involved 
businessmen and educated people of the sunni sect. It failed to realise its aim toward the 
establishment of social unity and national participation. But in general, as Gabash has 
said, it was an important experience in terms of the history and politics of Bahrain. The 
British Empire forced the prince of Bahrain to abdicate in 1923 because he supported the 
169 Al- Hosni, T., The Paramilitary Experience in The Arab Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) 
States: A Step Towards Democracy; Facts Ambitions Unpublished ph.D Thesis, The University of 
Hull, op.cit, 2000, p.29. 
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movement. Furthermore, the founder if this movement was exiled to India, where he 
died 171. 
However, this movement was the stimulus for the demand of democracy in Bahrain. A 
number of educated people and labourers in oil fields started to establish similar 
movements. These came under the influence of Nasser, the president of Egypt. His 
movement affected most Arab countries, reinforcing nationalistic sentiments. Nasser's 
idea was to unite the Arab world under one state and to free the Arabs from colonial 
. 172 
occupatIOn . 
The other significant movement within Bahrain was the establishment of a national 
association organisation in 1945. Although similar to the first movement, it was more 
mature, because it covered most of the demands of the social and political forces. This 
association, founded by Abd-Alazeez As-Shmlan, Abd-AIrahman AI-Baker and AI-
Elawat, was supported by both Sunnis and Shias. This gave credibility and strength to 
the movement. In 1954, this association made efforts to establish a foundation for a 
d . b' b d b B' . 173 emocratlc country, ut It was anne y ntam . 
Following British withdrawal, Around 27,000 people went to vote to elect a National 
Assembly in 1973. The people of Bahrain elected thirty members for the first National 
Assembly. However, in the year 1975, the Prince of Bahrain suspended the National 
171 Ibid. 
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Assembly. The second attempt to revive the representative process was made in 1993 
when the members of the As-Shura Council were appointed by the Princel74• 
Bahrain resumed the work of the constitution only in 2002. The prince of Bahrain 
established a Parliament including a Legislative Council, members of which are 
appointed by him, and the Congress Council, elected by the people. Around 98% of the 
Bahraini people supported this step by voting in the election. In the election, the Islamic 
party captured most of the seats; out of 24 seats, the Religious Committee gained 20 
seats, and the Shia Committee won only 4 seats. This is because the National Assembly 
partly refused to participate in the election because with the limited powers of Congress. 
In the Legislative Council the Prince appointed forty members six of whom were 
d f h · Chri' 175 women, an one 0 t e SIX was shan. 
3.4.1.4 Kuwait 
The first attempt toward democracy in Kuwait was in 1921 through the establishment of 
the Shura Council. This Council was established as a result of the pressure of Kuwaiti 
merchants, at a time when oil in Kuwait had not yet been discovered. After six months, 
174 AI-Hosni,T., op.cit. 2000, PP.1l4-115. 
175 United Nations Development Programme, http://www.undp-
pogar.org/arabic/countries/bahrainielections.html [2-2-2003]. 
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the government banned this Council. During the 1930s, there was another attempt to 
establish a wider institution which included merchants and politicians l76 . 
After gIVIng independence from British mandate in 1961, Kuwait established a 
governmental interim Council. The first priority of this government was to Issue a 
Constitution 177. The Constitution provided for the establishment of the elected 
Parliament, which included 50 members working together with the government. The role 
of this Council is similar to the role of other democratic Parliaments in democratic 
countries. At the beginning, this Council faced pressure from above. The government 
was reluctant to give the nation political rights, and dissolved the Parliament several 
times. Currently, this Council is very active. Members use their influence to the utmost 
extent; for example, they have withdrawn confidence from a number of ministers and 
criticised them openly178. These discussions are published in the media. In terms of 
foreign affairs, the National Council includes a political affairs committee. It coordinates 
and communicates with the ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kuwait. The Foreign Affairs 
committee provides regular reports to the Council explaining the latest Kuwaiti position 
towards developments in international politics. Furthermore, the National Council also 
plays an international role. For instance, it participates in the regular Parliament 
Conference of non-aligned countries, the Islamic Summit and the Arab Association 
Parliament. 
176 The Kuwaiti Parliament, Masirat Al-Hiah Al-Dimocratiah in Kuwait (the progress of 
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The constitution guarantees the role of women, but the conservative traditions of the 
Kuwaiti people have the hindered of the participation of women in the political sphere. 
In 1999, the prince of Kuwait issued a decree allowing women complete political rights 
in elections, but this step was banned by the National Council, which is composed of 
men. Only one vote supported the prince's proposal. Currently, efforts are being made to 
involve women in the Parliament. It is expected that they will be members in the 
Council very soon179• Finally, the position of the prime minister has been separated from 
the position of the crown prince. The separation between these duties will help to make 
the government more accountable. There are no political parties in Kuwait, but there are 
groups with tribal or religious affiliations and independents. 
3.4.1.5 Islamic Revolution in Iran 
During the last two decades Iran has seen significant movement towards democracy. 
Any revolution, at the beginning, takes a fundamental path. Later it starts to stabilise, 
and perhaps its ideological fervour becomes diluted. The Islamic revolution in Iran 
shocked all liberal states. America, for example, attempted to squeeze Iran and change 
its policy by means of information propaganda and sanctions. The evidence shows, 
however, that the Islamic Revolution is itself ending in response to internal demcands. 
The Islamic revolution can be classified into three periods: firstly, the period of 
revolutionary Islam, which lasted from 1979 to 1988, secondly, the reconstruction 
179 Al-Rahamah, H., Kuwaiti Diplomat in Morocco, Interview [15, 5, 2003] 
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period from 1988 to 1997, and thirdly, the republic or searching for a more open society, 
which began with the election of President Khatami in 199718°. 
During 1979 to 1981, there were three presidents in Iran. In the beginning Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini appointed Mehdi Bazargan to establish a transitional regime in Iran. 
But he resigned in the same year after students attacked the American Embassy in 
November 1979. Then the Iranian people elected Abu-Alhassan Sadr to the presidency; 
but Khomeini soon forced him to resign. The next president was Mohammed Ali Rejaee, 
who was assassinated 181 
After 1981, those who followed Khomeini's line controlled the Iranian political system. 
This group found strong support from the population, they declared their opponents to 
be "anti-revolutionary" and "clients of imperialism". Since the end of the war with Iraq, 
Iran, from 1989, has undergone major economic changes throughout the country. Also, 
with respect to foreign policy, the elites adopted a more pragmatic line, especially with 
Europe and the Gulf Arab monarchies. The efforts to secure foreign investment and the 
creation of better relationship with other countries has increased the demand for further 
opening up of society and enhanced dialoguel82 • 
180 Aras, B., Transformation of The Iranian Political System: Toward a New Model? 
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On 23 May 1997, Khatami was elected as the president, and at the same time the 
conservatives faced struggles with the new generation. Iran under Khatami's rule 
showed respect for pluralism and a more open dialogue with the West. Without 
denouncing religion as anti freedom, he emphasised that those institutions that suppress 
freedom of ideas and speech are destined to be doomed. He attempted to institute 
constitutional amendments and introduced institutionalised freedom in the public sphere. 
Following the elections of 1999, a de facto bi-party political system emerged in Iran. 
Executive and legislative offices, along with the presidency, remained under the control 
of the reformists, while the economy, intelligence, the military and the judiciary 
remained under the hegemony of the conservatives. 
In contrast with other countries in the Middle East, Iran became an attractive example of 
democracy with the election of Khatami. Once democratic elections were known as the 
source of political authority, then the focus of attention shifted to jostling amongst the 
various political parties. Political parties have moved towards being seen as the most 
suitable institutions for absorbing and representing the highly politicised demands of 
people in Islamic countries. The rearguard action of the conservative Guardians Council 
in banning pro-reform candidates in the February 2004 Iranian elections could be seen as 
a sign of the growing legitimacy of the pro-democratic institutions. The Guardians fared 
the power of a pro-reform majority183. Although democratic systems in Islamic countries 
still leave a great deal to be desired in terms of freedom and contribution, from Algeria 
183 http://news.bbc.co.uk [26-2-2004]. 
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to Indonesia there is a widespread attempt to maintain and improve multiparty political 
systems184• 
3. 5 Conclusion 
The hope that more states in the South would become democracies has not been fulfilled 
in the Middle East in general. Authoritarian leaders continue to dominate the region, but 
there are states that are experimenting with democracy, such as Jordan and Yemen. 
Ironically, the states which are economically less prosperous have adopted democracy, 
whereas the rest of the prosperous states are under authoritarian regimes. The legitimacy 
of the regime, is seriously threatened if the population suffers hardship. In such 
circumstances, democracy provides a way of venting peoples' pent-up feelings and 
frustrations. Certainly, autocratic or monarchical regimes cannot provide this outlet to 
the aspirations of an economically disadvantaged population; hence, they are unable to 
survive in poorer countries. The difficulties of democracy in the region are due to the 
history of imperialism, which created separate Arab states, and the wars with Israel, 
which meant that the military were very powerful in the region. As Korany has said, 
many states have introduced democracy not from below, but from the top down, so that 
there is a lack of informal democracy or civil society. In the oil rich monarchies, the 
power of the state to provide services without taxes has given the ruling family great 
authority, and reduced the demand for democracy. 
The Middle East is one region that has not experienced widespread democracy, but, as 
we have seen above, democracy, or democratic change is an important agenda of most 
184 http://www.fas.orgimanldod-10Ilops/war/iran-iraq.htm. 
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of the rulers of the reglOn, and people talk about democracy a lot. 185 There are 
interesting aspects about the popular attitude to democracy in the Arab world. Although 
most people want democracy in the Middle East, "Arabs do not trust their societies with 
democracy".186 It is widely believed that the tribal structures in the Middle East are 
inhospitable to democracy. Field has encountered such popular reactions from the 
Saudis: 
"When one asks Saudis what would happen if democracy were introduced to 
their country, almost everyone of them replies that it would immediately 
recreate tribalism, that nobody would vote for anyone except a member of 
his own tribe, or somebody from his own town, and that the different parts 
of society would soon be at each other's throats". 187 
One of the great challenges to democratisation in the Middle East will, of course, be 
Islam. Any democratisation project in the region must grapple with the force of Islam. 
Islam, as derived from the Quran, advocates firm rule based on consensus, and considers 
that a good form of government. In traditional Arabian society, a tribe or a town accepts 
as its leader a person, normally from a well-established family. The leader is chosen by 
consensus and then in government he consults advisers who reflect the views of the 
d'f'C . f . 188 I .Lerent sections 0 SOCIety . 
185 Field op.cit.1994, p. 313. 
186 Ibid, p. 311. 
187 Ibid, p. 312. 
188 Wiktorowicz, Q., in an interesting article "Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordon", 
Comparative Politics, 33 (1), October 2000, pp. 43-62 has identified an interesting hurdle to democracy 
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Finally, it is not always the rulers in the Middle East, but the people who have been the 
true democratises. People of the Middle East have risen in revolt for major social and 
political changes in their countries. As Halliday has pointed out with reference to 
Arabia: 
"While the local ruling classes developed their own autonomy, the anti-
imperialist movement in the peninsula was transfonned into a powerful 
section of the movement and was able to develop the anti-imperialist 
struggle to a level never before achieved in the region,,189. 
Thus, Arab nationalism in its various guises has remained a very powerful force for 
democracy and social justice in the region. In the discussion of democracy in the Middle 
East, such popular pressures from below must not be lost sight of. Such nationalism as 
has developed in various times since the post-Second World War period (Nasserism in 
the 1950s and 1960s being a prime example) is Western in spirit and Arabic in fonn. 
The content of democracy or popular rule that such nationalism has demanded is 
profoundly significant for the region's democratisation. 
In Oman, as part of this Arab world, the democratisation process, as the chapter that 
follows will shortly show, is naturally subject to the main challenges that the Middle 
East, as a whole, has been facing. But what makes the story of Oman interesting, is how, 
in the Middle East. He shows how civil society far from becoming a help to democracy has acted as the 
state's arm of control over its citizens. 
189 Halliday, F. op.cit. 1979, p. 17. 
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under the current Sultan, political order and political changes have been combined 
together, which contains an important lesson for other Arab countries to learn. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INTRODUCING OMAN: mSTORY AND SOCIETY 
"I observed with mounting concern and intense indignation my father's 
inability to govern.,,190 
4.1 Introduction: Oman's Backwardness 
Prior to 1970, Oman as a country was very backward. In 1970, the infant mortality rate 
was 75 percent. There were only three small primary schools, one hospital, no press, and 
a literacy rate of only 5 percent.191 The life in the villages was miserable: "In the villages 
of Oman there is often not a single healthy inhabitant in sight,,/92 An expert visiting the 
country in 1958 was shocked to say "In twenty years' experience of most of the 
countries of the Middle East he had never seen a people so poverty stricken or so 
debilitated with disease capable of treatment and cure,,193 Fred Halliday said, 
"Trachoma, venereal disease and malnutrition were widespread".194 
190 Statement by Sultan Qaboos Ibn Sa'id: Broadcast to the People ofOman---27 July 1970. For details, 
see Kechichian, op.cit. 1995, p. 277. 
191 Halliday, F., op.cit. pp. 274-75; According to his Majesty Sultan Qaboos" We had no hospital to care 
for our people, we had no schools to prepare our young to take their place in the world, we had no 
government structure with which to organise and develop the resources of our country, many of our gifted 
sons and daughters had left in despair to make life for themselves in other lands" The Royal Speeches of 
H. M. Sultan Qaboos ibn Said 1970 - 1995, Muscat, Ministry of Information, Oman Newspaper House, 
1995, p. 81. 
192 Quoted in ibid., p. 275 from a visitor's account. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid. 
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Even in the middle of the twentieth century, Oman was living in the middle ages. Sa'id 
ibn Taymur, from whom the current Sultan seized power in 1970, was opposed to any 
development. On one occasion he told his British adviser on development "This is why 
you lost India, because you educated the people" 195 • He was so angered at the prospect 
of development that just before his ouster in 1970 he decided to close down the three 
existing primary schools in the country because they had become a 'centre of 
communism' 196. 
Given the above, the political changes introduced, and various development activities 
undertaken in Oman since 1970 are far-reaching in their consequences, and need to be 
appropriately situated in the country's recent history and society. This chapter seeks to 
provide an overview of Oman's history and society as a back-drop to the political 
changes since the early 1970s. 
195 Quoted in ibid., p. 276. 
196 Ibid. For further details on the savageries of his rule, see pp. 276-97. 
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4.2 Geographical Location 
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The Sultanate of Oman is an Islamic country located on the south-eastern rim of the 
Arabian Peninsula, bordered by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
Archaeological evidence suggests that human communities have lived in the area for at 
least 5,000 years. Copper, frankincense, farming and fishing were the sources of 
employment. The country is situated beside the most strategic waterways in the Middle 
East. Out of some 4,000 miles of the Arabian Peninsula coastline, about one-fourth 
belong to Oman, the country which commands the entrance to the Gulf and faces the sea 
to the north, east and south. Oman occupies some 120,000 square miles, an area, which 
exceeds Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates together. 
Oman occupies a strategic location overlooking the Straits of Hormuz, through which a 
high percentage of world oil is currently carried by ships. The country's geographical 
location has had an important influence in shaping state boundaries and subsequently 
creating international links by air, sea and land. Oman has encouraged internal industrial 
sectors and built important ports, such as the port of Salalah, with the specific aim of 
creating links with North America, Europe, Asia and Africal97• 
Geographically, historically and politically, Oman remained outside the main currents of 
Arab history. Its major contacts were maritime and, as these withered the country 
became a "secluded, remote, and isolated comer" of the Arabian Peninsula. 198 For quite 
a long time, Oman's economy, linked as it was to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, had 
little cultural or commercial exchange with Europe and the Americas, even with the rest 
197 Internal Industrial sectors, Oman Daily, 1997. 
198 Riphenburg, C., op.cit. 1998, p. 1. 
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of Arabia. One cause of the country's insularity from the rest of the Arab world was the 
formidable Hajar Mountains which, standing as a ridge between the coast and the desert, 
have at the same time differentiated the two. 199 
Geographically rather diverse, Oman lies on the Tropic of Cancer which makes it very 
hot in summer. It is composed of Eight distinct physical regions: the Muscat, Batinah 
Coast, the Alshurkiah, Inner Oman, Aldhahirah, Central Oman, Dhofar, and the 
Musandam, each of which maintains a distinct cultural identity. 200 
4.3 Demography and Social Structure of Oman 
Demographically, Oman is small. Its population is estimated to be just two and a half 
million, three-fourths of whom are Omani nationals, and the rest expatriates. The 
population is unevenly distributed across the regions. The coastal and the metropolitan 
Muscat regions contains the largest population. Oman's people are a diverse ethnic and 
religious mix and bear the imprint of a history of maritime trade, tribal migrations, and 
contacts with the outside world. The majority of Arab tribes are diverse, a significant 
number being Ibadhi. Some communities in Oman trace their origins to before the Arab 
migrations. The ethnic composition of Oman's minorities is also mixed and not always 
easy to determine. 
199 Ibid. 
200 More details see Riphenburg, C., op. cit. pp. 2-8. 
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Table 4.1. Population of Oman in Regions, 2000. 
Estimated (mid - Year) Total population by Governiratel region 
2000 
Expa. Expa. Omani Om ani 
Governorate 
Region Total % 
(000) % (000) 
Number Number 
Muscat 661 47 295 21 366 
AI-Batinah 667 17 108 31 559 
Musandam 34 1 7 2 27 
Adh-Dahirah 215 9 54 9 161 
Ad- Dakhiliyah 273 6 36 13 237 
Ash -Sharqiah 273 6 36 13 237 
AI-Wusta 20 1 4 1 16 
Dhofar 225 12 74 8 151 
Sultanate 2,402 100 624 100 1,778 
Source: Oman: Facts & Figures, 2000, Infonnation and Publication Centre, p.l. 
Most Omanis belong to the Thadhi sect of Islam, which has largely shaped Omani 
culture. The Thadhis are one of the Muslim world's few remaining Kharighite sects. The 
Sunnis fonn the largest non-Thadhi group (around 25%) comprising a variety of ethnic 
groups such as the Baluchis. The vast majority of the people in Dhofar are Sunni. The 
Shia sect represents the third largest religious group in Batinah where the Liwatiyas are 
predominant. There are sizeable sections of the Indian Hindu community on the coast. 
Other religious communities are smaller in number, but they have freedom of worship. 
The dependent population below the age of 19 is quite significant, amounting to around 
57% of the total Omani population. This implies that in future the challenge of creating 
employment and opportunities for this fast growing population will be immense. 
113 
Women still constitute a small minority of the workforce, since Oman is a conservative 
Muslim society and this makes the dependent population even larger. The rate of 
population growth is high at around 3.43% during 2001. Life expectancy has increased 
considerably because of economic development from 49.3 years in 1970 to 72.5 in 
1999?Ol 
201 The National Economic Ministry, Sultanate of Oman, 2001, p.6. 
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Table 4.2. Population of Oman by Sex and Age, 2000 
Estimated ( mid year) Omani National population by Age Group and sex 
2000 1999 (000) 
Age group 
Total Female Male Total Female Male 
249 122 127 247 121 126 4-0 
262 129 133 264 130 134 9-5 
258 127 131 254 125 129 10-14 
238 117 122 234 114 120 15-19 
204 100 105 194 95 99 20-24 
136 66 70 121 58 63 25-29 
87 42 45 83 40 43 30-34 
71 36 35 69 36 34 35-39 
60 32 29 58 30 28 40-44 
50 26 24 48 25 24 45-49 
42 21 21 41 20 21 50-54 
36 17 18 35 17 18 55-59 
29 14 15 28 13 15 60-64 
22 10 12 28 10 11 65-69 
15 7 8 15 7 8 70-74 
19 10 9 18 10 9 75+ 
1,778 874 904 1,729 851 879 Total 
Source: Oman: Facts & Figures2000, Infonnation and Publication Center, p.1. 
The latest census which was held in 2003 showed an increase in the Omani population, 
to 2,331,391, of whom 1,779,318 are Omani and the rest, which represent 23.7 % are 
foreigners. The people are concentrated in two areas, Muscat and Batinah, which 
together have around 55% of the total population. However the population of 
Musandam and Al-Wusta is 2% only of the total. There are 312,708 inhabitants in Al-
Sharkiah, 265,083 in Al-Dhakhliah, 214,331 in Dhofar and 204,250 in Al-Dhairah. 
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Most of the foreigners are in the capital of Oman. They represent 45% of the total 
population of Muscat. Again, there are fewer foreigners in Al-Wusta and Musandam; 
they represent only 2.5 % of the total inhabitants of this area202. 
4.4 History of the Sultanate: The Establishment of the Elected State 
The Islamic era in Oman is thought to have begun as early as 630 A. D, when a ruling 
family, the Al-Julanda, received a letter from the Prophet Muhammad. The Al-Julanda 
converted to Islam shortly afterwards. 
As a result of the clear conception of the role of the Imam and how he should deal with 
his nation and other countries, Oman existed as a quasi state as early as 1253 years ago. 
This phenomenon was rarely seen in other places in the Middle East. As Aideed said: 
"The Sultanate of Oman was originally called the Imamat of Oman. This 
was because the country was ruled between 751 and 1792 by Imams of the 
Ibadhi sect of Islam, elected directly by the people,,203. 
According to Joseph A. Kechichian: 
"The sultanate of Oman was governed between 751 and 1792 AD by 
elected Imams of the Ibadhi sect of Islam". 204 
The fIrst Imam in Oman was Al-Gulanda ibn Musood in 751205. Omani people, who 
had studied in Basra, on returning to Oman, tried the same methods that they had learnt 
202 Ministry of Economy, Oman www.OmanCensus.net. [10 - 2- 2004]. 
203 Aideed, A., op.cit. 1996. 
204 Kechichian, J., op.cit. 1995, p . 3. 
205 AI-Wasmi., op.cit. 1993, p.70. 
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in the Islamic state by electing AI-Gulanda. The other Omani people supported the 
idea, and supported the new Imam. Many Omani delegations came to congratulate him 
and give him full support206. AI-Gulanda was considered a good ruler because he 
always asked specialists for their opinion. In 793, Mohammed ibn aby-Affan came to 
power and proclaimed himself as the new leade~o7. 
In 796, AI-Warth ibn Kab was elected208 . Most of the Omanis were satisfied with him. 
In his period, Esa ibn Gafar was sent by Haroon AI-Rasheed, one of the Abbasid 
leaders, to try to occupy Oman. Esa was executed on the judgement of the Omani 
COurt209. AI-Warth remained in power for around twelve years. In this period, the 
capital of Oman was changed from Sohar to Ni~lO. In 808, when AI-Warth died, the 
Omani people arranged a meeting to elect a new leader. They agreed to elect Gassan 
ibn Abullah in same year211 . He successfully defended Oman from external enemies 
and he also paid attention to building a strong navy. Oman fought and defeated ships 
from East Asia, as a result of which attacks on Omani ships were ended.212 Gassan died 
in 823. Then, Abd-AImalik ibn Humaid came to power through election in 824. He 
defended Oman from foreign agents who came from Yemen with the aim of 
destabilising Oman. He remained in power for around eighteen years213. The Omanis 
206 AI-Harthy, A., op.cit, S, 1973, op.cit. pp.10 -50. 
207 AI-Wasmi, K, op.cit. 1993, p.72. 
208 AI-Salmi., A, op.cit. 2000, p.112. 
209 Ibid. p.116. 
210 Ibid. p.118. 
211 ibid. P .120. 
212 Ibid. p.121. 
213 Ibid. pp. 132- 134. 
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then elected Mohana ibn lafar in 841. He was very strong leader, who built a number 
of ships, reportedly as many as three hundred. He also owned nine thousand camels, 
and maintained around ten thousand soldiers. He remained in power for around ten 
years214. 
This first period represented a test of Oman's viability as an independent and quasi 
democratic state. AIthough it faced opposition from neighbouring countries, through 
the means of elections which received massive support from the nation, it succeeded in 
defeating external enemies. The period of success lasted for around one hundred and 
thirty six years. Later, Oman faced internal and external problems215. New powerful 
leaders in Oman such as Mohammed ibn Zaidah and Rashed controlled Oman without 
elections216. The Omani people were not happy about this, so they acted to remove 
these people, and arranged a meeting to change the situation. 
The Omani people succeeded in electing AI-Sult as imam in 851, but when AI-Sult 
became an old man, Musa ibn Musa (scholar) announced a new leader. A number of 
intellectuals and leaders agreed with him to select Rashed ibn AI-Nader. However, the 
intellectuals faced a dilemma whether to support the existing leader or the new 
leade?17. There were three schools of thought: 
1- Musa ibn Musa should be supported because he was a very important 
philosopher in the country. He had the right to remove the bad leader. 
214 Ibid. p.148- 1150. 
215 AI-Wasmi., K,op.cit. 1993, p.73. 
216 AI-Salmi, A, op.cit. p.105. 
217 AI-Harthy., S, op.cit 1973, p.255. 
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2- Musa was acting wrongly when he announced his decision to change a leader 
who had been elected unanimously. This was a crime. 
3- Not clear about the situation. Those of this position gave wide legitimacy for the 
position of AI-SuIt. They were prepared to show him mercy, even though he was 
weak and he could not run the country, because they did not want civil war218 • 
This issue divided the Omanis into two groups, the Nizwani and Rustaqi. The Nizwani 
took a middle stance; they did not claim any party was in the wrong. In contrast, the 
Rustaqi did not support Musa. They believed that Musa had declared war against an 
elected president. This meant Musa was a criminal who had acted against the stability 
of the state. They called for war. This division lasted for around 739 years. 
In the period from AI-SuIt ibn Malik to Nasser ibn Morshid (885- 1624) Oman was not 
stable and most of the leaders came to power through militant means which left the 
people dissatisfied219 • During this period, there were around thirty Imams and some of 
them were kings who represented their tribes, not the nation. The most famous ones 
were from the Nabhani tribe. Some of them succeeded in controlling parts of Oman; 
others controlled the whole countri20• 
Despite their shortcomings, these Imams founded a united system of state governance. 
The Omani state covered the area from Bahrain to Yemen to Oman it self, and the 
218 Omar., F, op.cit. 1985, pp.13 - 27. 
219 AI-Salmi, A, Nizwa Magazine, V.30, April 2002. 
220 Ali-zkwai, S., Kashf Algumah, op.cit. pp 735- 753. 
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debate between the Rustaqi and Nizwani schools represented an advanced dialogue on 
the legitimacy of the president221 . The medieval history of Oman was also marked by a 
series of foreign invasions, divisions by domestic rivalries with competing Imams, and 
periods of rule by maliks (kings). 
In 1508, the Portuguese occupied Oman with the aim of securing the road to India222. 
This attack led to the destruction of Omani power and a number of important Omani 
cities. A number of Omanis were tortured. For example, the solders cut off the noses 
and ears of the local people. This atrocity infuriated the Omanis and pushed them to 
reunite. In order to achieve internal unity and the independence from external enemies, 
the Omani people elected Nasser ibn Morshid in 1624223 . The Alyarobah family thus 
came to power and tackled the Rustaqi-Nizwani dilemma. Nasir launched war against 
his local opponents, then he fought the Portuguese. He succeeded in liberating some 
Omani areas such as Gulfar and Sohar. He continued to fight them throughout his 
period of rule, but died in 1649 without completing his mission224. 
Then Sultan ibn Saif came to power in 1649 and he expelled the Portuguese the 
following yea?25. Furthermore, he occupied some Portuguese colonies such as 
221 Gabash., H, op.cit. 1997, p.45- 46 
222 AI-Salman, M., AI-Gazw Albortogalee lil-Ganoob AI-Araby Wal-Khaleeg, 1507-1525, (the 
Portuguese Occupation of the Southern Arabic states and the Gulf States, Zayd Centre for Heritage and 
History, 2000, p. 189. 
223 Omar., F, op.cit. 1985, p.35. 
224 AI-Siabi op. cit. pp. 2001, pp.177 -229. 
225 AI-Wasmi, op.cit. 1993, p 77, For details, see Riphenburg, op. cit., pp. 19-55. and see Gabash, 
op.cit. p.l 10-11 1. 
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Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania) and Guarder (now part of Pakistan). His action was a 
response to the request that he received from the local people of these places and a 
strategy to secure the country from further attack. He also pursued them in India, and 
gained much wealth from the attack. With that money he built the famous Nizwa fort 
in Oman, and built a number of F alajs226. He was so popular with the people that he 
could walk in the streets without bodyguards, and talked to people freely and openly. 
He remained in power for around forty years227. 
Then Bil-Iarab ibn Sultan came to power in 1680- 1692228. He built a famous castle 
called Gebreen castle, in which he opened a school, providing education for many 
Omani students229, who studied various subjects. Bil-Larab reigned for around thirteen 
years. But before the end of his life, in 1692230 Saif ibn Sultan asked to replace him. 
Bil-Iarab died before any conflict occurred between him and his brother. A number of 
people asked Saif to recognise his attempt to take power as illegal, but then he was 
elected by the people, as eventually they were convinced he was the person best fitted 
to the serve the state. He attacked the Portuguese in East Africa in places such as 
Mombasa and occupied that area. His strategy was to achieve stability for the Omani 
road to Mecca, the holy place for Muslims. He paid attention to the development of the 
economy. For example, he built seventeen Falajs and a number of new farms. He 
226 Falaj is a system in which a number of wells are dug and linked together through canals in the depth 
of the earth. The falaj might cover a distance of seven kilos or more. This system is unique. It provides a 
small community with few resources, with sufficient water for their various needs. 
227 AI-Salmi, op.cit., pp. 49 - 51. 
228 Gabbash, op.cit. 1997, p.113. 
229 AI-Salmi., A, op.cit. 2000, pp.81- 102. 
230 Gabbash, op.cit. 1997, p. 115. 
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owned 24 warships, such as the AI-Mulk. He died in Rustak city, after a reign of 19 
years231. 
Sultan ibn Saif, in 1692 232was elected by Omani people, but scholars imposed a 
condition that he should consult them on all major decisions. He was recognised as 
better than his father because he received more support from the Omani people. Before 
the election, Omanis arranged three review meetings and agreed to elect him. He 
fought the external enemy on land and at sea. He occupied Bahrain, Alqasam, 
Hurmoos, and built Alhazem castle. The country was very wealthy in his time because 
he paid special attention to agriculture and amassed wealth in the course of his battles 
against the external enemy. He died in 1711233. He was the last strong leader in 
Alyorobah family, which remained in power for one hundred years. This period laid 
the basis of Oman's latter days of glory. 
A new leader emerged in Oman after the Persian invasion. He was Ahmed ibn Sa'id, 
the founder of Sultan Qaboos's family. He fought the Persians from 1738 234 until he 
succeeded in expelling them in the year 1741. The Omani people viewed him as a 
national hero, and they elected him as Imam 235. 
231 AI-Salmi, A, op.cit. 2000, pp. 105- 108. 
232 Gabbash,op.cit. 1997, p.116. 
233 AI- Salmi, op.cit. 2000, pp. 117- 121. 
234 Darweesh., M, Sultanate of Oman in 18th and 19th Century, Egypt, Dar Al-Shorook, 1982, p.40 
235 Gabash., H., op.cit.1997, pp.128- 130. 
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For the next century, the Albu-sa'id dynasty had to engage itself in a struggle for 
survival in Oman and also in Muscat, effectively divided in 1785. Power was 
distributed between the sons of the Imam Sa'id ibn Ahmed This meant that: 
"sovereign power was now divided, the Imamate was falling into 
desuetude, and the most vigorous member of the ruling family, the sultan, 
was concerned almost wholly with maritime and commercial enterprises. 
Not unnaturally, a growing estrangement between the Al-Busa'id and the 
inland tribes developed, becoming more marked in succeeding 
generations,,236. 
The Alsa'ud, the leaders ofNajd (recognized now as Saudi Arabia) wished to unite all 
the Arabian Peninsula under their rule. They found that the division in Oman offered 
them an opportunity to attack Oman. But Oman was then ruled by Sa'id ibn Sultan, 
who put an end the the Najdi aggression and succeeded also in uniting the country. But 
after his death, the division erupted again and the ruling family divided Zanzibar and 
Oman in 1862237. This weakened the Omani Sultan who lost power and support . 
By the middle of the 19th century, Oman's power diminished in the wake of the control 
gained by the Europeans in the Indian Ocean trade, and internal problems escalated 
foreign influence especially the British. The country continued to face more and more 
236 Kechian, J., op.cit.l995, P.30. 
237 Gabash, op.cit. 1997, p. 201. 
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political turmoil, which ended with the re-establishment of an independent imamate. 238 
Between 1868- 1873 Imam Azzan Ibn Qais comboned both posts but the split re-
emerged and the problem came to a head with the death of Sultan Faisal ibn Turki in 
1913 when the tribes of interior refused to recognise Taimur ibn Faisal. They elected 
Salim AI-Kharose as imam 239. The election of AI-Kharose: 
"raised the standard of revolt against the sultan III an alliance that 
combined both Hinawi and Ghafiri tribes. A month later Nizwa was 
occupied, the AI Bu Sa'id wali expelled, and the town made the seat of the 
imamate as in times past. The new Hinawi- Ghafiri coalition was probably 
the most powerful ever created against an AIbu-Sa'id ruler,,24o. 
Taimur, assisted by the British defended himself from attack by the Imam's supporters 
and in 1920 the Treaty of AI-Sib created an uneasy balance between Sultan and Imam. 
The Sultan recognised the Imam as a religious leader with some power in the interior, 
but he still claimed sovereignty over all Oman as well as Muscat241 . 
Thus, for over three centuries Oman had faced external influence and internal 
problems. Between the 17th to 19th centuries, it was an imperial power that fought 
against the growing European colonial influence in the Gulf. It first contested against 
Portugal, and later the British for influence in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean and on the 
238 Kechician ,op.cit. 1995, p.3l. 
239 Ibid p.32. 
240 Riphhenburg, op.cit. 1995, p,44. 
241 Ibid, 28- 29 and see Geran, R, op.cit. 1967. 
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coasts of India and East Africa. Oman's maritime power in the Arabian waters for over 
two centuries from the expulsion of the Portuguese from Muscat in the middle of the 
17th century to the assertion of British supremacy, in the 19th century was considerable. 
Nevertheless it could not resist the 19th century expansion of British maritime and 
imperial power. 
4.4.1 Sa'id ibn Taymur (1932-1970) 242: 
242 The historical periods of various dynasties of Oman up to Sa'id ibn Taymur have been adequately 
documented in various books. The most important books on: Oman's political history are, Oman 
Islamic Democracy The traditional of Imamate and the Modern Political History, Gabbash, H., 
(1500 - 1970), Lebanon, Dar AI-Gadeed, 1997; Oman and the World, The Emergence of an 
Independent Foreign Policy, Kechichian, J., Rand, 1995; The Political System in the Sultanate of 
Oman, Dahdooh, S., Ph.D. Thesis, the University of Baghdad, 1999; Oman Since 1856: Disruptive 
Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society, Robert Grean Landen, Princeton, NJ, Princeton 
University Press, 1967; Oman between Independence and Occupation a study about the Omani 
Modern History and its Regional and International Relations, AI-Wasmi, K., Kuwait, Alsharu Al-
Araby, 1993; Tuhfat AI-Aian Beserat Ahl Oman, AI-Salmi, A, Muscat, Muktabt Noor Aldeen Al-
Salmi Oman, 2000. Dilemma of the Religion and Politics in the First Period of Islam, Giat, H., 
Beirut, Dar Altalyah, 2000; The History of the Gulf States in the Middle Ages, Omar, F., Iraq, Dar 
AI-Arabia, 1985; AI-Futah AI-Mobeen fee Seerat AI-Sadah Albu-Saideen, Ibn Ruzaiq, H., Egypt, 
Ministry of heritage, Amoon lltagleed waltibah, 1984; The History of the Gulf, Wilson, A., Translated 
into Arabic by Amine, M., London, Dar AI-Hikmah, 2001; Oman During History, AI-Siabe, S, Oman, 
Ministry of National Heritage and Culture al-Sharqiakah press, 2001; Kashf AI-Gumah, AIi-zkwai, S., 
written by hand 1407 the writer of the book was In 11th century, Oman, Almudarib Al-harthy, S., 
library, pp 735- 753; Sultanate of Oman in 18th and 19th Century, Darweesh, M, Egypt, Dar al-
Ashoroook, 1982; The Local Conflict in Oman between 1913- 197, Abdulraham Mohammed 
Shahdaad, Qatar, Dar Alawzy, 1989; Alkashf wa-Albian, AI-Azdy, M., Tunes, Sil-Silat a-lderasat 
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For a number of reasons, the period of rule of Sa'id ibn Taymur (l932-70i43 was the 
most significant for the purposes of this study, since it provided the immediate 
backdrop to the political changes since 1970. The seventh hereditary ruler of the 
family, which had ruled Oman since the 1740s244, he was educated in India at a school 
for princes conducted by the Anglo-Indian government. He spoke three foreign 
languages (English, Urdu, and Hindi,) in addition to Arabic. He had received 
recognition as heir-apparent during his father's reign, a practice which, in essence, 
established the principle of primogeniture as the basis for choosing the sultan.245 
His first objective was to eliminate the debts he had inherited, keenly aware as he was 
of the humiliation that both his father and grandfather had experienced from the British 
as a result of the fmancial condition of the country.246 He managed this and avoided 
further financial obligation by maintaining an economic strategy of rigid austerity. 
"The Sultan learnt two other lessons; the first was that if you are in debt to 
someone, then that person has a very strong hold upon you and can force 
you to do things that you would not otherwise dream of doing. In Oman's 
case the same one was with British government. The other lesson he learnt 
243 Risso, P., Oman and Muscat An Early Modern History, London, Croom HELM, 1986, p. 163 
244 The full name of the sultan was Sa'id ibn Taymur ibn Fisal ibn Turki ibn Said ibn Sultan ibn 
Ahmed ibn Said, Cited from Rosso, op.cit. P., 1986 
245 Riphenburg, C., op.cit. 1998, op. cit. 
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was that if you wanted to ensure that something was done as you wanted; 
you should do it your self,247 
Despite the fact that Sultan Sa'id continued to depend on a number of British and other 
foreign advisors, a characteristic of his rule, in addition to the autonomy gained 
through economic solvency, was his emphasis on restoring his power over the whole 
sultanate. He exercised his authority in the government by actively supervising the 
decision-making process.248 
Sa'id ibn Taymur was an extraordinary character, an arch-reactionary of great personal 
charm. He was opposed to any sort of change and attempted to isolate Oman from the 
modem world. Under his rule, a country which only a century earlier had engaged in 
empire building became a medieval anachronism. He personally issued all visas. He 
forbade travel inland by residents of the coast and vice versa. He opposed education, 
which he saw as a threat to his power. Most Omanis were not allowed to leave the 
country; and the few who managed to get out were rarely allowed to return. After 1958, 
Sultan Sa'id established his residence at AI-Hisn near Salalah, in Dhofar, where he 
remained permanently except for periodic visits to London. Only a handful of officials 
had a radio link to his palace. Retirement to the south helped assure his security from 
247 Risso,. P., 1986,op .cit. p. 165. 
248 Landen, R, Oman Since 1956: Disruptive Modernisation in a traditional Arab Society, 
Pricetion: Princition University Press 1967, p. 408. 
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assassination and removed the obligation to meet frequently with tribal Sheikhs and 
distribute subsidies, which might deplete the treasury. 249 
4.4.1.2 The Nature ofSa'id's Regime 
During the period of Sultan Sa'id ibn Taymur, Oman became even more isolated. 
Although the Sultanate enjoyed friendly relations with Great Britain Sa'id opposed any 
type of modernization. There was no attempt by the Sultan to allow the modernization 
of social services, such as health and education, while the transport system was basic, 
and the economy shut off from external influences. The country was described as a 
state of prohibition. For example, it was not allowed to wear sun glasses or buy books: 
women were not allowed to travel abroad250. 
4.4.1.3 Challenges to Sa'id's Regime 
From the early 1950s, Sultan Sa'id began to face political challenges to the regime. 
The famous Buraimi episode was an obvious example of the incapacity of the Sultan to 
deal effectively with encroaching powers. This had its origins in the combination of oil 
prospecting and the revival of Saudi activity.251 The Iraq Petroleum Company, received 
right to survey for oil for Oman from Sultan Sa'id in 1937 and 1939. The company 
found oil in the Dhahirah in the winter of 1938-1939 but then suspended the operations 
249 Mahamdi, Oman in Helen Cmetz (ed), The Persian State: Country Studies, Washington, DC 
Fedral Researsh Division, Library of Congress 1994, p. 301. Also see Rawlings, J., The History of the 
Royal Air Force, Feltham, Temple Press Airspace, 1984. pp. 252-254. 
250 Gabbash, op .cit. 1997, p.339. 
251 Kelly, J., Arabia, the Gulf and the West: A critical View of the Arabs and their Oil Policy, New 
York: Basic Books, Inc, 1980, p. 112. 
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for the duration of Second World War. After the war, it took up prospecting on the 
Trucial Coast. In the winter of 1947-1948 it expanded its survey to the city of Buraimi. 
But Al-Khalili the Imam declared that he would accept no oil prospecting in the 
area
252
• Meanwhile, Suleiman ibn Himyar, another powerful local figure, began 
reaching out to the Saudis, negotiating a personal deal with an oil company. In October 
1952, the Saudis began to encroach on the imamate's western frontier as ibn Sa'ud 
encouraged by Aramco (the Arabian-American Oil Company), occupied the city of 
Buraimi. Sultan Sa'id, recognizing immediately the intention to destroy the territorial 
integrity of Muscat, found common cause with Imam Al- Khalili and mobilized an 
army of 8,000 tribesmen at Sohar, within striking distance of Buraimi. Before he could 
mount his attack, however, the sultan was dissuaded by the British, responding to 
pressure from the United States at Saudi request, from proceeding with the attack. 
Subsequently, Sultan Taymur suffered a loss of reputation among his people; and the 
Saudis, who continued to lay claim to the area, were left at Buraimi. By then the 
situation within Oman was changing253 . When Imam AI-Khalili died in 1954, Ghalib 
ibn Ali from the Hinawi tribe won election as his successor. In the highly volatile 
content of oil prospecting, the British and Sultan Sa'id became convinced that the new 
ruler was receiving Saudi assistance. At this time, the British were sinking test wells at 
Fahud in country between that occupied by the imam and the vague Rub al-Khali 
border of Saudi Arabia. In September 1954, Sultan Sa'id's forces occupied Ibri, cutting 
the imam off from Buraimi and in 1955 the British cabinet decided to order British 
252 Gabbash, H., op.cit. 1997, p.312. 
253 Townsend., Oman: The Making of a Modern State, London: Croom Hem, 1977, P. 60. 
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Forces to occupy Nizwa the capital of the imamate254• The Imam sought to outflank 
Sa'id politically by applying to the Arab League for recognition as ruler of an 
independent state but, with military help from Britain in December 1955, Sa'id 
occupied the imamate's dual capitals of Nizwa and Rustaq. The rebels were defeated 
and the Sultan then annexed the interior. The Arab League supported Ghalib's 
membership application, because of anti-British sentiment, but was in no position to 
offer assistance255• The British, in contrast, were able to assist Sa'id in unifying his 
country in return for securing oil concessions for British companies. Imam Ghalib was 
allowed to go into exile in his home village but his brother, Talib, and another rebel 
leader Salih Al-Harthy, escaped to Cairo, where they received the support from 
President N asser256 • 
In May 1957, Talib returned to continue the struggle with supplies provided by Saudi 
Arabia, and subsidies from the Arab League. This secessionist movement, the Oman 
Revolutionary Movement (ORM), attempted to restore Ghalib and easily Sa'id's troops 
from Nizwa and BahIa. A strong propaganda effort based in Cairo succeeded in getting 
the "Oman Question" on the United Nations Assembly agenda. The British intervened 
on behalf of the sultan, forcing the ORM rebels to take refuge on the Jabal al-Akhdar 
(Green Mountain). Great Britain, under increasing criticism in the United Nations, 
agreed to help the sultan only if he promised to reform his old kingdom. A limestone 
massif, with a large plateau of 6,000 feet and peaks rising nearly twice as high, the 
254 Gabbash, H.,op .cit. 1997, p314. 
255 Lee, D., Flight from the Middle East. A History of the Royal Air Force in the Arabian 
Peninsula and Adjacent Territories 1945- 1972, London, Her Majesty Stationery Office, pp. 134- 136 
256 Gabbash, H., op cit. 1997, pp.315- 316 
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Jabal al-Akhdar was an ideal refuge for the imamate's guerrillas. By 1959, however, 
the Imam and his brother were forced to surrender. The British had re-established the 
sultan's authority. Treaty of AI-Sib was officially abrogated and the office of imam 
abolished257• 
4.4.1.4 The Dhofar Rebellion 
The most powerful challenge that the Sultanate in Oman ever faced came from the 
Dhofar region, in the shape of Marxist Nationalist Rebellions258• The Dhofar region 
lies in the south of Oman and has been historically very distinct. It is a very beautiful 
and green land. Comprising about one third of the total area of Oman, Dhofar blends 
with central Oman to the North East and with Yemen to the West. The province has 
three distinctive regions: the Salalah plain, the mountain region and a plateau beyond 
the mountains bordering on the desert. 
In the latter part of his rule the Sultan turned his back upon his country and his people. 
Salalah in Dhofar was to him what Zanzibar had been to the earlier Sa'id (1806-
1856259). He disappeared most of his time from the late 1950s onward. He rarely 
visited Muscat; and he never again visited the interior after his trip through Oman at 
the end of 1955. With the discovery of oil, great pressure had been put on Sa'id by the 
citizens to develop his country and spread the wealth of the oil among his people. A 
development organization had been established in the government structure in 1958. 
257 Allen, H., Sayyids, Shets and Sultans: Politics and Trade in Masqat Under the AI-Bu Said, 
1785-1914, Seattle: University of Washington, 1978, pp. 59-60. see alson Gabbash, pp. 317- 325 
258 See Halliday, F., (1974), op. cit., chapter 10, pp. 304-60 for a detailed account of the rebellion. 
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However, Sultan Sa'id had thought enough about development in the context of Oman 
in the last years of his reign to know that he did not want it to happen. 
An Omani presence in Dhofar had existed from 1880, when Turki ibn Sa'id sent 
soldiers and a regional governor to Salalah. Prior to 1970, however, the area had been 
only loosely tied to Oman. Sultan Sa'id tended to regard Dhofar as his personal 
property and to treat its people very bad. When problems arose in the mid- 1960s, they 
came from this area of factionalised and rival tribes. The local economy was stagnant, 
not helped by severe drought in the late 1950s, driving many Dhofaris to seek work in 
neighbouring Gulf states. A UN report put the situation thus: 
"He was cruel and imposed much arbitrary restriction on the people. They 
could not travel outside; they were not permitted to build houses; food 
could only be bought in one walled market where the quantity that could be 
bought was fixed; and they were not allowed to import or export goods. 
Furthermore, there was no work in Dhofar, no schools, no hospitals, no 
economic life, no company came, people from outside the country were 
given jobs, although local people had wished to work. However, the young 
people of Dhofar had held secret meetings about these matters and 
although they had no education, some of them had travelled and they all 
knew their rights,,26o. 
260 UN Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman 1965, p.l64. 
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In 14 August 1964, Dhofari rebels who had trained in Iraq and were opposed to Sa'id 
blew up an oil exploration vehicle and shot at Omani military installations within 
Dhofar itself61. Sa'id's security forces captured approximately 60 insurgents in coastal 
villages and compelled the remainder to seek refuge in the mountains262. To separate 
the other rebels from their supplies, the sultan surrounded Salalah with barbed wire 
and denied access to all outsiders. This move further disturbed the Dhofari tribes-
people, who relied on the markets of Salalah to sell their produce and purchase 
supplies263. 
In 1965, the rebels had established the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) controlled at 
first by tribally oriented separatists. In April 1966, DLF agents penetrated the Sultan's 
guard and attempted to assassinate him. Sa'id, in reprisal for the uprising and the 
attempt on his life, forbade all Dhofaris to go abroad to work. Deprived of one of their 
chief means of supporting their families, many tribes people left for the jabal 
(mountains) to join the rebels. Marxist radicals dominated the DLF by 1968, 
transforming a semi-nationalist struggle against the Albu-Sa'id leader into a leftist 
revolution. Unable to make many gains, these radicals sought to change the movement 
from a poorly organized tribal revolt against specific grievances into an international 
socialist, Arab nationalist, ideological struggle against imperialist forces throughout 
the Gulf region. They, thus, renamed themselves the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). The augmenting current of Arab 
261 Townsend, J., Oman: The Making of a Modern State, BiddIes Ltd, Guildford, Great Britain, 1977, p.96. 
262 Kechichian, J., op .cit. 1995, P.162 
263 Allen op.cit., 1978 
133 
nationalism reached Oman at about the same time that oil exports began. 
Consequently, the sultan's style of government began to appear more and more 
anachronistic. PFLOAG received ideological and material support from the USSR, 
China, and Iraq. For example, Russia provided some weapons to the Omani guerrillas 
and trained them in weapons and Marxist ideologi64• Furthennore, PFLOAG was 
provided a base and headquarters over the border in South Yemen, which had become 
independent under a Marxist government in 1967. Although PFLOAG did not attract 
much popular support from among the region's Jibali tribes people, by 1970 its 
guerrillas occupied Dhofar's mountains and much of the coast265 • In the middle of all 
the tunnoil, oil had been discovered at Fahud in 1964, with exports beginning in 1967. 
While Sa'id did proceed with a few development projects, progress was far too slow 
for the people of Dhofar or Oman. 
In June 1970, shows of revolutionary activity similar to that in Dhofar surfaced in 
central Oman. With the aid of the Iraqis, a new group emerged, the National 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (NDFLOAG), 
composed of foreign-educated Omanis of varied ideological stances and some locals 
who simply opposed the sultan. The new organization intended to operate in Oman 
along the same lines as PFLOAG in Dhofar. With fewer than a hundred supportars, 
NDFLOAG staged mortar attacks on Nizwa and Izki. A new group, the Arab Action 
Party, was fonned in Musandam. Exasperation was mounting in London over Sa'id's 
refusal to spend oil revenue to alleviate the living conditions of his people and his 
264 Kechichian, J., op.cit. 1995, pp.162-163. 
265 Kelly, P., op.cit. pp. 1979, 136-138. 
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inability to deal with the insurgency, which threatened to spread from Dhofar to Oman 
in general. Sa'id would have to be deposed, preferably before the date fixed for 
Britain's removal from the Gulf, in 1971, and with enough time for his successor to 
strengthen his rule266. 
4.4.2 The Coup of 23 July 1970 
The revolution in the north and the rebellions in the South ended any more hope for 
Sa'id to run the country. Qaboos reached a conclusion that his father should be 
replaced267. On Thursday 23 July, 1970, Qaboos with small number of supporters from 
the political elite launched a sudden attack on Sa'id ibn Taymur and removed him from 
power268. After a brief exchange of shooting in which Buraik (the governor of Dhofar) 
was shot in the stomach and the sultan in the foot, the sultan was detained. On Sunday 
26, July, the new Sultan Qaboos informed his citizens of the overthrow in his first 
. I d· b d 269 natlOna ra 10 roa cast . 
The old sultan was exiled to London, where he died in 1972. The new sultan had been 
born in November 1940270 to Sa'id's wife from the Maashani tribe in Dhofar. His early 
years were spent in Salalah, but he was isolated in the royal palace until the late 1950s 
when he was sent to public school in England, followed by training at the Royal 
266 Allen, op.cit. 1978, p. 71. 
267 Peterson, J., Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundation of an Emerging State, 
London, Croom Helm Ltd, 1978,. P. 202. 
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Military Academy at Sandhursf71 . Before returning to Oman, he served a tour of duty 
with British units in West Germany, trained in municipal administration in England, 
and went on a world visit. On his return to Salalah in 1965272, the future sultan was 
held under house arrest in for six years273, reportedly to study Islamic la~74, and was 
refused all visitors except for a few reliable Omanis and expatriates whose loyalty to 
the sultan could not be doubted. Qaboos international and progressive views were 
incompatible with his father's repressive conservatism and isolationism. He was 
worried that Oman would go the way of Marxist South Yemen and that Sa'id's policies 
were damaging to the country's development. The British agreed and British officials 
disaffected Omanis conspired with Qaboos to overthrow the regime. 
From 1970 to 1975, Sultan Qaboos concentrated on restoring control over the Dhofar 
region. He used both economic and military means, convinced that poor economic 
conditions had contributed in promoting the Dhofar rebellion. He offered a general 
amnesty to all opponents, especially those in Dhofar. He began an ambitious, socio-
economic campaign among the Jibali, building wells, roads, and schools, all aimed at 
winning the Dhofaris' political support. Between 1971 and 1975, Dhofar, with its 
population of around 50,000, received almost one-fourth of the country's growth 
money. 
271 http://i-cias.com/e.o/qaboosibnsaid.htm [7-1-2002]. 
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Divisions between the rebels helped the sultan. Traditional Dhofaris disliked the 
Marxists, who had taken over the radical leadership with foreign support. They broke 
with the movement; and when Qaboos gained power, many agreed to support him 
against the rebellion. Surrendering rebels were retrained by the British Special Air 
Service and organized into a special unit, thefirqat. By 1975, around 2,000 rebels had 
surrendered and been retrained and incorporated into the force, as pledged under the 
terms of the amnesty declared shortly after the 1970 COUp275 
The government succeeded in cutting supply lines and secured positions in the Jabal. 
Royal Omani Air Force Strike-master ground support aircraft flew missions from the 
RAF bases at Salalah and the island of Masirah. Sultan Qaboos also solicited the 
assistance of neighbouring states, worried about the growth of left-wing movements in 
the region. By 1973, the Shah of Iran, acting in his self-perceived role as guardian of 
the Gulf following the departure of the British and facing the opposition of a 
communist party in his own country, dispatched ground forces and air units to Dhofar 
to aid the sultan. Oman received economic aid from Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, Britain, 
Jordan and Egypt. In addition, the UAE and Jordan provided troops for guard duty in 
the north, releasing Omani units for service in Dhofar. In 1973-1974, with the arrival 
of Jordanian engineers and Iranian paratroopers, government forces attacked the 
guerrillas in the mountains. By 1975, the sultan had succeeded in suppressing 
militarily the Marxist-inspired rebellion; and he could tum to development issues and 
275 Mohamedi, op.cit. 1994, pp. 304-305. 
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the establishment of modem governmental and administrative institutions276. The 
rebellion finally ended when Oman and South Yemen decided to establish diplomatic 
relations in 1982. From that time the Aden government stopped its help to the rebels. 
From the above account of the recent political history of Oman and the various 
challenges to the Sultanate, it can be concluded that the various democratically 
oriented political changes after 1970 were the responses of a political regime in crisis, 
as an attempt to survive, with the backing of oil resources, in a fast changing world. 
The distinctive aspect of the political changes in Oman was that the process of change 
was fairly peaceful and the regime under the new Sultan managed to hold itself 
together. 
4.5 Society 
Oman is a country with a complex social structure. The majority of the population are 
Arab Muslims of the Ibadhi sect, although there are minority Sunni and Shi' a 
communities. The principal form of social organisation is the tribe. There are minority 
sections of Omani society such as Baluchi, Hindu, and some Christians, whose origins 
lie in the imperial past when immigrants from the Indian sub-continent, or east Africa, 
were either settled in the country, or imported as slaves. Slavery in Oman only ended 
in 1964. The majority of the minority communities have lived in Oman for generations, 
and have Omani citizenship.277 The last three decades in Oman have been characterised 
by modernisation. This has affected society in a number of ways. First, the provision of 
276 Kelly, J., op.cit. 1979, pp.142-150. 
277 Allen, op.cit. 1978. 
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a strong and centralised leadership under Sultan Qaboos has reduced the local power of 
the tribal Sheikhs. The development of a state apparatus has enabled people to by-pass 
the Sheikh when seeking, for example, jobs, passports, or licenses for various things, 
such as cars. Land ownership is now based on legal documents registered with a 
government agency. Tribal Sheikhs maintain traditional roles but these are being 
increasingly reduced in modem Oman. In the past, the tribes provided the security, a 
job and everything that a person needed, but the state has replaced the tribe in this role. 
Consequently, loyalty has been transferred to the government. This helped the 
government to impose its authority on the citizens. Today, the central government has 
superimposed its authority over the traditional patterns of authority and power 
structures like the tribes that were historically accustomed to autonomous existence278• 
Sheikhs have lost their privileges, with jobs in the modem society going to those who 
possessed better skills and knowledge. This has created conflicts between the new elite 
and the Sheikhs. Also, as a result of the massive development in Oman, a trade 
community has started to have strong influence in the society. Traders are influential in 
places such as the Chamber of Trade and Industry, which was established in 1974. 
Some of them occupy important positions in the government and play an important role 
in the policy formulation in Oman. 279 In the past, everything was in the hands of the 
Sheikhs, but today all persons with sufficient wealth can educate their children, so they 
might change the balance in the structure of the society in the future. Some claim that 
the government supports the Sheikhs financially, but this is a strategy of the 
government to command the support of the Sheikhs while creating a new elite. This 
278 Riphenburg, op.cit. 1998, p. 115. 
279 Dahdooh, S., op.cit. 1999, p. 161. 
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might help the government to achieve more stability and decrease the power of the 
Sheikhs. 
Revolution has to be forced on people where as an evolution or modernisation can be 
made to seen to be in the people best interest leading to their support for the process. 
The stability that Oman obtain from it strong social and religious foundation gives a 
stability in which peaceful gradual political change can flourish. 
Modernisation has also effected change in the way that people live. In particular, 
information technology in the form of the telephone (including mobile phones), fax, e-
mail, radio, television, cinema, and household goods such as refrigerators, washing 
machines and motor cars have transformed the day-to-day activities of the greater part 
of the population. 
More important has been the creation of state schools and public health services. 
These services are free, though some facilities in hospitals -such as a private room-
have to be paid for. 
Modernisation in the form of transport, other than the motor car has been important. 
Long distance travel, and the traditional forms of transport used in desert areas, such as 
the camel, have been replaced by the truck. This enables greater quantities to be 
transported more efficiently over long distances, but has not meant that the symbolic 
value of the camel has been lost to the more nomadic tribes of the interior. 
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In Oman, a number of cultural associations have grown up over the years. However, 
while these may become elements of a civil society, at the moment, they have all been 
funded by the state and may be in some way supervised by the state. For example, in 
sport, there are football clubs in every Wilayat. Other popular sports privately 
organised are table tennis, volleyball, handball, and athletics. Cultural clubs exist 
whose interests are the arts, such as poetry and music. Science clubs also exist. 
Modernisation has also changed the way that people work in Oman. Traditional jobs in 
Oman before 1970 were in the agricultural and fishing sectors of the economy. 
Building, and crafts, such as stone masonry, gold and silversmithing and carpet 
weaving were all common trades. Since 1970, and the development of a state 
apparatus, a large number of office-based, white collar jobs were created, as were other 
jobs in institutions such as banks and private companies. 
Industrial production in Oman has grown, mostly staffed by immigrant labour from 
India. The proportion of the labour force in Omani industry that is from abroad is 
significant28o• Industrial jobs in food production, textiles, and oil-related products, are 
thought of as low-paid and unattractive, relative to other jobs that are available. Thus, 
for Omanis themselves, desirable jobs in a modem society are office or white collar 
jobs in either the government or the private sector. However, increasing unemployment 
amongst a growing population suggests that more and more Omanis will work in the 
industrial sector, and that there will be a reduction in the numbers of immigrant 
workers in the country. 
280 Riphenburg., op.cit., 1998, p. 141. 
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During the 1970s and 80s, unemployment was very low and jobs were easily available. 
Most Omanis entered into white collar jobs because of the abundance of opportunities 
and the fact that the lowly paid worker's jobs were taken up by foreigners. However, 
since the 1990s the situation has changed drastically. Unemployment has risen and the 
availability of white collar jobs has also declined. 
"Today the situation has changed. Young Omani graduates are beginning 
to take over jobs previously held by expatriates. The Sultan has frequently 
stressed the importance of reducing Oman's dependence on a foreign 
work-force and has reminded the youth of Oman that they must gain the 
necessary academic qualifications to equip themselves with necessary 
knowledge to work effectively in serving their country.281 
This means that more and more Omanis are now being forced to accept the jobs that 
are less remunerative and were previously done by foreigners. In fact, it is the strategy 
of the government to replace foreign workers with Omanis to tackle the problem of 
growing unemployment. As a result, the number of Omani labourers in industries 
increased from 16% in 1993 to 28% in 1997282. Since there is a considerable difference 
between the earnings of white collar workers and labourers jobs, this has widened the 
income gap among Omani people. In the long term, this might affect social harmony 
and be a source of concern because of frustrations that inequality brings to society. The 
281 Morris, op cit. 1991, P 4. 
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problem of unemployment has to be solved carefully if these dangers to Oman's path 
of progress and development are to be avoided. 
The process of democratisation that has been taking place since the 1980s, has also 
given a degree of public access to decision making. In addition, the citizens 
themselves, whose opinions in previous years would not have been aired in public, now 
take part in discussion programmes on radio and television, and can write to the 
press283 • 
A form of social welfare exists in Oman. In some cases, the government pays subsidies 
to traditional jobs such as fishing, agriculture and handicrafts. Families who have been 
affected by natural disasters, such as floods or fire, are entitled to a monthly income. 
Charitable foundations also exist that are targeted at the poor, women and children284 . 
The lifestyle of people has changed. Individualism has started to influence the new 
generation. In the past the person used to live with his family sharing the income and 
the food. Now, in order to find a job he has to go elsewhere. Most educated people 
have started to leave their home towns to go to Muscat, where they relish the free 
environment, especially the modem life. 
Emigrants have also returned to Oman. Before 1970, a huge number of Omanis went 
abroad to search for better jobs, a better standard of life and freedom. They went to the 
283 White Book, Oman op.cit. 1996. 
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Gulf states, Egypt, East Africa, India and other parts of the world. The fundamental 
changes in Oman have encouraged Omanis to come back and the knowledge and 
experience they have brought with them gave them the opportunity to participate in the 
development of a modem country. Also they have participated in designing the features 
of the Omani social policy. 
In addition there was an internal migration. People from rural areas migrated to cities, 
where there were better chances of jobs, better chances of education for their children 
and higher incomes. This led them to decrease their loyalty to the traditional style of 
life, such as their interest in growing animals and agriculture. Before 1970, around 
90% of Omani people depended for their income on agriculture which in 1967 
constituted around 34.6% of the total income.285 Today, Omanis prefer to work in 
industrial, trade, and service sectors. This migration increased their level of awareness 
and enhanced their knowledge by bringing them in contact with experts. Despite the 
fact that the government pays attention to developing urban areas, this migration 
adversely affects the infrastructure there. People leave their gardens and their animals 
in villages, and today the immigrants take care of them. 
Also there have been cultural changes. At the beginning of the 1970s the government 
provided opportunities for the development of cultural activities, by establishing 
educational and information institutes. Clubs, schools, youth centres, and training 
centres spread throughout Oman. In addition, the government became 'liberal'. People 
285 Dahdooh, S.,op.cit., 1999, p.254 
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were free in their beliefs, so they could drink alcohol, smoke and shave their beards, 
women could go unveiled if they wished, and so on. 
Women now have the freedom to work, own property, and join men in their activities. 
They have started to be effective elements in the society. Women's participation in the 
government has increased. For example, Sheikha A'aisha bint Khalfan AI-Siyaby the 
President of the Public Authority for Craft Industries, Dr Rawiah Al-Busaidi the 
minister of Higher Education and Under Secretaries in the Education, Social Welfare 
and Development ministries are women. Also, a number of women are members of the 
State Council and the Consultative Council. But a number of families are still 
conservative and much needs to be done in the field of gender justice. 
The position of children in the society has also improved greatly. They enjoy good 
health and rich nutrition now, as compared to thirty years back. The vaccination and 
immunisation campaigns have been a great success, decreasing the chances of fatal 
diseases and physical disabilities. There are community parks in residential areas 
where children can go and play along with their families. For example, the municipal 
body in Muscat organised a new year festival for children which was sponsored by 
many companies. The children learnt about the heritage of the country and were 
entertained with their families. Children have the opportunity to watch interesting 
programmes on TV, which was banned before 1970. 
The nature of cuisine has also undergone a significant change. Today one can find 
restaurants serving dishes from various countries like Mexican, Chinese, Indian, 
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Turkish etc. The food habits within the household have also been influenced by Indian, 
East African and European tastes. 
In the past, relations between father and son were a traditional. For example, if the 
father was a fisherman, the son would continue the same work. But as a result of the 
change in the society and the better standard of education, the new generation have 
found themselves taking different professions, and have started to think differently on 
various issues of life, compared to the previous generation. 
As a result of the job opportunities that have been created since the 70s, experts and 
workers came to Oman from abroad and the number of tourists increased every year. 
These people brought with them new habits unusual for the Omani society. This 
affected the society at cultural and social levels. The number of criminals and drug-
takers has increased during recent years. These phenomena were absent in Oman 
earlier. As a reaction against these trends, various fundamentalist elements and 
organisations entered Omani society. For example, during the summer of 1994, the 
government arrested hundreds of members of the international organisation of Muslim 
Brotherhood who were planning to overthrow the current regime and replace it with a 
fu d 1· I 1· . 286 more n amenta 1st s amlc regIme. 
286 Riphenburg, op.cit., 1999, pp. 106-107. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
The location of Oman at the far comer of the Arabian Peninsula has had a profound 
effect on Omani history, its people and the current situation. Historically, Oman 
remained outside the main currents of Arab history and its relations with Asian 
countries were far stronger than those with Arab countries. In present times, this is 
reflected in the considerable number of South Asian economic immigrants in Oman. 
The history of Oman shows that it has passed through many phases. From being an 
Indian Ocean empire between the 17th and 19th centuries, it was reduced to being a 
relatively poor state until the 20th century. On the social front, change is slowly 
creeping in through education and contact with external societies by the new 
generation. The government has tried to reconcile the traditional authority structure 
with the demands of the centralised authority of the state. So far it has been successful 
in this balancing act. 
We will see in the next chapter that significant progress has been made in the health 
and education sectors in order to enhance the human resources at the disposal of the 
nation. In the international arena, the government has acted responsibly and in 
cooperation with various governments and organisations, and has fully participated in 
international organisations like United Nations, WTO etc. The policy of the 
government has been to keep itself open to influences and ideas without compromising 
its sovereign interests. 
Social and economic developments in Oman have lifted the country from poverty and 
backwardness to a modernizing society competing with developing Arab neighbours. 
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This has in tum added to the legitimacy of Sultan Qaboos. But he has also sought to 
broaden the legitimacy basis of his rule, internally and externally. 
Democratisation in Oman has not been an exact copy of western European or 
American democracy. It has some formal elements that can be found in the West, but 
most important is the way that it has incorporated Islamic traditions into the 
consultation process. Also, in Ibadi Islam, there are requirements that leading figures 
be elected. This means that people in Oman recognise democratisation as their own, 
and not as something imposed or imported by foreigners. Oman offers a different 
experience from the other states in the region. It is one of the oldest states in the region, 
it is oil rich, and it has begun to experiment with democracy. The specification of 
democracy in Oman will be examined in chapter six but because of the key importance 
of the Omani setting the next chapter will examine the interaction between political and 
socio-economic change in the country. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE INTERACTION OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
"The comprehensive development that is taking place throughout the 
length and breadth of our land has been achieved through hard work and 
honest endeavour and its success has been due to the sound planning and 
support afforded by the government,,287 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to examine the interaction between political and socio-economic 
changes in Oman because in practice, they have been closely interlinked. The current 
Sultan has seen to it that his model of political changes is not de-linked from social and 
economic changes. 
The political changes that have been introduced in Oman since the 1970s are 
immensely important for the subjects of Oman. Oman is not yet a democratic country, 
but the changes have democratic significance. Politically, the situation in the country is 
much better than in the pre-1970 period. It will take perhaps many decades before the 
full import of the political changes will be understood. But what is more important is 
the set of social and economic effects for which those political changes have been 
287 Qaboos , S., The Royal speeches of H.M Sultan Qaboos ibn Said 1970 - 1995, Oman News 
House, 1995 p. 277. 
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responsible. The political rationale of rulers in introducing change is, of course, their 
need for survival in world of change. Political rulers, especially in a monarchy, buy 
time by introducing political changes. The history of the West is full of examples of 
how political rulers have introduced changes in the face of serious challenges to their 
authority. It is true that not all of them survived. Eventually, monarchies in the West 
have given way to popular rule. In the Middle East, by contrast, with the backing of the 
sudden oil revenues, the political rulers are more equipped to survive in the rapidly 
changing world than, perhaps, their western counterparts. Nevertheless, the people tend 
to judge the efficacy of such political changes in terms of social and economic goods 
delivered. In Oman, the political changes that have taken place may not be 
revolutionary, but the social and economic changes that have followed have been 
overwhelming. Such social and economic effects have prepared further grounds for 
political legitimacy to the Sultanate. The existing writings on Oman's politics have 
neglected this aspect of the political changes in Oman. This chapter seeks to rectify this 
neglect by providing an overall descriptive account of various changes that have 
followed the political changes in Oman since the 1970s. 
5.2 Oman before 1970 
Oman before the 1970s was a stagnant country. Despite some oil revenues, its 
infrastructure was almost absent due to the complete lack of any development. The 
country was extremely backward in health, education, housing, and communications. 
The country faced a full- scale local war in Dhofar, and all the consequent dislocations. 
The people of various regions of the country suffered from various hardships due to 
lack any development, and redistribution of the oil resources. There was almost total 
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illiteracy, malnutrition, diseases and so on. Oman before 1970 was a classic case of a 
poor underdeveloped country. The country at that time was heavily dependent upon 
agriculture, which was not developed, despite being the main source of income for the 
country. The main source of state revenues was the heavy taxes imposed on crop-
growers and cattle farmers. The taxes were exorbitant because the country was isolated 
and did not have external trade relations to diversify its resources. However, with the 
political changes, and within the space of three decades, Oman has made remarkable 
progress and development in various fields: oil production, gas exploration, 
industrialization, international trade and commerce, service and tertiary sectors, 
agriculture and fisheries. 
5.3 The National Income Since the 1970s 
"It has long been our intention that our economy should be so diversified 
that our dependence on one resource - oil - is reduced. To do this, we must 
exploit our country's other natural resources and our industrial potential to 
the full" Qaboos ibn Sa'id, 10th National Day, 1980288 
5.3.1 The Main Income 
Oil in Oman was known before the new era began in 1970. In fact, the first oil 
concession was granted in 1925. Initially, oil companies did not look favourably on 
Oman's resources. It was only when superior deposits of oil were discovered in Yabil 
and N atih in the central province in 1962 that oil companies took a keen interest, and 
288 Ibid. pp.82-83. 
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the first oil from these sources was exported in 1967. However, owing to Sultan Sa'id 
ibn Taymur's reluctance, the Dhofar war, and the lack of a physical infrastructure, it 
was not until 1975 that practical measures on a substantial level were taken to develop 
the oil industri89• 
The development of the oil industry took place with the implementation of a strategy 
devised by Sultan Qaboos in 1974. The First Five-Year Plan, launched in 1976, 
targeted the physical infrastructure, that is, transport and communications, and laid the 
foundations for long term improvements in the provision of health and education. The 
plan was based on the revenues from oil, which increased substantially as development 
coincided with the oil boom of the 1970s-1980s29o• 
An additional feature of the oil industry has been Oman's refining potential. The first 
refmery was opened in 1982, and is used mostly for domestic supplies. Other 
developments have included investment in the petrochemical industry, and the 
provision of oil refining facilities in other countries, such as India291 • The government 
announced in 2003 the establishment of a new refinery in Sohar city, expected to be 
operational from the year 2005292• 
289 Oman Information Book, Muscat, Ministry of Infonnation, 1997. 
290 Ibid. 
291 http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeulcabs.oman.html [1-8-2002]. 
292 www.Oman News Agency [5-1-2003]. 
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5.3.2 Diversification of Income 
Non-oil resources of importance in Oman are gas, fish, processed copper, and textiles. 
Gas was first discovered and developed in the period between 1989 and 1991, also in 
the central province. There are considerable reserves and a large amount of capital has 
been invested in the industry. Natural gas is used in Oman for electricity supplies and 
to power water desalination plants. It is also an export resource, with contracts signed 
to supply India, South Korea and other Asian and European countries. Investment in 
the project totals about one billion dollars and it is expected to cover around ten percent 
of the total income of the government293 • 
The Omani strategy focused from the beginning on the necessity to adopt harmonious 
policies for development to ensure diversification of the national economy and its 
balanced growth. The recent economic plan shifted Oman from a backward economy 
to a modem and diversified one that had the potential for self-development and the 
ability to adapt to regional and international changes. The following table shows the 
contribution of oil and non-oil sectors to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Oman 
during 1998-2000. Whereas the contribution of the non-oil sector remained almost 
stagnant, the contribution of the oil sector more than doubled from 1998 to 2000. 
293 www. Oman news Agency, [13-11-2001]. 
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Table 5.1. Oman's GDP by Economic Activity 
Gross Domestic Product by Kind of Economic Activity at Current Prices 
MnRo 2000 (2) 1999 (1) 1998 
A- Petroleum Activities 3,731.4 2,365.8 1,672.6 
Extraction of Crude Petroleum & incidental 3,631.5 2,299.2 1,609.7 
services to Oil & Gas extraction 
Extraction of natural Gas 99.9 66.6 62.9 
B- Non Petroleum Activities 4,041.2 3,751.2 3,859.7 
Mining & Quarrying 18.1 15.8 15.8 
Manufacturing 397.8 253.9 251.3 
Construction 116.3 140.0 202.0 
Electricity and Water Supply 78.0 71.4 67.9 
Public Administration & Defence 699.8 682.7 671.3 
Other Activities 2,731.3 2,587.5 2,651.5 
Total Activities (A+B) 7,772.6 6,117.0 5,532.3 
Less Financial International Indirectly Measured 212,2 197.0 178.2 
Plus Custom Duties 42.5 80.3 61.7 
G.D.P At Market Price 7,602.9 6,000.3 5,415.9 
Source: Oman: Facts & Figures 2000, Infonnation and Publication Centre, 
The most important economic achievement since 1970 was the huge jump in the GDP 
which rose from RO. 104,7 million in 1970 to around RO. 7603 million, according to 
initial estimates for the year 2000. A growth rate of 5.9% in GDP was achieved during 
the first half of the year 2001 and the non-oil sectors achieved growth of 9.9%.294 In 
addition, per capita income rose from RO. 1,596 to around RO. 3,200 during the same 
period. The social indicators also witnessed a huge development in tenns of big 
increases in the production and distribution of electricity and water and the expansion 
294 Mucki, A,. Review of the Omani Economy, Muscat, Oman News Agency, 18, 11,2001. 
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in education and health services, which positioned the Sultanate among the developed 
nations295 • 
Another economic achievement was the diversification of the economic base as the 
non-oil sectors' contribution to GDP rose from 31% in 1970 to around 52% in 2000. 
The continued growth in the private sector's role in boosting economic development 
and the comprehensive renaissance witnessed by the Sultanate was another economic 
landmark of this era.296 
Oil production still remains the main pillar of economy with 350 Million (Mn). Barrels 
(BBL) produced per annum. Of this, 327 Mn. BBL is exported every year, bringing 
huge revenues297• Oman remains heavily dependent on oil revenues, which account for 
roughly 80% of country's export earnings298• The number of producing wells is around 
2,525 and five crude oil companies are involved in the exploration and production of 
oil in Oman. To top it all, the annual average price (US $ BBL) of oil has more then 
doubled since 1998 from 11,92 to 26,71.299 
295 Oman: Facts & Figures 2000, Information and Publication Centre Ministry of National Economy. P.3 
296 Mucld, A., op.cit. 
297 Oman: Facts & Figures 2000,op.cit. 2000. pl. 
298 www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/oman.html [1-8-2002]. 
299 Oman: Facts & Figures 2000, op.cit, p.l. 
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Table 5.2. Profile of Oil Production in Oman, 1998-2000 
Oil 
2000 1999 1998 
Crude Oil Production: 
Daily Average (OOOBBL) 955 904 899 
Annual (Mn. BBL) 350 330 328 
Production Wells (no) 2,525 2,470 2,377 
Exports (Mn BBL) 327 309 301 
Average Daily export (000 BBL) 895 846 825 
Crude Oil Prod .• Companies 5 5 5 
Annual Average Price (uss BBL) 26,71 17,35 11,92 
Source: Oman: Facts & Figures 2000, Information and Publication Centre, 11 
Oman has also concentrated on the production of natural gas. In 2000,547,219 Million 
Standard Cubic Feet (MNSCF) of natural gas was produced compared to 367,123 
MNSCF in 1998. Chief minerals produced include Marble, Limestone, Gypsum, Salt, 
Chromate, Iron and Building Materials30o• 
A number of strategic projects were implemented, which were important for economic 
diversification and helped boost the national income and hard currency earnings. These 
projects included the Liquid Natural Gas Company plant in the Wilayt of Sur, the 
Salalah Container Terminal Expansion and Sohar Port. 
300 Oman: Facts & Figures 2000,op.cit., pll. 
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5.3.3 Fisheries and Agriculture 
Sultan Qaboos has emphasised the importance of the fisheries and agriculture sector 
and said 
"This sector will be given all necessary support to enable it to become an 
important national income project, with the widest possible opportunities 
for participation by all Omanis. As encouragement of agriculture, as a vital 
factor in our national economy, we intended to declare next year as the 
Year of Agriculture. This signifies the importance we attach to all efforts in 
the field, by both government and the private sector. In this we include the 
essential factor of marketing, which will also provide support for our 
farmers". 30 1 
As it can be seen from Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 a total area of around 173,400 Faddan 
(acre) is under cultivation with maximum utilisation in fruit production.302 This is a 
significant improvement from the figure of 63,000 Feddan used for agriculture till 
1993. Shortage of irrigation water was the key reason behind this underutilisation of 
land resources303• Fisheries are another source of foreign income with around 29% of 
fish produced being exported every year. Domestic animals include cows, camels, 
sheep and goats304• 
301 Qaboos, S., op.cit p. 166. 
302 Oman: Facts and Figures op.cit. p. II. 
303 Dahdooh, S., 1999, pp.254-256. 
304 Ibid. 
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Table 5.3. Agricultural Production in Oman, 1999-2000 
Estimated Cultivated Area and production by Crops 
2000 1999 
Production Area Production Area 
Vegetable 151.7 15.7 166.9 17.1 
Fruit 345.0 100.3 347.8 100.1 
Field Crops 23.8 14.8 24.5 15.1 
Crops 692.2 42.5 747.4 42.4 
Total - 173.4 - 174.7 
- Area in (000) Feddan - Production in (000) Ton 
Source: Oman: Facts & Figures 2000, Information and Publication Centre, Page 10 
Table 5.4. Fish Production In Oman, 1997-2001 
Fisheries 
Ton 2000(1) 1999 1998 1997 
Traditional Fishing 108,019 96,663 88,556 84,444 
Commercial Fishing 12,402 12,145 17608 34,549 
Fish Landed 120,421 108,808 106,164 118,993 
Fish Expert 
Quantity 34,905 29,889 45,640 55,920 
Value OOORO 18,610 13,980 19,128 25,948 
% of Exports to Production 29.0 27.5 43.0 47.0 
Source: Oman: Facts & Figures 2000, Information and Publication Centre, Page 10 
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Table 5.5. Estimated Production in Agriculture and Fisheries 
2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 
1- Agriculture Sector 
a- Estimates of Cultivated land (000 Fadden) 173 172 
- - -
b- Estimates of Agriculture Production (000 Fadden) 1,213 1,121 
- - -
2- Fish Sector 
a- Fish Landed (000 ton) 120 140 119 95 
-
b- Commercial Fishing 12 31 19 13 
-
c- Traditional Fishing 108 109 100 82 
-
3- Export of Fish 
a- Quantity (000 ton) 35 59 34 19 8 
b- Value (000) R.O 18,610 23,612 17,280 8,764 2,007 
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistics Year Book, Information and 
Publication Centre, 2000 pp. 138-139 
Since the 1980s when the development programmes in the country were really 
launched, the country's agricultural and fisheries production has shown manifol 
increase. As Table 5.5 above shows, overall, production in both the sectors has 
registered a nine-fold increase in R.O values. 
Table 5.6. Estimated Number of Animals 
Animals (000) 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 
Cows 298,9 285,0 270,2 258,1 246,0 234,5 
Camels 118,9 117,0 115,1 110,8 107,6 104,5 
Sheep 343,9 327,0 310,9 295,9 280,9 266,7 
Total 978,5 959,0 939,9 922,4 905,3 888,6 
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistics Year Book, Information and 
Publication Centre, 2000, p.147 
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Better health care and governmental support have meant that the cattle population of 
the country has witnessed growth (Table 5.6). During 1996-2000, the numbers of all 
the three major animals (cows, camels, and sheep) have grown. 
5.3.4 Tourism 
The government paid this sector attention from the beginning of the 1990s. The 
Sultanate has all the potential for a prosperous tourism industry not only in terms of 
natural, cultural and heritage resources but also in terms of the level of security and 
stability it enjoys. In addition to that, basic infrastructure and other services related to 
tourism including accommodation, transport, entry and residence procedures are all 
present in the Sultanate and create conditions conducive for the growth of tourism. 305 
Since the Sultanate is a secure destination for tourists and abounds in rich and diverse 
tourist sites, the plan to enhance tourism movement will depend on the availability of 
utilities and services in addition to promotion and marketing programmes. The roles of 
the government and the private sector are integrated in this respect and the government 
will continue to provide all facilities including infrastructure and institutional 
requirements in addition to promotional campaigns.306 The plan now is to assist private 
companies operating in the sector which should, on their part, make their own 
marketing programmes to attract tourists from around the world. For example, the 
government supported the private sector, in the year 2000, in establishing an annual 
Film Festival to attract famous artists and media to come to the Sultanate. This step 
305 AI-Busaid, B., Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview [10- 4- 2001]. 
306 Ibid. 
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attracted people who work in films to visit Oman and encouraged film producing 
companies to use Omani facilities307• 
To improve the level of tourism activities in Oman, the government and the private 
sector have established a number of modem hotels, keeping pace with globalizing 
economic changes around the world. Indeed, a major indicator of the change in Oman 
is the increase in hotel industries, both nationally owned and internationally owned. 
From the 1980s, Oman has seen the establishment of major hotels, representing major 
international chains, notably Intercontinental, Sheraton, Holiday Inn and Novotel. 
5.3.5 Privatisation policy 
Oman is keen to privatise comparues III sectors such as electricity, water and 
communications. The foreign private sector's contributions reflect the success of the 
privatisation policy, as well as the success of economic diversification and the 
interaction between the Sultanate's economic policies and new developments in the 
international field. These developments include liberalisation, economic freedom and a 
gradual reduction in the economic role of the public sector, particularly in the 
productive fields, as well as a greater role for private-sector consumer and capital 
spending in boosting economic development. This policy will give opportunities to 
local businessmen and external investors to invest their capital in Oman 308. 
307 AI-Zadjali ,K., the president of the Omani Film Society, Interview [21-8-2002] 
308 Muc1d op.cit. 
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From the beginning, privatisation aimed to strengthen the development process and 
economic diversification, reduce the government's role in the productive and service 
sectors and expand the role of the private sector by giving it the opportunity to fmance, 
implement and manage service projects. Privatisation had several advantages. It helped 
promote economic freedom, made the private sector more productive, provided 
services and attracted domestic and foreign investment for industrial and commercial 
enterprises which had previously been the preserve of the public sector. This in tum 
helped promote greater economic diversification309• 
The result was more and better goods and services, more training opportunities for 
nationals, enhanced productivity and greater efficiency. Privatisation also played a vital 
role in developing the capital market and, as a result, the financial system. It also 
helped reduce the burden on the state budget by reducing expenditure on subsidising 
products and services and by increasing state revenues by selling off the state's shares 
in various industrial and commercial enterprises31O• 
The Minister of Economy in Oman said: 
"Transfers of ownership and attempts to expand and modernise may 
demand that a company or establishment be restructured, and this can lead 
to surplus labour - particularly unskilled labour - becoming unemployed 
until it can be absorbed elsewhere. The government has taken several steps 
309 Ibid. 
310 Al-Manthary, F., "Towards Excellence in the Private Sector", Al-Markazi, vol, 24, issue 3, 1999, 
PP.20-22. 
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to minimise the negative effects of privatisation on the work force. These 
include retraining people who have been made redundant so that they can 
fmd employment elsewhere. In addition, various other economic reforms 
will stimulate economic activity and create new job opportunities" 311. 
The government expects privati sed establishments to create greater job opportunities in 
the long term. This is because they will become well-organized and more dynamic and 
will develop a greater need for trained manpower312. 
An important role in economic planning is played by the census. It is well known that 
the Sultanate's development programmes are based on the five-year- plan system. 
These plans need accurate statistics and other data, so the census provides information 
which is essential for the preparation of the development plans. In addition, 
development proj ects and social services programmes are based on the results obtained 
from the census. 
The new census, which took place in the year 2003, will enable the government to 
identify its achievements, as well as future needs. Moreover, the census data will 
provide useful statistical information for specialist surveys and field studies. 
Oman is also affected by the polices of the Gee, of which it is part. The Gee 
countries announced the creation of the customs union similar to the European Union. 
311 Mucld op.cit. 
312 AI-Lamki, S., "Barriers to Omanisation in the Private Sector: the Perceptions ofOmani Graduates" 
The International Journal of Human Resources Management, vol 9:2 April 1998 
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They agreed also on a single Gulf currency by the end of 2010, linked to the US 
dollan13. These two measures reflect the trend towards greater Gulf integration, with 
the year 2010 marking the start of practical steps to create a unified Gulf. 
The Muscat Security Market was established in 1989 but by the late 90s was affected 
seriously as a result of the recession in the world economy. The Security Market began 
to recover its health after the latest steps taken by the government to support it and the 
measures introduced by the Capital Market Authority (CMA) on procedures and 
conditions for listing on the market. The Capital Market Authority will continue to 
introduce reforms when necessary. The government sees its role as to focus on creating 
a suitable environment and climate for investment and encouraging domestic and 
foreign investors314. 
5.3.6 External investments 
The following tables show Omani imports and exports of goods: 
Table 5.7. Imports and Exports 
Item (Mn R.O) 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 
Merchandise Imports 1,972.80 1,683.60 1,075.90 1,161.90 678.00 
Merchandise Exports 4,352.00 2,345.90 2,116.40 1,778.10 1,294.50 
Total Trade Exchange 6,324.80 4,029.50 3,192.30 2,940.00 1,972.50 
Trade Balance 2,379.20 662.30 1,040.5 616.20 616.50 
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistics Year Book, Information and Publication 
Centre, 2000, pp.228-229 
313 AI-Busaid, B., Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Muscat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview 
[10- 4- 2001]. 
314 Ibid. 
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Table 5.8. Value of Recorded Merchandise Imports (the top ten) 
Country 2000 1999 1998 
(000) RO (OOO)RO (OOO)RO 
UAE 570,891 505,314 550,766 
Japan 350,869 273,697 343,780 
UK 112,776 122,894 159,001 
USA 103,981 115,318 153,522 
Germany 72,66 70,760 107,150 
Korea (south) 66,781 37,909 41,310 
India 63,269 62,004 63,689 
Australia 56,292 48,480 46,290 
Saudi Arabia 52,942 61,167 64,652 
Netherlands 45,016 57,720 47,256 
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistics Year Book, Information and 
Publication Centre, 2000, p.263 
Table 5.9. Value of Recorded Merchandise (the top ten) 
Country 2000 1999 1998 
(OOO)RO (OOO)RO (OOO)RO 
UAE 299,133 276,104 286,884 
Saudi Arabia 62,609 44,738 38,865 
Iran 58,453 46,159 61,652 
Yemen 58,410 35,021 52,456 
USA 41,137 33,235 33,393 
UK 28,289 33,235 33,393 
Tanzania 21,983 29,696 24,290 
Singapore 13,828 9,720 9,706 
Zambia 11,594 16,133 9,339 
Kuwait 11,589 8,330 7,382 
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistics Year Book, Information and 
Publication Centre, 2000, pp.273-279. 
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Table 5.10. GDP at Market Price 
Item 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 
MnRO MnRO MnRO MnRO MnRO 
Total Petroleum Activities 3,719.9 2,020.00 2,144.40 1,780.70 1,322.70 
Total Non-petroleum 4,069.00 3,368.50 2,407.00 1,832.30 878.20 
Activities 
GNI per Capita (R.O) 3,053 2,426 2,708 2,474 1,979 
Gross National Disposable 6,786.80 4,594.20 4,086.00 3,191.60 1,973 
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistics Year Book, Information and 
Publication Centre, 2000, pp.328-329 
As Tables 5.7-10 above show, the country's exports and imports have grown by seven 
hundred percent manifold in the last two decades. That is what the Sultan wanted when 
he emphasised the need for diversification of the sources of revenues for the country. 
International trades have diversified, and Oman has increasingly involved itself in 
trading with many nations. The country's trade balance has also been retained. Oman's 
international trading partners are not simply confined to its neighbours in the 
developing countries, but include many advanced western countries such as USA and 
the UK. All these are signs of a fast growing economy. 
The Gross National Product (GNP) has seen remarkable improvement. In 1970 it was 
estimated at 105 million Omani Rials, but in 1985 the amount was estimated 3454 
b 'll' 0 . Ri 1 315 1 IOn manl as. 
315 AI-Harassi, H, The Sultanate of Oman's Foreign Policy: Analysis and Explanation of Oman's 
Independent Approach Since 1970 University of Salford, 1994, p. 65. 
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Table 11. Estimated Production of Crude Oil, Gas, Copper, Gold and Silver 
2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 
IProduction of Oil Daily (000) BBL 955 852 685 498 283 
~nnual (Mn.BBI 350 313 250 182 104 
k\. verage Daily Exp (OOOBBL) 895 785 21 27 37 
IProduction Gas (MNSCF) 547,219 242,266 186,880 141,985 92,964 
Sales Copper Cathode (Ton) 24,400 1,100 12,400 14,014 -
Gold 1,029 1,578 54 59 -
Silver 4,594 4,490 3.000 - 905,3 
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistics Year Book, Information and 
Publication Centre, 2000, pp.166-167 
The table above shows that although the country's oil production has increased over 
the last two decades, the other sources of the country's revenues such as gas have 
registered significant growth. For example, in 1980 Oman produced, 283.000 BBL, 
which was increased to 955.00 BBL in 2000. In the year 2003 the production dropped 
sharply as a result of technical problems, but production is expected to return to its 
former level by the year 2004316• 
5.3.7 "Vision of 2020" 
In 1995 Oman held an international conference, to which numerous experts from 
different parts of the world were invited. Members of the government, and the Omani 
1· db' 1" t d317 Par lament an usmessmen a so particlpa e . 
316 Oman News Agency [5-1-2003]. 
317 AI-Lamki, S., op.cit 1998. 
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The aim of the conference was to establish a clear vision of how Oman could handle 
the challenges of globalisation and establish an economy based on international 
competitiveness and productivity. The government, private sector and citizens would 
translate these directives into plans, which would enable the Sultanate to enjoy its 
prominent economic and financial position by reliance on the private sector. Both the 
government and the private sector identified the following aims: 
1. Develop and upgrade Omani Human Resources in order to cope with 
technological progress and attain international competitiveness. 
2. Develop a private sector capable of optimum use of human and natural 
resources in an efficient and economically sound way, in close collaboration 
with the government. 
3. Utilize the geo- strategic location of the sultanate, optimize the use of its natural 
resources and promote economic diversification 
4. Distribute the fruits of development among all regions and all citizens. 
5. Preserve, safeguard and develop the achievements accomplished in the past 
twenty-five years318. 
Oman is taking the recommendations of the conference seriously. Most of the 
current proj ects in areas such as the education, health and business are based on the 
advice received from this conference. 
318 http://www.moneoman.gov.om/ministry/vision2020/2020visioncon.htm [1-8-1002]. 
168 
5.3.8 World Trade Organisation 
In October 2000 the Sultanate of Oman became the 139th member of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO)319. It was expected that WTO would produce numerous 
advantages but at the same time create major difficulties. The national industries would 
face considerable external competition. For this reason, the Sultanate fixed the general 
customs general duty ceiling for manufactured products at 15%, with some exceptions 
above or below that level in a number of areas. Various tariff categories would become 
effective in a period of 3 to 10 years from the date the Sultanate attained WTO 
membership32o. 
Since those ceilings were higher than or equal to the tariff ceiling currently employed 
in most cases and there was a grace period of up to 10 years in some cases, Omani 
industry had enough time to prepare for competition with imported goods and for entry 
into international markets321. 
The private sector needs to improve external competitiveness by raising the quality of 
its products and capacity for production and marketing as well as focusing more 
attention on research and development. The government has already taken significant 
steps to amend the legal framework to meet the WTO requirements, encourage local 
and foreign investment, improve productivity and efficiency, reduce production cost 
and realise competitiveness, while observing international standards and specifications. 
319 Flifal, J., Sultanate of Oman and its involvement in the World Trade Organisation, Muscat, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry 2001, p.3. 
320 Mucki, op.cit. 
321 Ibid. 
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5.4 State-Building 
"At the same time, we call upon every citizen to participate in this drive 
for comprehensive development. More that never before, it is essential 
that the private sector should take serious and progressive steps to make 
as much as possible of the qualified Omani working force. Naturally this 
will greatly help in developing the capabilities of our national skills,,322. 
The above speech suggests that Sultan Qaboos has always emphasized the overriding 
need for the total development of the country in a more progressive direction. 
However, the development of the country needs efficient government officials, and 
hence the need for state-building. 
One of the major areas of the effects of the political changes in Oman has been the 
growth in the state itself, to be precise, the government. Governmental activities 
required governmental apparatus, the bureaucracy. Thus, the governmental structure 
has also developed in the wake of multifarious developmental activities. Before 1970 
the number of workers in the government was 4,900 around 93 percent of whom were 
Omanis 323. As Table 5.12 below shows, there has since 1980 been a persistent growth 
(almost three-fold) in various sectors of state employment. The most spectacular 
development has taken place in the civil service, which is strategically very important 
for the social and economic development of the country. 
322 Qaboos, S., Op. cit, p. 16l. 
323 Hassn, M., The Progress of the Omani Administration Law, (Golden Press, Sultanate of Oman, 1990), p414. 
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Around RO. 2 million was allocated to building a national fund for support and 
development of small projects. The private sector was expected to carry out the role of 
on-job training for nationals, with state support324• This called for the enlargement of 
both government and investment expenditure in order to achieve growth in the social 
services and to complete the mega proj ects. The same was also necessary to start new 
projects and to support the private sector efforts to develop tourism and continue 
supporting soft loans offered by the government in the health, education, industry and 
tourism fields. 
The Sultanate is one of the highest spenders on education; a fact recognised by the 
Wodd Bank. These successes have reflected positively on the policy of Omanisation. 
The number of Omani employees in the private sector and registered with the Public 
Authority for Social Insurance more than doubled at the end of the Five-Year Plan 
from 25,000 workers in 1995 to 56,000 workers as at the end of 2000 and 59,000 
workers in August 2001 325• 
324 Oman news Agency, [17-11-2001]. 
325 Ministry of Manpower, Oman, Report, 2001. 
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Table 5.12. Government Employees 
2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 
ttotal government employees (000) 110 111 84 69 40 
I-Civil Service 84,662 86,202 68,120 54,962 34,652 
a-Omani 63,934 59,728 44,024 33,772 21,625 
ib-expatriates 20,728 26,474 24,096 21,190 13,027 
2-Diwan of Royal Court 18,280 17,004 12,384 11,686 4,188 
a-Omani 12,243 10,848 6,420 5,424 1,820 
b-expatriates 6,037 6,156 5,964 6,262 2,368 
~-Public Corporations 7,556 7,323 3,807 2,462 1,500 
a-Omani 5,602 5,176 3,039 1,682 1,105 
ib-expatriates 1,954 2,147 768 780 395 
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistics Year Book, Information and 
Publication Centre, 2000, pp. 88-89. 
Meanwhile, employment in the private sector has also kept pace. For expertise and 
knowledge, Oman has always employed foreign workers who constitute a significant 
element of the work force in the country. This foreign element in the workforce was 
unavoidable when the country itself did not have the adequate infrastructural facilities 
to create its own technical skills. However, with development, this dependence on 
foreign workers has been reduced and the country's educated manpower is now 
searching for adequate employment. 
Necessary arrangements for the growth of the private sector and enhancing its 
contribution to the national economy were made, including institutional and legal 
frameworks, improvement of the investment environment and opening up the economy 
to embrace globalisation. This resulted in a very tangible contribution from the private 
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businesses to economic activities. Private investments as a percentage of the total 
investment increased considerably from 28% at the end of the eighties to more than 
40% at the end of Fifth Five-Year Plan. The plan is that private sector investment will 
reach 54% of the total investment projected in the Sixth Five-Year Plan, thereby 
exceeding for the first time government investments326• 
Table 5.13. Private Sector Employment 
Total Omanis Working in the Private Sector 
Year 2000 1999 
Number or Workers 55,671 50,660 
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistics Year Book, Information and 
Publication Centre, 2000, p.114 
As it can be seen from Table 5.13, despite the growth in educated and skilled Omanis, 
the country still depends on foreign workers. Therefore, the government is yet to stop 
the recruitment of foreign workers, but it has been stipulated that companies have to 
employ Omanis as well. The statistics show that in 1998, there were 470,000 foreign 
workers but in 1997 there were 500,000. Thus, decrease has not been great. Currently, 
the country is facing some unemployment around 30,000 Omanis search for jobs every 
year327. 
326 Ministry of Manpower,op.cit ,2001. 
327 AI-Hosni, A., Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, The Ambassador Conference, November 
2000, Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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Table 5.14. Civil Service Employees in Ministries and Government Organisations by 
Educational Level 
Educational 1996 1997 level 
Omani % Non- % Total % Oman! 0/0 Non- % Total 
Omani Omani 
Illiterate 9,526 18.0 1,855 7.3 11,381 145 8,434 15.5 1,649 6.6 10,083 
Can read and 5,510 10.4 1,223 4.8 6,733 8.6 5,440 10.0 1,090 4.4 6,530 
write 
Primary 4,197 7.9 504 2.0 4,701 6.0 3,988 7.4 470 1.9 4,458 
Preparatory 4,859 9.2 307 1.2 5,166 6.6 5,150 9.5 296 1.2 5,446 
Secondary 7,938 15.0 1,539 6.1 9,477 12,1 8,825 16,3 1,000 4.0 9,825 
Diploma 14,403 27.2 5,065 20.1 19,468 24,9 15,042 27.7 5,436 21.8 20,478 
Bachelor 6,038 11.4 12,195 48.3 18,233 23.3 6,633 12.2 12,372 49.6 19,005 
Degree 
Bachelor 303 0.6 1,133 4.5 1,436 1.8 441 0.8 970 3.9 1,411 
Graduate 
Diploma 
Master's 229 0.4 889 3.5 1,118 1.4 247 0.5 985 3.9 1,232 
Degree 
Ph.D. 35 0.1 529 2.1 564 0.7 42 0.1 685 2.7 727 
Total 53,038 100.0 25,239 100.0 78,277 100.0 54,242 100.0 24,953 100.0 79,195 
Source: Al- Hashmi, S., The Urgent Need for an Expansion of Higher Education in the 
Sultanate of Oman, Unpublished Dissertation, University of Hull, 1999.p.93 
It can be seen from Table 5.14 that the number of Omanis in government, educated to 
below secondary school level, is higher than that of non Omanis. 
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% 
12.7 
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12.4 
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0.9 
100.0 
Table 5.15. Skilled Labour 
1993 2020 
Occupation 
Total Omanis Non-Omanis Required Available 
Specialist 62,600 19,300 43,300 153,200 127,700 
Technicians 33,000 15,600 17,400 91,100 86,700 
Skilled Labour 157,500 110.300 47,200 453,600 295,200 
Semi-skilled 111,000 9,100 101,900 246,400 174,900 
Other Semi 303,000 84,100 218,900 344,300 103,300 
Skilled 
Total 667,100 238,400 428,700 1,288,600 787,800 
Source: Al- Hasshmi, S., The Urgent Need of an Expansion for Higher Education 
in the Sultanate of Oman, M.E.D Dissertation, University of Hull, 1999, p.96 
5.5 Education 
"The human being, as we have always said, is the power of the instrument 
and the ultimate aim of national development. Thus, we exert every effort 
to provide him with these essential qualities so that we can all, together, 
build our nation. You are aware that there are countries in this world which 
do not posses rich natural resources, but nevertheless have cared for their 
people and directed them in the right direction, developed their skills and 
provided them with technological experience in order to face their 
domestic and international evolution. Therfore, their innate abilities have 
been realised and their inventions have been eagerly sought throughout the 
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world. By this means they have taken their place in the forefront of the 
developed countries,,328. 
As the above quotation from Sultan Qaboos strongly suggest the advancement of 
education is constitutionally guaranteed in Oman and there is state support for it as part 
of the overall development of the country. Article 13 of Oman's Basic law (The White 
Book: The Basic Law of the Land) says: "Education is a fundamental element for the 
progress of society which the state fosters and endeavours to make available to all." It 
also states: "Education aims to raise and develop the general cultural standard, promote 
scientific thought, kindle the spirit of inquiry, meet the needs of the economic and 
social plans, and create a generation strong in body and moral fibre, proud of its nation, 
country and heritage, and committed to safeguarding their achievement." According to 
the same Article, the Omani state "provides public education, combats illiteracy and 
encourages the establishment of private schools and institutes under state supervision 
and in accordance with the provisions of law,,329. 
Enlargement of literacy is a major indicator of development. Around 1970 there were 
only three primary schools in the whole country, and the last Sultan closed them down 
for the fear of communist rebellion. Two of them were in the capital (Muscat and 
Mutrah) and the other one in the South, in Salah. Girls were forbidden to go to school 
328 Sultan Qaboos ibn Said quoted in AI-Hasshmi, S., The Urgent Need for an Expansion for Higher 
Education in the Sultanate of Oman, Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement of 
the Degree of Master of Education, University of Hull, 1999, p.116. 
329 Royal Decree No. 101196, issued on 6 Nov 1996. 
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and there were no schools in other parts of Oman330• Some rich families sent their 
children to study abroad in countries such as Egypt, the Gulf states and European 
countries. 
Since the 1970s, the country has made remarkable progress in the sphere of literacy. 
Statistically, illiteracy among the older generation was reduced to 41 % and among the 
younger generation to merely 4.5% for male and 21 % for females in 2000. In 2000, as 
much as 86% of the children of both sexes within the age-group of 6-11 were attending 
primary schools, a figure which compares vary favourably with most developing 
countries. As the detailed data in the Information and Publication Centre of the 
Sultanate show clearly, number of students in basic and primary education have 
increased by leaps and bounds since 1993, from 290,199 in 1993 to 301,281 in 1998. 
What is most remarkable is that fact that the girl students have not lagged behind boys. 
In 2000, for instance, 48.4% of students in these two categories were girls. In 
secondary education, girls outnumber the boys. In 2000, for example, of 54,192 
students in the secondary sector, as many as 51.7% were girls331 • 
Up to 1998, Oman had only one University, called Sultan Qaboos University, which 
admitted 2,887 Omani students.332 There are a number of private and governmental 
Colleges that aim to cater to the higher education needs of the Omani people. Since 
330 Dahdooh, S., The Political System in the Sultanate of Oman, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, the 
University of Baghdad, 1999. 
331 Infonnation and Publication Centre of the Sultanate, pp. 506-14. 
332 Statistical Bulletin, The Cooperation Council for the Arab States ofthe Gulf, (2000, vol. 10), p. 
76. 
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there is an acute shortage of University education facilities in Oman, the Government 
sends most of the students for higher education abroad333• The figures show that in 
1999 there were around 23 000 students studying abroad, 48% of them being girls. 
334Table 5.16 shows that there were no girls attending school before 1970. The number 
of students going to school rose dramatically by 630 percent, from 1970 to 1999. 
There were only 900 students in 1970, whereas in 1999 there were around 566,000 
students studying in schools. The number of schools rose from 3 to 1103 between 1970 
to 1999. The number of girls attending school rose from zero to 48% of the total 
student population between 1970 and 1999. Almost 100% of children attend primary 
schools in Oman today, 97% attend intermediate schooling, and 68% attend secondary 
schools.335 Thus, Oman has made commendable progress in the field of education 
within the last 30 years. 
Table. 5.16 Educational Profile of Students in Oman, 1970-99 
1970 1999 Average increases year 
The total number of male students ( by thousands) ** 0.9 96.6 24.9 
The number of girls (%) zero 48 -
The number of teachers (in thousands 0.3 27 16.8 
The number of students in primary schools (%) 99.8 
The number of students in - 966 
The Number of students in secondary schools - 68.3 
The number of university students 23090 
The number of girls% 0 48 
The Share of individual from general expenditure 25 *** 126 7.0 
. . Source: MinIstry of NatIOnal Economy, Statistics Year Book, (InformatIOn and 
Publication Centre, 2000) p.512 
333 AI-Lamki "Higher Education in the Sultanate of Oman: the Challenge of access, Equity and 
Privatization" Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, vol 24 (1) 2002) 
334 Ministry of Economic Affairs, Sultanate ofOman,2001. 
335 Ibid. 2001, pp. 6-7. 
178 
The spread of schools under the care and control of the government has taken place in 
such a way that the country's regions have adequate representation. During 2000-01, 
for instance, Dhofar had 15% of all government schools while Muscat, the country's 
capital, had 13%. Dhofar's 15% share of all government schools today contrasts rather 
sharply with only three primary schools in the whole country before 1970. The main 
reason why armed rebellion took place in Dhofar was its regional deprivation and 
complete lack of any development. With adequate governmental attention since the 
1970s, Dhofar is a competing region in the country's developmental map336. 
The most remarkable development in the field of education in Oman since the 1980s 
has been the establishment of the Sultan Qaboos University in 1986 which enrolled in 
2000 some 6000 students, two-thirds of whom were women. Very few countries in the 
Arab world could boast of such an achievement. 
In addition there are five technical and industrial colleges which include 4500 students, 
of which 60% are male and 40% female. Also, there are 4 centres which take those 
who could not fmish their education at school. There are around 170 training institutes 
scattered in the capital and the outside337. 
As it can be seen from Table no 5.17 there is remarkable increase in the number of 
schools, institutions, classes and students 
336 For further details, see Infonnation and Publication Centre, op. cit., p.519. 
337 AI-Hosni, A., op.cit. 1999. 
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Table 5.17. Government Education Institutions 
Type of Education 01100 98/97 95/94 
School and institutions 1,014 980 960 
Classes 17,388 55,937 14,739 
Students 571,517 526,991 479,545 
freaching Staff 30,874 26,817 24,278 
freachers 27,620 24,229 21,883 
Technicians 199 78 
k\drninistrators 3,055 2,510 2,395 
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistics Year Book, (Information and 
Publication Centre, 2000) p.513 
5.6 Social Affairs 
"We believe that the time has come when the poverty and distress that 
afflicts so many millions of the people of this world must be the subject of 
concerned actions by all nations338" 
Sultan Qaboos has made it his resolve to take Oman out of its poverty and 
underdevelopment for which the country was known for much of the earlier centuries. 
The social security system of the country is yet to develop fully, but a good beginning 
has been made. The government pays an allowance for those families who cannot 
work. There were around 43, 800 cases in 1999 who benefited from this system and 
received around 23 million Omani Rials. There are also some social services, for 
example, for Women's Community. Now there are around 25 such communities in 
Oman and the government plan to open a new community in every Welayat. Also there 
338 Qaboos, S., op.cit. 1995. p. 78. 
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are 12 centres for charities. Lastly there are some institutions for the care of those who 
are sick or do not have families339• 
Various women's associations have been active and play an important role in the 
voluntary sector. In 1999, there were 25 associations with a membership of 3,991 
women who, in co-operation with the relevant ministry, have been carrying out social 
work within the communi!l40. 
The number of women's associations has increased to 27, although the membership 
surprisingly dropped to some extent. (Table 5.18) 
Table 5.18. Women's Associations and Membership in Oman 
No. of Recipients of Social Welfare by Governorate region 
Region 2000 1999 
Muscat 2,143.0 4,297 2,157.8 
AI-Batinah 7,360.5 13,963 7,229.9 
Musandam 583.3 1,072 592.1 
Adh-Dhahirah 2,360.6 4,431 2,292.6 
Ad-Dakbilyah 2,748.5 5,598 2,853.7 
Ash-Sharqiah 5,175.5 10,299 5,185.9 
AI-Wusta 450.7 886 437.1 
Dhofar 2,433.6 5,486 2,647.7 
Total 23,255.7 46,032 23,396.8 
1998 
4,120 2,083.4 
12,963 6,804.8 
1,040 573.9 
4,094 2,179.7 
5,477 2,846.6 
9,673 4,922.1 
820 408.4 
5,587 2,887.5 
43,774 22,706 
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistic Year Book, Information and 
Publication Centre, 2000, p. 605 
339 AI-Hosni, A., op.cit 
340 Ibid. 
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4,151 
13,173 
1,049 
4,149 
5,587 
9,848 
833 
6,043 
44,833 
There are good reasons for the government to support those who have fmished their 
study and are unemployed. If they do not find jobs or assistance from the government, 
they might threaten the stability of the country. 
5.7 Health 
"The new Royal Hospital, which we shall be opemng soon and the 
teaching hospital of the Sultan Qaboos University which is nearing 
completion, are on earnest of our deep interest in the health service. These 
two projects will playa significant role in ensuring a highly advanced 
standard of medical care for our people, and in meeting their increasing 
needs. Equal attention, is being paid to improving the standards of our 
hospital and medical services through the country,,341. 
Oman has made considerable progress in the health services area since the 1970s. The 
number of hospitals rose from only 2 in 1970 to 54 in 1999. Over the same period, the 
number of health clinics rose from 19 to 162. The number of doctors rose from a mere 
13 to 3143 in 1999, and nurses increased from 77 in 1971 to 7525 in the same period. 
The number of hospital beds rose from 12 to 5069. The report published by World 
Health Organization in 2000 said that Oman is one of the best countries in the world 
for the quality of its health system, and number eight in per capita health facilities. 342 
341 Qaboos. S., op.cit. 1995,pI67. 
342 Ministry of Health, report of the ministry, Oman" 2001. 
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Public health has been a top agenda for the new Sultanate. Over the years, budgetary 
allocation for health has increased. In 1999, health and education together received 
priority and accounted for around 40% of current expenditure. In 2000, health received 
a 7% increase (at RO 127 million). In 1970, the average life expectancy in Oman was 
under 50 years, but today it is 70 years. In 1970, there was only one small hospital in 
Muscat whereas today there are now 47, 13 of which are referral hospitals. The total 
bed capacity has increased to 4443. There are, in addition, 116 primary health centres 
of which 57 have maternity beds and 7 are extended health centres. 
Table 5.19. Health and Medical Care 
Item 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 
lHospitals 55 53 52 43 31 
lHosp. Beds 5,190 4,564. 3,873. 3,040. 2,111. 
lHealth Centres 118.00 120. 94. 79. 55. 
!Doctors 3,258 2,477 1,441 958 289 
IPharmacist 495. 356. 247. 193. 9 
~irth rates per (000) pop. 32.6 34.00 44.70 48.00 50.00 
~nfant mortality rate per (000) live births 16.7 20.00 29.00 45.00 64.00 
Crude Death Rate per (000) pop. 3.7 6.10 7.60 9.90 13.30 
~ife expectancy at birth 73.4 67.40 66.50 61.60 57.50 
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistics Year Book, Information and 
Publication Centre, 2000, pp.452-453 
As Tables 5.19-21 show clearly, the public health care in the country has witnessed an 
all-round development. First, life expectancy at birth in 1980 was 57.5 years, which has 
increased to 73.4 years in 2000. Second, the infant mortality rate, which in 1980 was 
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abysmal at 64 per 1000, has decreased to only 16.7 in 2000. Third, numbers of 
hospitals, health centres, doctors, and pharmacies have all greatly increased. 
Table 5.20 in particular shows that the numbers of patients attending both in-patient 
and out-patient departments have increased too. 
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Table 5.20. Patients Attending Ministry of Health Hospitals and Health Centres 
In Patients Out - Patients Year 
12,430 120,380 1972 
23,140 145,110 1973 
28.800 183,330 1974 
56,119 1,376,580 1975 
64,900 1,982,000 1976 
77,700 2,449,300 1977 
86,431 2,564,317 1978 
92,462 2,777,400 9179 
108,208 3,123,354 1980 
125,608 3,525,854 1981 
134,999 3,328,434 1982 
142,722 3,616,137 1983 
155,546 4,071,611 1984 
150,798 4,589,863 1985 
151,868 4,821,734 1986 
166,611 5,296,5965 1987 
177,470 5,435,136 1988 
177,338 5,591,425 1989 
183,375 5,837,768 1990 
189,482 9,963,458 1991 
202,850 10,433,166 1992 
225,600 11,550,147 1993 
220,368 11,998,776 1994 
220,846 12,233,202 1995 
217,070 12,469,906 1996 
214634 12,255,522 1997 
215,477 9,171,461 1998 
222,485 9,797,432 1999 
225,868 9,906,200 2000 
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Statistics Year Book, Information and 
Publication Centre, 2000, p. 472 
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Table 5.21. Health Educational Institutions and Student Enrolment in Oman 
Year Nursing Institution of Health Oman Institution of Oman Assistant 
Science Public Health Pharmacy Institute 
Students Graduates Enrolled Graduates Enrolled Graduates Enrolled Graduates 
Enrolled 
1990 78 8 41 - - - -
1992 255 59 59 41 35 - 38 
1994 308 193 60 47 63 62 32 
1996 403 331 76 64 31 67 34 
1998 458 305 64 61 - - 54 
Source: Al- Hasshmi , S., The Urgent Need for an Expansion for Higher Education 
in the Sultanate of Oman, M.E.D Dissertation, University of Hull, 1999. 
5.8 Media and Development 
"Every Omani is required today - more than at any time before- to roll up 
his sleeves and give his devoted efforts to carrying out his duties seriously 
and consistently343" 
Article 29 of the Basic law of Oman recognIses the "freedom of opinion and 
expression, whether spoken or written or in other forms within the limits of the law". 
Article 31 of the Basic law states: "Freedom of the press, printing and publication is 
guaranteed in accordance with the conditions and circumstances defmed by the law." 
Encouraged by the basic law more congenial atmosphere, there has been a good growth 
of the various newspapers and magazines in Oman over the last few years. 
343 Qaboos, S., op.cit. 1995, p.228. 
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Before 1970, the media hardly existed in Oman. People depended on personal 
communication. They tried to own radios, but this medium was not welcomed by the 
regime, because political opponents used it as a tool to attack the Sultan. Some 
countries such as Iraq and Egypt gave space in their media to talk about Omani' s 
problems and support the opponents of the regime. 
The fIrst breakthrough in the media was after 1970. Soon afterward, various media 
came to be established. For example, a radio station was introduced in 1970, which 
circulated various programmes from Bite alfalag in Muscat. Then the fIrst newspaper, 
Alwatan was launched in 1971. TV was launched in 1974. 
At the beginning, the media concentrated on development and on influencing the 
people so that they would appreciate and support the Omani policy in various sectors 
such as economics, politics and social plans. This strategy continues to the present. The 
Omani media so far are formal media that come from the government to the citizens. 
Nowadays, the government invites public opinion to participate in the media, but on 
condition that they should not attack the policy of the government. At the same time it 
seems that the important target recently is to spread the voice of Oman in the entire 
region and the Arab world as a whole. 
The Omani media are not multi-channel. There are branches to feed the main channel. 
For example, there are eight locations for TV in the Welayat but all feed the main 
station in Muscat. This reflects the government desire to unite opinion instead of 
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creating further differences. Officials are afraid communicated media might be used by 
opponents to launch an oppositional ideology against the regime. F or example, 
conservative and religious people will refuse any openness to Western culture. 
5.9 Crime, Law and Order 
Table 5.22. Crime Statistics for 1996 and 2000 
1996 2000 
Drugs 83 252 
Thefts 1024 4479 
Forgery 67 71 
Homicide 18 8 
Rape 97 18 
Fraud 67 43 
Prostitution 73 1 
Other crimes 52 219 
Sources: adopted from Royal Oman Police 1996 Annual Criminal Statistics 
report, Sultanate of Oman, AI-Nahadah Press, Sultanate of Oman, 1996); Comparative 
Statistics of the Royal Oman Police Activities, between 1999- 2000, International Press 
Sultanate of Oman, 2000. 
There has been an increase of crime as a result of the rapid changes in social and 
economic life, for example, the influx of foreign workers who brought new habits to 
society; Unemployment; migration from rural areas to urban areas; and the failure of 
the religious institutions (Mosques) and the education institutions (schools) to reach the 
people. But compared to the size of the population, the rates of law-breaking and drug 
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abuse are not alarming. In the past, the life was lived according to traditional customs, 
and controlled by the religious institutions. The level of crime may be higher than 
reported as sometimes families do not admit their problem because it might affect the 
reputation of the family. 
5.10 State and Labour 
"When it rains, it begins in small drops and then it pours. It is the same 
with material benefit. What you should be doing is to enlighten your 
children on these matters so that they can feel responsibility towards 
themselves and towards serving their country344". 
One of the major areas for judging the effectiveness of a political regime is the way the 
country's workforce is protected and socially insured by the government. This is also a 
measure of the development of a country. In Oman, the Ministry of Social Affairs, 
Labour and Vocational Training is responsible for the national workforce employed in 
the private sector, as well as foreign labour employed by private companies. The 
government issued the Social Insurance law in 1992, and the Public Authority for 
Social Insurance has since registered some 4000 companies and establishments. By the 
end of 1999, some 50660 Omanis were registered. Under this registration, Omani 
workers and their families are provided for in cases of sickness, injury, disability or 
death. On retirement, a worker gets a pension from the authority. 
344 Qaboos, S., op.cit. (1995) p. 300. 
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One major aspect of the Sultanate's labour policy is that no Omani should remain 
unemployed for want of a job, as long as he or she is capable of working. Another 
related policy is to bring Omani women into the workforce wherever suitable 
employment can be found. 
As part of the modernisation and Omanisation drive of the new Sultanate, the highest 
priority has been given to recruit more and more Omanis for jobs they traditionally 
were less inclined to do. As a result, young men and women can be found to be 
working in retail business at check-outs, and as shop-assistants. 
The government gives special importance to Omanisation and the development and 
training of national cadres at all levels. Huge amounts were allocated for educational 
training programmes for Omani citizens in the Sixth Five-Year Plan. In addition to 
that, several official and private bodies were set up and encouraged to support the 
private sector projects, for example, the Oman Development Bank, and the Youth 
Projects Development Fund. 
5.11 Other Services 
Oman has also made considerable progress in the social welfare sector. The annual 
grants for social security have increased from 0.2 R.O. Million in 1973 to 23.4 R.O. 
Million in 1999 with a corresponding rise in the number of social security cases from 
131 to 43,774. The total value of Housing Bank loans has risen to 350 R.O. million in 
1999 from zero in 1975. Today around 86% of people in Oman own houses. Oman has 
also spent around 1,631 R.O. Million on the transport sector during 1971-2000. As a 
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result, asphalt roads have increased from 10 km to 8,138 km and graded roads from 
3620 to 25,344 km during 1973-1999. The number of vehicles owned per thousand 
populations has grown at the rate of 9.6%345. A drain on the economy is the 
government's spending of around 16% of the GDP for defence expenditure346. The 
figures show that around 25% of the total income in Oman during the period from 1970 
to 1975, during the Dhofar civil war, went for defence expenditure, around $1.8 billion. 
This money could have been better utilised for developmental purposes, but the 
exigencies of the situation demanded this unwanted expenditure. In contrast, even 
though there is no crisis like the one that prevailed during 1970-75 today, the 
government still continues to spend heavily on defence related equipments. For 
example, the Omani government placed orders for fighter planes from US and Great 
Britain in the year 2001-02. This appears all the more striking with the fact that 
inflation in Oman today is at a phenomenal high. One justification for this increased 
defence spending is the concerns of the government after the terrorist events of 11 th 
September 2001 and its consequences. 
5.12 Conclusion 
Since the early 1970s, and the beginning of the reign of Sultan Qaboos, fundamental 
economic changes have transfonned Oman into a major regional and an important 
international power. Although the economy even today is heavily reliant on oil and 
345 Ministry of National Economy, Thirty Years of Development Process, 1971-2000, p.32-45. 
346 AI-Busaid, K., The GCC Security and the Arab Order: Relation in Question, Unpublished M.A 
Dissertation United States International University, 1995, p36. 
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related resources, efforts are being made to diversify into other sectors of the economy 
to ensure a long-term future for the country. 
Like the political changes, the socio-economic changes in Oman over the last three 
decades have been overwhelming. It has taken many more decades for many a western 
country to achieve the level of development that Oman has achieved quickly within a 
short space of time. Many third world countries decolonized for longer periods than 
Oman have yet to reach the level of development that Oman has recorded. Omani 
society and its people have been exposed to the global development and information 
and telecommunications revolutions. Therefore, the forces released in the wake of the 
development of Oman themselves will be the basis for further political changes 
towards more democracy. So far the social and economic changes in Oman have been 
the offshoots of the political changes, and they have worked hand-in-glove. If, 
however, the regime fails to cope with the rapidly changing society, the situation might 
change. Such is the paradox of political reform. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
OMAN: PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY 
"We are following with great interest the Council's activities which take 
into account our deep-rooted Omani traditions and which call for sincere 
work and co-operation in the interest of the country and the people,,347 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to answer three questions: when did the process of democratisation 
in Oman begin; why was it begun; and how has it been managed? The core of the 
study will look at the creation of formal institutions of democracy, such as the Mujlis 
Ash-Shura (Consultative Council), and the Mujlis Aldawlah (State Council), and 
informal institutions, such as the media, the Chamber of Commerce, Businessmen's 
Council, Sablat Alarab (Arab Council Web site), and the role of leading individuals in 
democratic debate. But before that the chapter will provide a cultural overview of the 
experience of the Omani people in relation to AI- Biah - the election of the Imam 
(president) . 
6.2 The Establishment of Ibadiah 
Democracy is not a new feature for the Omani culture. Mosques and some other places 
such as sablah (common rooms) were points at which people met and elected their 
leaders. These represented an elective dimension in the earlier period. 
347 Qaboos., S , op.cit., 1995, p.147. 
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The formal ideology of Oman is Islam. Omani people belong to the Ibahdi sect. Ibadhis 
believe the Imam should be elected by the citizens through Biah. Their belief is based 
on the experience of the election of the Imam after the death of the prophet 
Mohammed. The first khalifa in Islam was Abu Baker who ruled from 632 to 634. His 
name was proposed by the important figures such as Omar and Abu-Obaidah. The 
majority of Muslims approved of his leadership. This gave him legitimacy as a ruler. In 
his first speech, he asked people to be loyal to him if he remained fair; otherwise they 
were free to reject him. Then Abu Baker asked the Muslim community to elect Omar 
to be his successor and he found approval. When Abu Baker died, Omar became 
khalifa with the approval of other Muslims. The agreement was written by Othman in 
644348• When Omar was on his deathbed, he selected six people of ability to succeed 
him. In the year 656 the Muslims accepted Othman as presidene49• A number of people 
who gave Othman their support started asking him to stop a number of malpractices 
such as favouritism and discrimination towards his favourites. People accused him, for 
example of giving his family priority in appointment to important positions. These 
practices eventually led to Othman's assassination35o• After the death of Othman, the 
Muslims arranged a meeting and they agreed unanimously to elect Ali. It was made 
348 Giat., H, Dilemma of Religion and Politics in the First Period of Islam, Dar Al-Talyah Beirut, 
2000, p.55. 
349 Omar, F, Tareekh AI-Khaleeg AI-araby fy AI-Usoor AI-Wasta, The History of the Gulf States 
in the Middle ages, Iraq, Dar AI-Arabia, 1985, p.99. 
350 AI-Azydy, M., AI-KushfWa-AIbian, (Description and Explanation), Tunis, Silsilat alderasat 
Aleslamiah, Tunis University, 1984, pp.37- 39. 
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clear to Ali that he should not give any chance to those who might be corrupt, 
otherwise the people would withdraw their support351 • 
These were the ways of electing the khalifa in that time. It was believed that Muslims 
had the right to elect a fair and able leader for this important position. Based on these 
fundamental experiences, Ibahdi people do not believe in hereditary rule352• An Imam 
should be mature; if he is not very intellectual he should rely on specialist advice, he 
should have a good background, be a good listener, and have an open mind to the 
advice of other people. 
The Ibadhi sect which is so influential in Oman was started in Basra, by a group of 
people who were not happy about the political situation. They insisted that the khalifah 
should be elected by the people. At that time, the Islamic world was in a dilemma. 
People were divided between Ali and Muawiah. Ali was the person who had come to 
power through elections, but he was opposed by his Governor, Muawiah, in what is 
now called Damascus (Sham). In order to avoid the conflict, both sides agreed to 
appoint delegations to find a solution. These two delegations were given full authority 
to decide what was best for the Islamic people. Both of them agreed to replace Ali with 
a new leader, but they did not agree to appoint Muwaiah. This created a new conflict in 
the Islamic world. Some of Ali's supporters asked for a new election in which the 
351 Ibid. p.58. 
352 AI-Wasmi., K,. Oman Byn Al-Isticlal Wal-Ihtilal: Drasah fy Al-Tareehk Al-Omani Al-Hadeeth 
Wal-Alakat Al-EqIimiah Wal-Dwaliah (Oman between Independence and Occupation, a study of 
Omani Modem History and its regional and international relations), Kuwait, Alsharu Alaraby, 1993, 
p.74 
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leadership issue would be settled by the Muslim people themselves. Ali said that he 
had entered into negotiations to stop bloodshed but that he did not intend to lose power. 
This infuriated his supporters and a small group of them chose to part ways from Ali, 
insisting on electing a new President for the Muslim people. This group, of around 
10,000 people, known as Al_khwareg353, which means a group which left the 
governmene54, elected Abdullah Al-Rasbi to be the Imam.355 • Ali attacked them and 
most of them died. The few who survived separated into two groups. One of them was 
the Ibadhi sect. The Ibadhi attached importance to education and they established a 
school in a secret cave. They succeeded in producing influential followers. One group 
went to Oman and came to power through peaceful means. From that time, Imams in 
Oman have come to power only through elective means356• 
The Imam (the president), in the view of the Ibadhi sect, should have certain attributes 
such as broad knowledge, especially about Islam. However, his tribal or racial origins 
353 Originally, the word AI-Khwareg had positive contributions and meant the people who left their 
wealth and prosperity to follow God. However, later on, AI-Azariqah and Al-Suffariah practised 
fundamentalist behaviours and announced a war against all groups who did belong to them. They 
reached a appoint where they have considered themselves entitled to kill any person who did not belong 
to them. The Ibadhi people rejected this behaviour and joined together under Abullah ibn Ibadh, the 
strongest man in his tribe, who protected them strongly. The meaning of Al-khwaredg has changed to be 
indicate those people who left the government and created instability in society. 
354 AI-Harthy., S, Alu-Quod Alfidiah fy Alosool Alibadiah, (Silver Chains in the Omani Ibdai History), 
Beirut, Dar Al-yakadah, Lebanon, 1973, pp.10-50. 
355 Gubash, H., op.cit. 1997, p53 
356 AI-Harthy A., op.cit. 1973, pp.10-50. 
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are unimportant. The law should rely on the Islamic shariah COurt357• If the President 
fails to rule through Shariah and he turns out to be corrupt, it is the duty of the Islamic 
community to replace him with some other leader, even if it involves a civil war. This 
struggle to establish good rule is known as Jihad. 
The normal way of electing the Imam is called aldohoor, meaning the normal selection 
of the khalifah. This process may be interrupted in periods when Muslims do not have 
freedom of action. In this case, the practice of alcotman prevails, a method derived 
from the incidents that happened to Prophet Mohammed. He disappeared in the house 
of Al-arqam ibn Abe-alarqam before he announced the fIrst Islamic state. When he 
ruled, he changed the strategy and announced his ideology. The Ibadhi movement 
began the practice of alcotman after the death of Al-Julanda in 793 it lasted for around 
forty years, in the modem history after the death of Azan ibn Qais in 1881, until 
6.3 Oman's Administrative Structure 
The Sultanate of Oman is divided, for administrative purposes, into provinces and 
areas, each of which includes a number of Wilayts359• 
357 Al-Abdalkareem, A., Political Economy and Political Development in the Arabian Peninsula: 
The Case Study of the Sultanate of Oman, Unpublished Dissertation, University of South California, 
1997.p, 85. 
358 see Gabbash., op.cit, 1997, p.68. 
359 A Wilayt is an area which includes a number of cities and villages. Every Wilayt involves branches 
of ministries, clinics or hospital, and court. The Waly is the person who deals with issues with regard to 
the tribes and any local problems. 
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Source: http: //www.shura.om/start.htrnl [12-6-2003] 
In geographical terms, a province and an area may be large or small. Provincial status 
is conferred for strategic or political reasons, or by the level of population found within 
it. For example, one of the main provinces is Muscat, the capital of Oman, which also 
has within it five Wilayts. Dhofar, a large province in the south of Oman bordering the 
Yemen, has five Wilayts, but has a smaller population than some of the areas. 
Musandam, located in a strategic position on the border with the United Arab Emirates 
[UAE] , has fewer Wilayts of the areas. Batnah is the most important, owing to its 
agricultural base and its large population. In geographical terms, two areas, Sharkia and 
Dakliah, are larger than Musandam province. The area known as Wusta is the oil and 
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gas rich part of Oman, but has a small population. Dahrah also has mineral 
resources360• 
6.4 The Government Structure 
The conflict between the citizens and the preVIOUS sultans, especially Sa'id ibn 
Taymur, led the country to lose internal and external power but the current sultan 
restored the Omani tradition of participation in the regime. When Sultan Qaboos came 
to power, a new era in Omani history started. The present Sultan evolved a new method 
of ruling, based on a strategy of combining the experience of the past with the adoption 
of the tools of moderate values. 
Now, Oman is a monarchy with the Sultan as the ultimate source of sovereignty and 
legitimacy. Key bodies of the government organisation are the Sultan, the Cabinet, the 
Defence Council, the Financial Affairs and Energy Resources Council, the Supreme 
Committees and Specialised Councils, the Higher Committee for Conferences, the 
Civil Service Council, the Supreme Committee for Town Planning, the Higher 
Education Council, the Economic Co-ordination Council, Sultan Qaboos University 
360 Muscat governorate includes: Muscat, Mutrah, Bausher, Seeb, Alamerat and Quriyat. Dhofar 
includes: Slalah, Thamrait, Takah, Morbat, Sadah, Rakhyoot, Dhalkoot, Mukshan, Alhalanit islands. 
Musandam includs: Khasab, Bokha, Daba, Albiah and Madha. Batinah: Sohar, Alrustak, Shonas, Saham, 
Liwa, Alkhaborah, Alswaiq, Nakhal, Wadi Almuawil, Alawabee, Almuosonah and Barka. Aldhirah: 
Alborainmi, Ebri, Mohadah, Yankul and Dhank. Aldakhliah: Nizwa, Samail, BahIa, Adam, Alhamra, 
Manah, Ezki and Bibid. Sharqiyah: Sur, Ibra, Bidiah, Alqabil, Almodaibi, Doma waltaeen, Alkamil 
Walwafee, laalan bany boaly, laalan bany bohasan, Wadi bany Khalid and Mosirah Isalnd. Wusta: 
Mahoot, Aldoqm, Algazir, and Hima. 
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Council, the Tender Board, and The State Financial Audie61 • The ultimate authority 
lies with the Sultan and his remains the last word in matters of governance. He 
appoints the Ministers and nominates members to various Councils, and he is the 
Minister of Defence, Financial Affairs and Foreign Affairs. The Cabinet includes 29 
members and meets regularly, presided over by His Majesty and in his absence by the 
Deputy Prime Minister for the Council of Ministers. The Defence Council includes 
eight members and discusses issues related to the safety, security, well-being and 
defence of the sultanate. The Financial Affairs Council is responsible for drawing up 
the state's fiscal policy and financial and monetary regulations. It also prepares the 
annual General State Budget, studies financial allocations for development projects, 
and examines domestic and foreign investment and investment funding and other 
savings, investment, fiscal and monetary matters362• 
Oman has moved towards a modem, secular, independent judicial system. From 1974, 
civil law started to take its place beside Shariah law. Ten years later the government 
established the Trade Dispute Association to cover business's problems. Then, in 1996 
Sultan Qaboos announced the basic law363 • This gave Omani people the freedom of 
religion, equality before the law, a free of speech, freedom press, the right to a fair trial. 
Citizens gained the right to call the regime to account through formal and informal 
institutions364• In 1999, a royal decree gave more details about the new Omani Judicial 
361 Oman 2000, Ministry of Information, Muscat, 2000, pp. 28-31. 
362 Oman 200- 2003 Minstry of Information, Muscat, 2002, pp.33- 45. 
363 Trowers and Hamlins., "Consultation Finn, Oman Recent Development Further Development of 
Oman's Legal Systems", Arab Law Quarterly, vol 15 issue 1 (2001). PP. 112-114. 
364 http://www.sgsa.comlabomanlpolitical/politicall.htm [10-8-2002]. 
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system. The Supreme Judicial Council ensures and maintains the independence of the 
judiciary and monitors its developmene65 • It can be said that Omani law is now really 
independent and follows the progress in the judicial systems in modem states such as 
the UK. 
6.5 Formal Democracy in Oman 
The 1970s in Oman was a decade in which the new Sultan Qaboos ibn Sa'id al-Sa'id, 
put an end to internal rebellion, and began the process of uniting the country. With 
western investment, the petroleum industry was developed, so that by the end of the 
decade, economic and social change had begun to take place, with a modem transport 
and communications infrastructure, and the provision of housing, health and education 
services for the people. The goal of democracy was in the mind of Sultan Qaboos. At 
the beginning of his rule, he received a wann welcome from public opinion. A few 
days after the coup, he left the region of Dhofar to go to Muscat (the capital of Oman) 
where he received Omani people who came from different groups. They congratulated 
him and pledged their loyalty to him as the rightful ruler of Oman. Most of the 
previous regime's opponents, who were abroad, decided to return. This step 
represented a type of election (biah) of the new leader, and reminded the Omani people 
of the previous practice. In August 1970, Qaboos promised his nation in a public 
speech to democratise the country and involve his subjects in running it, without 
discrimination. He said: 
365 Ibid. 
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" the process of educating and training our people should start as soon as 
possible, in order for the Omani people to rule the country as Omani 
nationals in the long run366" 
On the fIrst national day, he confIrmed that he would lead Oman to become a 
democratic state when he said: 
"our plan inside, is to build our country and provide a good living and affluent 
life for our people. This is an objective that cannot be achieved, without people 
participating in sharing responsibilities and the mission of construction. Our 
doors are open for all people, in order to reach this objective and we will work 
hard to establish a fair democratic ruling in our country. This while catering to 
our Arabic Omani reality and according to tradition and customs of our society, 
takes into consideration Islamic rules which enlighten our path367" 
This gave an indication that the sultan was serious about changing Oman in its type of 
rule. The opponents started to be loyal to the government and worked hard to build the 
state. 
Despite the fact that Sultan Qaboos succeeded in achieving a number of steps toward 
democracy during the fIrst period, 1970-1980, the focus of his efforts was on achieving 
internal unity. The Dhofar civil war which lasted six years and the opponents who 
remained outside represented examples of threats to the unity of the country Training 
366 AI-Rawahy , A., Islamic Concept of Al-Shura and the Omani Model, lecture in Virginia, 
Washington 12th - 15 September 2000, p. 28. 
367 Ibid. 
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toward democracy was one means to achieve stability. The ability of the Omani people 
to run the country was tested by limited reforms. For example, the Sultan brought 
figures from important tribes into the cabinet. Two years into his rule Sultan Qaboos 
gave assurance in speech that the policy of the sultanate was to establish cooperation 
among the nation368• In 1972 the Sultan established a Higher Council for Economic 
Planning and Development. This Council included a number of experts from Arab 
countries and Omani citizens but was abandoned because some of the experts left the 
sultanate369• In 1973, the Sultan established the National Council for Defence, to 
coincide with the resignation of the British experts. This step was an indication that 
Omani citizens were able to take mature decisions on defence issues. In 1974, Sultan 
Qaboos established the Natural Gas Council. He was the chief of this council and the 
rest of the members were foreigners. Later on, a number of Omani people from the 
private sector were appointed to this council. In the same period, the government 
established the Financial Councie7o• All these councils were under the supervision of 
the sultan. Despite the fact that the sultanate was unable to give wide trust to the 
citizens who belonged to different groups, there was a degree of training towards 
democracy through the Council and the wider membership of the cabinet. 
In July 1979, the Sultan established the first democratic institution in Omani history. 
This was the Council of Agriculture, Fisheries and Industry. It was composed of twelve 
members. Three of them were the chiefs of the Chamber of Trade and Industry, the 
368 Ibid. p.31. 
369 AI-Mawafy., A, Oman Bina Aldwalah Alhadeethah, (Oman: the Building ofa modem state), 
Cairo, Trade Press, 2002 p.256. 
370 Ibid. pp. 2560 258. 
203 
undersecretary of Agriculture and Fisheries and the undersecretary of Petroleum. The 
rest were appointed by the sultan from the chamber of Trade and Industry. It was a 
condition of membership that the nine members should not work in the government 
and were well known for their experience in their respective areas. Seventy five 
percent of the members did not belong to the government. The term of membership of 
the council was four years. The chief of the council was nominated by the sultan from 
the members. All ministries were asked to give support to this council. The aim of this 
council was to study the regulations and the law regarding these three areas, to study 
policies and projects related to these sectors, to study the projects of the private sector, 
to search for the best methods to increase productivity in these sectors and put forward 
suggestions, and to study complaints regarding these areas. The members held monthly 
meetings. Recommendations, which had to be passed by a majority of those present, 
were forwarded to the Sultan. Every minister in the government with responsibilities in 
these areas was to meet the members during the latest three months of the year and 
inform them about the plans of the government. This council improved the three 
sectors in which it was involved; fisheries, agriculture and the industry. Furthermore, 
this project affected a wide number of citizens, since most of the Omani people depend 
for their income on agriculture and the fisheries. The council also coincided with the 
first Omani plan (1976- 80)371. 
6.5.1 Structure and Operation of the Parliament 
In the early 1980s, quite differently from other Arab monarchies, Oman began to 
introduce forms of democratic consultation in politics. The democratisation process 
371 ibid. pp.258- 260 
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was built on fOlIDal institutions. In 1981 a AI-Mujlis Alestishari (Consultative Council) 
was set up in Muscat. It consisted of 45 men appointed by the Sultan. This number was 
later expanded to 55 members. In his speech in 1983, Sultan Qaboos ibn Sa'id declared 
that, 
UWe have taken steps to open more new channels of co-ordination between 
the Council and the government, as a clear indication of our desire to 
provide more and wider opportunities for the participation of citizens in the 
affairs of the council and in involving them in the decisions given by the 
Council ,372. 
The aim of the establishment of this council was to provide a place for participation in 
economic and social policy, but the council was prohibited from making regulations on 
these issues. On the other hand, the Sultan has the right to put any subject to the 
council, and allows discussion on subjects wider than economic and social issues.373 . 
Initially, decisions had to be approved by 70 percent of the members. The importance 
of this council was that, for the first time, Omani citizens were consulted on the 
fOlIDulation of the development plans. Council members were appointed from different 
governmental, geographical and economic sectors374. The council held three sessions 
every year, in January, May and September to study the issues raised to them from the 
general secretariat. Meetings had to be attended by 70% of the members, in secret. The 
members had the right to call any person in the government to answer their questions. 
372 Ash-Shura Council, op.cit. 
373 AI-Mowafy, op.cit. 2002. p266. 
374 Dahdooh., S, op.cit. 1999, pp.79 -81. 
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The right of the freedom of members was guaranteed. No one could stop any member 
when he spoke, with the exception of the chief of the council who could only later on 
delete some of speech in the final record. The chief of the council had the duty of 
raising recommendations with the Sultan. The vote was taken through the raising of 
hands during the meeting375• 
Governmental representatives were at the level of under-secretaries from ministries 
such as Interior, Education, Youth, Health, Trade and Industry, Agriculture and 
Fisheries, Social Affairs, Municipalities, Communications and Housing. These 
representatives were links between the ministries and the Council. 376 19 members of 
the council were from the public sector, 36 of them from the nation, 11 members from 
the private sector and 25 members from the regions. The members had to be thirty 
years or older. Membership was for two years, but tenure could be renewed by the 
government. At the beginning there was only one vice president, but in 1983 there 
were two. The Council included firstly: the chief of the Council who was responsible to 
ensure that the work and process of the council were not contrary to its internal 
regulations. He could invite the committees of the council to discuss any issue and 
supervised the general secretary of the council377• He held a similar position to that of a 
government minister378. Second was the executive office; the focal point of the 
Council. It planed for the activities of the council and organised the meetings of the 
375 AI-Mowafy, op.cit. 2002. p266. 
376 AI-Mashikhy, , H, Al-Maglis Al-Istishary li-Dawlah , (Consultative Council) Unpublished MA 
Dissertation, University of Cidy Mohammed, Science College for Law and Economy,1988, pp. 6- 11. 
377 Consultative Council (1981- 1991) Oman, Newspaper, 1991. pp.44-45. see also Al-Mowafy op.cit. 270 - 271 
378 AI-Mowafy, A. op.cit pp. 270-271. 
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committees, coordinated between them and organised the regular work of the council. 
It sent details of the important issues to be studied and then received the committees' 
reports. It held weekly meeting. The meetings were not valid unless five members 
attended the meetings plus the chief of the office or his assistant. The meetings were 
not reported. During its work this office asked a number of ministers to attend meetings 
with the Council committees379• Third were these committees of the Council; there 
were six permanent committees, covering such topics as economy, legal system and 
education. Temporary committees were established as necessary and disbanded when 
the aim was achieved. Every committee included nine members from the private and 
public sectors. The committees held weekly meetings. They had the right to ask the 
chief of the council to invite people from different ministries in the government for 
questioning. Meetings of the committees were not public. The quorum was 70 % of the 
members. The fourth dimension of the Council was the General Secretariat which 
included the general secretary and his . assistants and staff. This supervised 
d .. . d fi . I . 380 a numstratIon an mancla Issues . 
This Council raised around 59 studies to the government, 10 of them in the areas of 
fisheries and agriculture381 • In these areas the members suggested for example that the 
government should provide support to fisheries, search for the best method to find a 
suitable market for lemons, and investigate the best climate for livestock breading. 18 
379 Consultative Council (1981-1991) the press of Oman news Paper, 1991. pp.45-47. see also Al-
Mowafy op.cit. 271 - 272. 
380 Consultative Council (1981-1991) the press of Oman news Paper, 1991. pp47-48. see also Al-
Mowafy op.cit. pp.272 - 273. 
381 Ibid, p.277. 
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of them were about economic, social and trade development. In this area, the council 
suggested, for example, supporting internal investment, increasing internal capital to 
support the Omani banks, and the first trade legislation. Five studies were on education 
policy and training matters. The Sultan asked the Council to study the best method for 
the programme of Omanisation, the possibility of increasing the weekly holiday from 
one day to two days, and how to encourage Omani people to run businesses382• 
That system continued for ten years. In 1991, the consultative process was changed and 
a new Mujlis Ash-Shura (Consultative Council) was created, whose members were, for 
the first time, elected by the people. 
In 1996, the Sultan in his Royal Decree enlarged the role of the constitution. This new 
development in Omani political life was the most important step of legislation. The aim 
was to give strength for political and social stability and ensure the rights and freedom 
of the people383 . The decree said the Mujlis Oman (Omani Council) shall consist of the 
Ash-Shura Council and the State Council. It added: 
"The Law shall specify the powers of each of these Councils, the length of 
their terms, the frequency of their sessions, and their rules of procedure. It 
shall also specify the number of members of each Council, the conditions 
382 Consultative Council (1981- 1991) the press of Oman news Paper, 1991. pp51- 78 
383 http://www.sgsa.com/abomanipolitical/politicall.htm [10-8-2002] 
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which they must fulfil, the method of their selection and appointment, the 
reasons for their dismissal, and other regulatory provisions,,384. 
These two Councils represent the instruments of formal democracy in Oman. These 
councils have different forms of representation. The members of the Consultative 
Council are elected by people from different Wilayts, whereas members of the State 
Council are nominated by the Sultan by royal decree. Members of the State Council 
should be aged over forty years, but the qualification for the Consultative council is 
thirty years385. The Presidents of both Councils are invited to an annual meeting held 
by cabinet ministers, which authorise the Sultanate's plans for the year ahead. Both 
councils have a general secretary and deputies. In order to cooperate with the 
government, both councils in the Parliament meet with the cabinet twice a year386. 
These meetings discuss important issues regarding development through an open and 
positive exchange of opinion. When they meet together in a combined session, they are 
called the Mujlis Oman (Oman Council)387. Ministries and other governmental 
institutions are required to provide any data or information that is asked for by the two 
councils. The chiefs of both Councils send yearly reports to the Sultan about their 
d . d· h 388 utles unng t e year . 
384 http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/muOOOOO_.html [27-6-2002]. 
385 http://www.shura.om!start.html [1-10- 200]. 
386 Sultanate of Oman Ash -Shura Council: 1991-1997, Al-Sharkiah Print, 1997; Royal Decree No 91, 
94,95,96,97/1991; Royal Decree 74/94. 
387 Ministry ofInfonnation, op.cit, 1997. 
388 Document of the Ash-Shura Council.Op.cit., p 30-31. 
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Every three years, the Sultan meets with the members of both councils. He also has the 
right to hold emergency meetings. All members should attend such meetings unless 
they have a strong reason for not doing so. Resolutions are passed by majority vote. 
The chief of the Council does not vote, except when votes are equally divided, when he 
has a casting vote389. Members are not allowed to be members in both Councils, or to 
have a job in the government and to be member in any Council at the same time, unless 
they have an academic position. It is not allowed to be a member for more than two 
terms390. In the year 2003, the Sultan decided to enlarge the term of both councils to 
four years instead of three years391. 
6.5.2 Mujlis Ash-Shura (Consultative Council) 
6.5.2.1 Sessions and Duties of the Council 
The Council holds four meetings a year, lasting at least one week; on some occasions 
for longer. Elites from the Wilayts elect three members and the government selects one 
of them. Candidates who have a good reputation among the people and a good level of 
culture and knowledge have a better chance of being slected392. During the first period, 
around 177 competitors entered the election, of whom 59 became members in the 
council. This number is equal to the number of Wilyats in the Sultanate393. In the first 
389 Royal Decree No 86/97. 
390 AI-Hashmi, S., Comparison study between some Arabic Parliaments and Some European 
Parliaments, Unpublished paper, presented to the State Council, Sultanate of Oman, April 2000, pAO 
391 www.omannews.com [20-10-2003]. 
392 Oman news paper, [17-2- 1991]. 
393 AI-Mowafy, A., op.cit. p. 287 
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four years of the Council (1991-1994), it achieved many things. Among these were the 
sessions it held in public with ministers, at which their plans for Oman's development, 
and other future prospects were discussed. Members of the Council were also free to 
open discussion on any matter suggested by the people. These discussions were 
broadcast live on television to enable the general public to observe the proceedings. 
They were also reported on and analysed in the press. As the Sultan put it: 
"The role being played by your council is acquiring growing significance 
at the present stage and that makes it necessary for the council, more than 
at any time before, to participate in shouldering the burdens and 
responsibilities of the new stage to achieve the progress and growth we 
cherish for Oman,,394 
In the second period (1994-1997) of its life, the Majlis was expanded in terms of 
representation. The number of members was increased to 80, compared to 59 in the 
first period. In addition, membership was expanded to include businessmen and 
intellectuals. The number of voters was increased to be between 100-300. Every 
constituency elected a committee from the members to supervise the process of the 
election and announce the winner395• The basic reason for this was that Wilayts with a 
394 Qaboos., S, op.cit, 1995, p.207. 
395 The author was a member in the committee in my wilayts (AI-Qabil) during this period. It gave 
practical experience of the election at that time. Each candidate had a representative among the persons 
responsible for counting the votes, so that those people could observe each other and ensure that every 
candidate was treated fairly. The names of the candidates were written on a board in the meeting launch. 
There was a box where people put their vote. But the problem was that, each candidates knew who 
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population of more than 30,000 gained an extra two members to represent them in the 
Council. Another innovation in the second period was the appearance of women in the 
council. Two women were elected. This visible progress has been remarked upon 
nationally and throughout the Arab peninsula. The Council is seen as acting in 
partnership with the government in developing the country's economic and social 
potential396• 
In the third period (1997-2000) the number of members was expanded to eighty-seven, 
in line with the projected increase in the population. Another feature of change in the 
Council is the higher proportion of younger representatives being elected to serve. 
This, it is hoped, will give the Council the opportunity to cope with new innovations 
taking place, nationally and globally. During this period, the members issued a number 
of studies to the government on varied issues such education, security market, social 
affairs and external investmene97• There is no universal suffrage. Rather, the law 
allows for one person in 35 of the population to vote. The number of voters was 
51,000, representing between 100-625 from every Wilayt. In this stage the door was 
opened to more types of voters. In practice, voters are selected. The process of 
selection varies. In some cases, a voter is selected by members of a family. In other 
cases, the voter will have been selected by people living in a village. In the case of 
women who have become voters, it may be that they have been nominated by their 
supporters. Unlike the previous election, where only women from Muscat were 
supported him and who did not, because voters wrote their names on the paper. This created 
embarrassment among the voters. 
396 The construction of Al-Shura Council. Op.cit. pIS 
397 http://www.shura.omlstart.html (1-10- 200] 
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eligible, in this period, women were allowed to enter the election from any Wilayts in 
the Sultanate. In 1997, two women were elected to the Ash-Shura Council398. The 
number of women who entered the competition was 27. While the competition between 
women in the previous election was confined to the capital, during this period it was 
expanded to include all women in Oman399 Typically, the Waly of a Wilayt grants the 
authority to vote, and nominations are made through him. The number of cnadidats 
were 800.82 of them won in the election4oo. 
The government announced in the year 2002 a new step in the system of elections, by 
which every person aged 21 years and above has the right to vote40I • This was an 
important step for the following reasons. After the end of the Omani civil war, the 
government was busy with building the state in different aspects, political, social, 
cultural, economic, and infrastructural. When the government succeeded in achieving a 
sufficient level of development, it then started to train people in democracy. Because 
Oman comprises various ethnicities and tribes, the government decided to test the 
feasibility of democracy, to see whether it worked or not. It gave the citizens, firstly, a 
Council which includes leaders of various ethnic and tribal groups. The results were 
favourable towards advancing this experience. It was found that people responded 
positively towards democracy. Then the government gave the right to the people to 
elect their candidates. Initially, from two or three wining candidates, the government 
chose one, but then the government decided to normalise the experience and stopped 
398 Dahdooh, S, op.cit. 1999, p 157. 
399 Sultante of Oman, The structure of Ash-Shura Council, (1997- 2000) p.25 
400 AI-Mowafy, A., op.cit. p318. 
401 Oman News Agency [1-12-2002]. 
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interfering in the electoral system. The person who wins takes his/her position as a 
member of Parliament. 
It can be found that from the beginning, there was no discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity, religion or gender. The values of democracy are taught in schools through 
direct or indirect means. For example, Students practise the means of democracy 
through elections to run such social activities as health facilities, libraries, shops and 
radio stations. Every person who desires to be a leader of one of these activities can 
enter the election. Furthermore, these people contact others and express their desired 
aims. This process continues from primary to secondary school. Then in Sultan Qaboos 
University, there are associations, in which people enter a competition to take part. The 
university represents an advanced level of thinking. These students are preparing 
themselves to play an important role in the state after graduation. At time of 
graduation, students will be 21 years old. That is why the government decided to take 
people who have reached this age. The training in democracy among students is very 
important, especially since young people constitute the majority of the population. This 
allowed the franchise to be safely expanded to involve all Omani citizens, giving them 
the chance for their views to be represented in the Parliament. The members thus 
elected are more educated and have better awareness of the current Omani demands, so 
they can develop the role of the Parliament. Also, this brought the Omani experience 
into line with the international trend in democratic election systems whereby every 
person (male or female) aged 21 years and above has the right to vote for his or her 
candidate. In addition, the direct connection of the population with the parliament 
helped to switch the loyalty of the citizen from tribes and elites to the state. 
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The duties of Council members are concerned, primarily, with representing the 
interests of their constituents, and reviewing government policy. Members can receive 
visits from citizens who live in their Wilayt, and pass on to the relevant government 
office their concerns or questions, and expect a response from that government 
department. 
Members are allowed to raise policy issues for consideration by the government. The 
Council has committees that specialise in particular areas such as health, education, 
transport and employment. From these committees, proposals can be made and 
forwarded to the government. For example, Council members concerned about rising 
unemployment have put forward proposals to deal with the problem. In tum, members 
of the Council have the right to look at government policy papers before they have 
become law. Amendments and suggested changes can be discussed and sent back to 
the government. 
During a Council session, a Minister from the government can be held accountable for 
the performance of his department or his department's policy. For example, the 
Ministers of Information, Electricity, Transport, Energy, and Education have all been 
questioned by the Council. Sometimes the sessions have been confrontational, as when 
a controversy arose with the Minister in charge of the National Economy, who was also 
Deputy Chairman of the Financial Affairs and Energy Resources Council. The Minister 
proposed to charge secondary school students 30% of their fees. A female member of 
the Council raised an objection to the proposal, and was supported by other members 
of the Council, causing the government to withdraw its proposal. When interviewed by 
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newspapers based in the Gulf, Shura Council member Tibah Al-Muali was highly 
critical of some Ministers in the Omani government. Such public criticism led to the 
Minister of Information retiring from the government. 
In the fourth period (2000-2003) it can be seen that the Council encouraged the 
government to help the Omani social and sports clubs to combine. The government 
took up this suggestion and that is why, from the year 2002, it can be found that a 
number of clubs have started to unite. Also, the Council suggested that the government 
pay subsidies to the private schools and the government adopted this idea. Other 
suggestions of the Council include measures to curb over-fishing in Omani waters, and 
suggestions as to how the government can provide work, education or training for 
secondary school graduates402 • 
In addition to routine matters of government policy, members of the Council also 
review the long-term development plans proposed for Oman. Development proposals 
can come from committee reports produced by members, through criticism of 
development proposals, or through schemes as they have been put into practice. There 
are a number of committees in the Council. These are the Legal Committee, Economic 
Committee, Health and Social Committee, Education and Cultural Committee, 
Development of Local Society, and the Environment and Awareness Committee. Every 
402 Al-Hashmi, S. The Omani Experience in the Consultation, Muscat, State Council, September 
2000, p.60 
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committee elects its own chairman and deputy. The chairman of the committee 
declares the times of the meetings 403. 
Matters of foreign affairs are not usually discussed in the Consultative Council. As in 
the past, when the US Senate debated foreign policy rather than the House of 
Representatives, so in Oman, foreign affairs are limited to the State Council. 
The Minister of Interior publishes at each election the names of the committee 
members who will be responsible for the supervision of the polling stations. They 
usually include the Waly, Vice-waly, judge, a high ranking police officer, and four 
senior staff from each wilayt. Their duty is to supervise the election, receive the 
complaints of citizens, prepare reports about the conduct of elections and establish 
three-sub committees, for organisation, voting process and counting the votes. The role 
of the organisation committee is to prepare the polling stations, check the identity of 
the voters to ensure security and show them the polling boxes, and report on conduct of 
the election. The role of the vote committee is to check that the voting boxes are empty 
before the polling starts, provide cards for the voters, supervise the boxes during the 
vote and close the boxes with red stickers. The vote counting committee is responsible 
for the opening the boxes, checking the papers, accounting the votes and preparing a 
file for this purpose 404. 
403 Documents of the Ash-Shura Council, 1998 to 2000 ,Golden Press, Oman, 1998, pp.48-51 
404 Al- Hashmi, S., In the Omani Election, www.Alwatan.com [10-6-2003] 
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In the 2000 election, the actual number of voters was 114,567. The total member of 
candidates was 540. The government had already forced 114 aspirants to withdraw 
because they did not meet the eligibility criteria (see the next section). Two candidates, 
both women, withdrew. The number of members elected was 83, of whom four were 
women. The people in Muscat showed less interest in the elections than others; only 
46% of those eligible to vote participated in the election. In contrast, arourid 98% of 
eligible voters in Al-Wusta participated in the election. Overall, the participation ratio 
was around 65%. 40% of the members of Al-Shura Council participated in the new 
election, and 23 of them won. Also, there were 60 members who entered the Council 
for the first time. Most of them were young and 80% of them had a degree. The 
average age of the members was between 40 to 55, in contrast to the previous election, 
when it was between 57 to 65years405• 
The number of voters has increased in the year 2003 to 175,000, representing 25% of 
people aged 21 years and above and three times the number of voters in the previous 
election .. The participation of women trebled compared to the previous election, from 
10% to 30% of the voters406• The number of the candidate decreased to reach 721. 163 
men and 8 women withdrew. The final number were 540 519 of them were men and 21 
women. 114 became excluded407• 
405 Ibid 
406 AI-Hashmi, S., www.Alwatan.com [27-5-2003] 
407 AI-Mowafy, A., op.cit, pp 326- 327 
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The Ministry of Interior succeeded, for the first time, in computerising the data of the 
election. There was a net-work linked with a main control room. At the same time, the 
media covered the developments in both the constituencies and in the control room and 
held interviews with the voters, experts, and those who organised the election. The use 
of the computer enabled the ministry to announce the winners on the same day. The 
Ministry of Infonnation presented various programmes on the TV and the radio and 
published several articles in newspapers and magazines to encourage people to respond 
positively to the election. Through these tools, the government sent messages to the 
nation, such as advising them to choose fit representatives and to take advantage of 
their rights. A TV programme, for example, covered the events of the elections, 
replacing other programmes with the exception of the News bulletins. The process of 
voting was also quick. In some areas, such as the South of Oman, it took around five to 
ten minutes. Furthennore, the government gave people a holiday on this occasion. 
These steps would give people a good impression and encourage them to attend polling 
stations in the future. Polling boxes were also opened for Omani people who lived 
abroad in a few states such as Qatar, Egypt and Jordan (a list which the government 
plans to expand). Journalists from abroad covered the events. There were 
correspondents from many channels and newspapers. The atmosphere of the election 
also showed signs of greater democratic, maturity. Previously, candidates had simply 
made verbal attacks on each other. Now there was a greater emphasis on policy. The 
legitimacy of the opponent was accepted. The number of members elected was 83 of 
whom 50 entered the Council for the first time408• 
408 AI-Qutaby, A., www.omannews.com [14- 11-2003] 
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The following diagrams show the percentage of voters who participated in the latest 
election: 
Diagram 6.1 
The turn out of voters in Muscat 
( the capital of Oman) in 2003 
Muscat Mutrah Busher Seeb Alamera Quriyat 
Series1 60.50% 59.00% 67.30% 58.00% 69.70% 83.50% 
It can be seen that this diagram represent the election in the capital of Oman. With the 
exception of the Wilayt of Quriyat there is less interest in the capital of Muscat to 
participate in the election. This is a universal trend in the modem cities in different part 
of the world. It seems that the percentage of voters is in the 60%. But in general it 
represent a good response from the people. 
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Diagram 6.2 
The turn out of voters in Batinah in 2003 
Almuosonah Wadi Almuawil Alswaiq Saham Shonas Sohar 
Sarka Alawabee Nakai Alkhaborah Liwa Alrustak 
Al- Batinah region includes the largest population compared to other regions in Oman. 
The tum out is exceptional. It represents around 70% of all potential voters. 
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Diagram 6.3 
The turn out of voters in Musandam in 2003 
Khasab Bokha Oaba Madha 
o Series1 90.30% 94.40% 91.40% 90.60% 
Musandam includes less number so people knew each other. Through family campaign 
the candidate can reach to the people easier. That is why most of the region the respond 
was more than 90%. 
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Diagram 6.4 
The turn out of voters ALDakhliah in 2003 
Bidbid Ezki Manah Alhamra Adam Bahia Samail Nizwa 
The people of Al-Dakhliah react positively to the election. In five wilayts out of eight, 
more than 80% of the eligible population participated. 
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Diagram 6.5 
The turn out of voters in AL- Dhirah in 2003 
77.60% 80.20% 86.20% 
65.30% 
Alboraimi Ebri Dhank Yankul Mohadah 
The tum out in AI-Dhirah region represents around 70%. However, this number is 
quite high, considering that a number of them work in the capital of Oman and others 
work in the UAB, since this area is located on the border with the UAB. Therefore, 
some of them might not able to attend the election 
Diagram 6.6 
The turn out of voters in Sharqiyah in 2003 
Bidbid Ezki Manah Alhamra Adam Bahia Samail Nizwa 
The table indicates that there was a good response to the election here. In 5 wilayts out 
of 8, the voters numbered more than 80%. 
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Diagram 6.7 
The turn out of voters in Wusta in 2003 
Aigazir Aldoqrn Mahoot Hirna 
The story of Musandam was repeated in the AI-Wusta region. People knew each other 
and could launch a successful campaign. 
Diagram 6.8 
The turn out of voters in Dhofar includes in 2003 
Islands 
Thamrait Mukshan Alhalanit 
As in Al-Dhakhliah, the people of Dhofar responded positively to the election. In five 
wilayts out of nine, more than 80% of the eligible population participated. 
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These diagrams represent the latest example of the percentage of voters who participate 
in the election. It might be said the maj ority participated in the election. However, in 
places such as Alhalnit Island only around 28 percent of those who have the right to 
vote participated. 
Although the Mujlis Ash-Shura still does not fully meet democratic aspirations, it 
represents the basis for further democracy in Oman. People have started to elect their 
representatives who practise the role of parliament through their debates with 
government ministers. 
6.5.2.2. Membership Criteria 
In order for someone to become a candidate for the Consultative Council elections, and 
thus, a Council member, a number of criteria need to be met. To begin with, candidates 
must be Omani by birth and family origin. The aim of this requirement is to maintain a 
purely Om ani identity, and Omani culture, in the state's institutions409• This means that 
descendants of immigrants from the Indian sub-continent are not eligible to register as 
candidates, even though their families may have lived in Oman for more than a 
generation, and even though they hold Omani citizenship. This preservation of Omani 
identity has some similarity to the situation in Jordan, where special rights of 
representation are given to Christians and the Bedouin, who have guaranteed seats in 
Parliament. 
409 The construction of AI-Shura Council, op.cit. p. 75. 
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In order to register as a candidate, a person must be more than thirty years old. This 
requirement is based on the argument that someone of this age will, through their 
educational background, and their experience of life, approach their responsibilities 
with greater maturity. Another requirement for candidates is that they possess a 
favourable reputation in their Wilayt. Representation is taken seriously, and is also 
taken to be a reflection on the people who elected the candidate 410. The view is that if a 
candidate performs well in the Council, this will reflect well on the place and the 
people he or she represents. Thus, it can be said that the responsibilities taken by a 
candidate and an elected member of the Council require them to be wise, well-
educated, and experienced. However, these are subjective criteria. 
By contrast, the conditions which bar people from standing in an election are clear and 
objective. A person may not put themselves forward as a candidate if they have been 
declared financially bankrupt, or have debts that have not been cleared. Also, people 
diagnosed as suffering from mental sickness are not allowed to become candidates. 
Serving members of the armed forces are also not eligible for election. Anyone from 
the military, who wishes to become a member of the Council, must resign or retire 
from the forces and then wait for a further two years before becoming eligible to stand. 
Conviction of the crimes of fraud or deception bars a person from becoming a 
candidate. Thus, many of the restrictions on candidates that are found in Oman, can 
also be found as regulations covering candidates in other democracies in the world, 
410 Ibid. pp. 75-76. 
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such as the UK. Council members have freedom of the speech but within the limits of 
h 0 . I 411 t e man! aw . 
6.5.2.3. Criticism of Mujlis Ash-Shura 
The activities of the general assembly, the reports of the committees, and the studies 
which prepared in the Mujlis Ash-Shura are classified as secret. This fact was asserted 
in the principles of the Council412. 
The Council does not have public media, such as Hansard. It depends on public media 
such as Oman and Al-Watan newspapers, the Omani TV and Omani radio. This affects 
the capability of the Council to publish important massages since, when these media 
are busy covering other important issues, they will not be able to give enough attention 
to the Council413 . 
The Council conveys suggestions to the government about new rules, but, the 
government does not mention the advice of the Council, even if it acts on their 
suggestions. Thus, people are not aware of the Council's activities. This affects the 
level of trust of the nation towards the Counci1.414. 
A number of members depend on the salary which they receive from the government 
during their membership. This creates two difficulties: firstly, they cannot criticise the 
411 http://www.shura.om!start.html [1-5-2003] 
412 AI-Harthy, S., from www.alwataninOmania.net.com [12-6-2003]. 
413 Ibid. 
414 Ibid. 
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role of the government as, ideally, they should be able to, and secondly, they feel when 
they leave the council they need to search about a new job. This fact decreases the 
number of people who desire to be members in the Council and reduces the quality of 
debate415• 
Members of the electorate sometimes do not vote and, if they vote, they do not care 
about the capability of the candidate; what is important to them is friendship or the 
tribe. This decreases the quality of the Council membership416. Women are still not 
competitive with men because Omani society is controlled by men. Consequently few 
women enter the election417• 
The Sultan stressed the importance of cooperation between the members of Ash-Shura 
Council and the government. The nation depends on the dialogue between these bodies 
and analysts watch carefully the development of this relationship. Some members in 
the Council at the beginning were aggressive and attacked ministers personally, not 
their plans. This affected the level of the trust between the government and the 
Council. Also, some members did not care to discuss the plans and the programmes of 
the ministers, but were only concerned with local demands and small projects which 
could be solved through personal visits to the office of the ministers. The members 
used this strategy to win support from their local voters in the future. They did not treat 
the ministers as they should be treated. Furthermore, there is a tendency to make 
415 Ibid. 
416 AI-Hamhami, S., the membership in Ash-Shura Council www.alwatan.com [7 and 11-6-2003]. 
417 Abd- Al-Khaliq, T., Shura and Women www.alwatan.com [4-6-2003]. 
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unsupported assertions, unsupported by figures and facts, causing the debate to be 
weak. Besides, some ministers who had long experience of dealing with the media, 
used this ability to stifle debate from the members. Some of them accused the members 
of disloyalty and had difficulty accepting criticism. Members cannot reply to what 
ministers say418. 
A number of well educated people do not vote. During the last election, around 5,000 
people refused to vote, because they believe that the Ash-Shura Council is not a real 
Parliament. Members cannot use the media to express their plans. Also, the law bans 
those who are still in government position from being members. The only way they can 
participate is to take a holiday without salary. During 2003 the government started to 
organise a campaign to make people more aware of the elections and the importance of 
choosing high quality members for the Council. In the past, every person could vote for 
two candidates, but now the voter can vote only for one person. Some argue, however, 
that this will increase the chance that people will vote according to tribal affiliation 
rather than choosing the best person. Another concern with the present system is that 
the voter has to give hislher name on the voting paper. This constrains a voter's 
Co d d' . 419 lree om to vote accor lng to conscIence . 
418 AI-Harthy, S., the Meeting with the Ministers in Ash-Shura Council, www.alwatan.com [15-5-2003] 
419 AI-Hashmi, S op.cit. 
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6.5.3 State Council: (Majlis A'Dawlah) 
6.5.3.1. Membership Criteria 
The second important council III Oman is the Majlis A'Dawlah (State Council), 
established in 1997. The members of this Council are appointed by the Sultan. To 
become a nominated member of the Council, a candidate would nonnally have 
considerable public experience. The aim is to bring together a group of people who 
have already served the state for many years, and who can use their wisdom and 
experience to enrich the political debate. Thus, members of the State Council have 
served the Government, for example, as Ministers of State, or as professional civil 
servants, in the case of retired under-secretaries. Retired ambassadors are eligible for 
nomination, and this is also true of officers in the armed forces who have either 
resigned from the service or who have retired42o• In the year 1997 the number of 
members was 41 and in 2000 the number reached 48, five of whom were women. In 
the year 2003, the number of members in the council increased to 55, six of whom are 
women. For the third time, the chief of the council remained in position421 • A new 
leader of the council was appointed on March 2004 after the death of the previous one. 
Outside the areas of government and the military, nominations can be made from 
public figures whose reputation is based on, for example, commerce. Leading 
businessmen and merchants can be nominated. Intellectuals and scholars have been 
chosen, as have people known for their wisdom. Sheikhs are also people whose 
420 http://www.shura.om/start.html [1-10- 200]. 
421 www.Omannewsagency.com [19-10-2003]. 
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authority gives them enough social status to be eligible for nomination422• The Council 
holds four meetings every year, in January, February, May and October. The chief of 
the Council has the right to call emergency meetings 423. 
6.5.3.2. Duties of the Council 
Members of the State Council have six important duties to fulfil. The first is to take 
responsibility for the preparation of studies on a wide range of issues aimed at 
stimulating the country's development. A more precise focus provides members with a 
second duty. This is to draw up recommendations and suggestions aimed at creating 
more effective enterprises in the production and service sectors 424. 
Because members of the State Council have had experience in government, and in 
management, they are also responsible for evaluating the efficiency of administrative 
plans in various sectors. Again, the experience of members of the State Council gives 
them the authority to review and evaluate projects passing between Ministers and the 
Consultative Council before they are forwarded to the cabinet for implementation. 
Members of the Council may also study and provide expert opinions on the issues 
forwarded to the council from the Sultan, or Cabinet ministers relating to public 
development projects425 
422 Ibid. 
423 Ibid. 
424 Documents of the Ash-Shura Council, 1998 to 2000 ,Golden Press, Oman, pp.31-37. 
425 Ibid. 
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This Council was able to prepare a number of studies in areas such as modernity and its 
negative social effects. It was set up in 2003 and discussed the problem of begging, the 
large sums of money paid to the bride on marriage, the effects of divorce, the effects of 
alcohol and drugs and dangers to the Omani identity posed by the imitation of 
undesirable behaviours from other parts of the world. The latter study did not discuss 
solutions to the problems but it did provide suggestions426. 
As was noted above, it is not usual for members of the Consultative Council to discuss 
foreign policy issues. In the State Council, the eminence of its members, some of 
whom may have been in the armed forces or the government, gives them the authority 
to discuss foreign policy. 
6.5.3.3. Criticism of the State Council 
The State Council is still in its early stages. Both the Ash-shura Council and the State 
Council will be the cornerstone to help the evolution of the government to a 
constitutional government. Through their criticism they will help the government to 
correct its mistakes. For example, the State Council has conducted a number of studies 
in areas such as law, tourism, economy and population. Members have paid visits to 
other countries in order to learn from their experience and so develop their work427. 
Also the number of members has increased step by step and the number of women has 
reached five. 
426 State Council, Modernity changes and the negative social effects on Omani society, Social 
Committee in the State Council 2002. 
427 Al-Muskary , S., Member of the State Council, Interview [15-9-2002]. 
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The aim of the establishment of the State Council is to achieve a balance between the 
Ash-shura Council and the government. The members of the State Council have good 
experience in government. However, the Members of the State Council feel their work 
is undermined by other authorities. For example, Sultan Qaboos asked the Council to 
study the reasons for the collapse of Muscat Security Market428• The Council 
established a committee to study this case, but the Minister of Commerce and others 
complained that the Council was investigating and claimed that it did not have the right 
to do so. Even when the report was prepared by the Council, it did not reach the 
Sultan429• 
The role of the Council is to criticise the government and explain its mistakes. Despite 
the fact that a number of laws allow the members to express their ideas, the members 
are not willing to criticise the government frankly, because sometimes they have their 
own interest or they do not want to create conflict with the government. Another 
problem is that the members do not have own data to support their criticism of the 
government. They depend on the formal statistics provided by the government430 • 
6.6 Informal Democracy in Oman 
In addition to the formal institutions of government, one of the outstanding features of 
Ibadhi culture, is that at the political level, people elected to authority are supposed to 
428 Ibid. 
429 Ibid. 
430 Ibid. 
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be accountable to the people who elect them. Before the democratisation process in 
Oman began, the Ibadhi system of election and accountability was limited to Islamic 
scholars (Ulema), who had the right to elect their Imam, and who were accountable to 
the Islamic community as a whole431. 
Because the concepts of election and accountability have existed in the religious 
sphere, it has been relatively easy to extend them into the political sphere. Moreover, 
by creating a political system which incorporates a variety of political opinions, Oman 
has not suffered from the violence of Islamic opposition to the state found elsewhere in 
the Middle East. 
In addition, accountability is enhanced by the visits which Sultan Qaboos makes to 
selected areas of the country 432. These visits which started from 1976, take place during 
a one-month period each year. The Sultan takes with him members of his government 
and they conduct face to face consultations with anyone wanting to make 
representations to him on any subject433 . These visits not only bring the Sultan close to 
the people but they can also result in action being taken on a range of issues. 
Sometimes Sultan Qaboos organises surprise visits to observe projects, visit specific 
areas or military camps and to talk to people in public434. The purpose of his visits in 
general is to hear from people about the real needs for further development, to learn 
about problems, to expand development in every area in the country, to highlight to 
431 Al-Harthy., S, op.cit. 1973, pp.15-25. 
432 Oman 2002-2003, op.cit, p.30. 
433 Ash-Shura Council, op.cit. 1998. 
434 Oman newspaper, 8- 3- 1990. 
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citizens the importance of development to correct misunderstandings, and to assure 
them of the importance of keeping the Omani and Islamic identity 435. 
Another feature of democratisation is the development in gender issues. Women have 
equal rights according to Omani law and many reach top positions and participate in 
democratic councils. These developments are in line with current world trends 436. 
6.6.1 The Media 
The media play an important role in democracies. They can act as a means by which 
people make their views known to the government. In Oman, the media also see 
themselves having a role in the development of the country. The media may also carry 
out an investigation on a subject of interest to the public, independently of government. 
In Oman there are a number of programmes on TV or Radio which are open to people 
who want to complain about some aspect of government business, and to offer 
alternative suggestions. In addition, satellite TV has opened up a wide range of Arabic-
language stations broadcasting from the region, and other channels, such as CNN. 
Sometimes an official from a government institution will be in attendance on an Omani 
programme to answer questions. Also, in every Om ani newspaper (the press started 
only in 1970) there is at least one page on which people can voice their opinion on an 
issue to the relevant Ministry, and expect an official reply437. 
435 AI-Rawahy, A., op.cit p.6. 
436 AI-Alawi, op.cit,1997. 
437 Dahdooh, S, op.cit., 1999, p.144 
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6.6.2 Arabic Web site (Sablat Alarab) 
This is a web site forum, which criticises the role of the government very frankly. It 
was established in November 1999, and the numbers of the visitors up to 2nd August 
2002 was over 40 million438 • The number increased in November 2003, to reach more 
than one hundred million 439. This indicates that democracy in Oman finds fertile soil in 
opinion, as a result of the cultural background of the Omani people. The forum 
discusses topics of interest, things such as politics, economics, social issues, religion, 
and sport and publishes poems about Oman and other related countries 440. The most 
interesting section is the political and economic section. 
The OpInIOnS which are discussed in Al-Sablah are very important because they 
stimulate public opinion. The government faces very severe attacks from people441 • 
People in positions of authority are very sensitive to public opinion and are deterred 
from using their authority to practise any type of corruption, for fear of being attacked 
strongly the next day. For example, when the Minister of the Civil Service secured a 
job in his ministry for a member of his family, he was openly criticised by more than 
one hundred and fifty people 442. It can be said the reason why the ministers of 
Information and Education were replaced was because their policies were not 
supported by public opinion. Some believe that the Sultan himself follows what people 
say in this web site and uses it as a tool for political change in Oman. 
438 www.omania.net [3-8-2002] 
439 www.omania.net [13-8-2003] 
440 www.omania.net [3-8-2002] 
441 AI-Harthy, A., Founder of the Website Interview [10-4-2002] 
442 Ibid. 
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6.6.3 Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
This chamber was established in 1973 with the aim of providing the nation as a whole 
with important statistics, infonnation and advice on economic and commercial issues. 
It conveys the proposals of the private sector to the decision makers in the government, 
through its membership being on various boards of directors of government authorities 
and in high level committees443 • 
At the beginning, the members of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry were eight 
in number. Four of them were elected and the others were selected by the government. 
In 1985, the government feared that some members were not "mature enough" and 
others were loyal to the fonner Communist Party which had been abolished in 1975, so 
it decided to select the president of the Chamber through Royal Decrees444. 
In order to expand the democratic experience inside the Chamber, at the end of the 80s, 
Sheikh Yaqoub Al-Harthy, the chief of the Chamber at that time, decided to change the 
strategy of the Chamber. His plan was that, firstly, the members should represent 
geographic regions, and secondly, the chief of the Chamber should be appointed by the 
Sultan, not through any minister from the government. This latest suggestion was a 
response to the advice provided to the government that the chief of the Chamber should 
be appointed by the Minister of Trade and Industry. The government did not accept his 
idea, so Al-Harthy decided to resign, because he thought that the role of this institute 
443 http://www.omanchamber.org/) [11-8-2002] 
444 AI-Harthy, ex Chief of the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Chief of 
Businessmen's Council Interview [20-4-2003]. 
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should be to criticise the government, not to please it. He believed that because Sheikh 
Salim Al-Khalele was appointed by the government, he would support the government 
policy of opening a trade co-operation office with Israel. Shiekh Al-Harthy refused to 
establish any type of cooperation with Israel, because he believed his stance 
represented the position of Omani businessmen. His claim was that the Omani 
Chamber was part of the Arabian Association Chamber and he could not establish 
communication as long as the occupation of Palestine continued. He added that the 
Omanis should await the fruits of the negotiation. He also refused to accept the idea 
that Iraq should be expelled from the Arabian Chamber - an association belonging to 
the Arab League- , as suggested by the general secretary of the Gulf Co-operation 
Council. His idea was that Iraq was part of the Arab League and separation from any 
association meant separation from the Arab League. Any step concerning expulsion to 
the withdrawal from any association of the Arab League should be discussed in the 
general assembly of the Arab League, not within the affiliated association itselt45 • 
6.6.4 Businessmen's Council 
The Businessmen's Council was established in 1999, with sixteen members. The role 
of the council is to link the government and the private sector in all things related to the 
economy and the development of the country. It can give advice on issues such as 
• . .. .. 446 
investment manpower and the involvement of Omams m econonuc actIvltIes . , , 
445 Ibid. 
446 Oman 2000, Ministry of Information, Sultanate of Oman, 2000, p. 32. 
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The government again selected Shaikh Yaqoub Al-Harthy as president of this Council. 
He believes that there are two weaknesses in the Council. Firstly; the government pays 
insufficient attention to its resources. This led Sheikh Yaqoub himself to pay the salary 
of the secretary, provide a meeting place and pay for the expenses of the Council. 
Secondly, the government selects all the members. He argues that they should be 
elected, since businessmen are better able to judge who is capable of working in this 
Council than the government447• 
The Council has made a number of suggestions, such as the establishment of a college, 
to teach students about tourism activities. The government accepted the idea and 
established such an institution. Also, the Council suggested establishing the Sultan 
Qaboos Investment Fund. This Fund was intended to receive one Billion Omani rials 
over five years. A number of specialised people were to work in this Fund and use it 
for strategic plans with the aim of decreasing dependence on oil as a main source of 
. h fu d hi . 448 Income. However, t e government re se to act on t s suggestIon . 
6.7. 5 Democratisation and external actors 
The influence of external actors such as the IMF and World Bank was felt most 
strongly in economic decision making in 1995. An international conference called 
"Oman 2020" was convened. The conference brought together Omani representatives 
and foreign advisers to plan an economic strategy for Oman over 25 years. One of the 
447 AI-Harthy, ex Chief of the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Chief of 
Businessmen's Council Interview [20-4-2003]. 
448 Ibid. 
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proposals that has been acted on has been the privatisation of state utilities, such as 
I .. d t 449 e ectnclty an wa er . 
One of the aims of the privatisation process was to encourage people with capital who 
were investing overseas to invest in Oman. From this point of view, privatisation can 
be said to benefit the Omani economy. In terms of the democratisation process, it is not 
clear that the decisions made by external a'ctors necessarily obstruct the development of 
democracy. If by informal democracy we refer to people at all levels of society being 
involved in decision making, then it can be said that this aspect of democracy is still in 
the process of being developed in Oman. However, effective members of the 
Consultative Council would normally make the effort to visit the people they represent, 
to discuss issues with them. 
6.7 Conclusion 
It is true that in Oman, the inspiration for political reform has come from the top of 
society, from the Sultan himself. In Oman, the democratisation process began in 1981, 
when there was no crisis. Other examples in the world show that such weak processes 
can break down, but this has not been the case in Oman, where the democratic process 
has expanded since 1981, to include women, and younger members of society. 
Although some may argue that Oman is not a democracy, the point is that Oman has 
begun a process of democratisation at its own speed. Oman has not gone too fast in 
changing its political system, and this may be why it is more stable. This means that 
449 Oman 2002- 2003, op.cit. p.95. 
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Oman is in a democratic transition, in which it can learn from the past and make 
reforms to the system as it develops. 
In the context of the Middle East, the democratisation in Oman is part of the same 
process that has begun in Jordan and Yemen, but it has its own character. Some 
liberalisation has also taken place in Qatar in recent years. Why is Oman's experience 
of democratisation different from that in Jordan and Yemen? In the first place, recent 
democratisation in Jordan and Yemen was begun in a period of economic crisis. Also, 
democratisation in Jordan was one way that King Hussein maintained the loyalty of his 
subjects, after he broke his connections to the occupied territories. 
However, in Oman, there have not been economic or political crises behind reform. 
Rather, the major changes that have modernised Oman in such a short time, have led to 
a need for public discussion on what development is taking place. In other states in the 
South, rapid modernisation has led to great instability, but not in Oman. In the early 
period of modernisation, there was not a growing division between the very rich and 
very poor. The benefits of modernisation were spread across society. In recent years, a 
gap has begun to show between the very rich and others, and this might create tensions 
in the future. But, as Oman develops its democratic institutions, and maintains levels of 
investment providing employment, such problems can be openly discussed and 
addressed within the political system. 
Democratisation in Oman has not been an exact copy of western European or 
American democracy. It has some formal elements that can be found in the West, but 
242 
most important is the way that it has incorporated Islamic traditions into the 
consultation process. Also, in Ibadhi Islam, there are requirements that leading figures 
be elected. Furthermore, rule in Oman is not oppressive. There are no torture camps. 
Through education, Qaboos encourages political changes towards proto- democracy 
based on traditional Shura, and there is an element of freedom of speech. This means 
that people in Oman recognise democratisation as their own, and not as something 
imposed or imported by foreigners, 
The previous Sultan failed to continue in office because he ignored the voice of the 
nation. He oppressed the population and refused to transform his country to a modem 
state. His strategies of survival, as we have seen, threatened the throne. The present 
Sultan seems to have learned from the previous one. He has found that the best strategy 
to survive is to consult the nation, involve them in its institutions, build a modem state 
and enhance the relation with other countries. The next chapter therefore will provide 
an overview of the Omani Foreign Policy. 
243 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
OMAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: SEARCHES FOR LEGITIMACY 
"As part of the world, we must respond to events around us positively and 
clearly. We must exert all our efforts to actively and objectively promote 
peace and cooperation regionally and internationally". (Qaboos, 17th 
National Dayt50 
7.1 Introduction 
The foreign policy of a country is the extension of its domestic policy and hence a 
reflection of the same. Foreign policy is the state playing its role in world politics. It 
i~cludes various issues such as trade, commerce, culture and ideology. Students of 
international relations and politics are aware of the various factors in the making of 
foreign policy. However, in a politically changing country such as Oman, foreign 
policy acquires an additional meaning: it is directly linked to the issue of the political 
legitimacy of the rulers who seek to gather international support for the policies 
pursued at home. The political changes that have taken place in Oman for the last three 
decades or so are very challenging for the ruling family. In a world which is 
experiencing a so-called third wave of democratization, these changes may not loom 
large, and their limited nature may invite contrary assessments from home and abroad. 
In such a world, the survival of the monarchy is indeed fraught with considerable 
difficulties. As C. J. Riphenburg has pointed out: 
450 Qaboos., S op.cit, 1995, p. 167 
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"The concentration of foreign policy is on the regime's dynastic interests. 
Decisions are made in terms of their impact on the future of the ruling 
family. Omani diplomacy remains highly personal".451 
This may be true but as the personal interest of the monarchy is democratisation, 
foreign policy can playa role both in enhancing the broader political legitimacy of the 
regime and in strengthen the process of democratisation. 
This chapter aims to examine the changes in Omani foreign policy after 1970 from the 
point of view of the internal make-up of the country, and in the light of its political 
history and the content of world events. Further, it describes Oman's involvement with 
world organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Arab League 
and the United Nations, and the relations with specific states such as Iran and the 
United Kingdom. Finally, it discusses the subject of regional and international crises, in 
which Oman plays a part, along with other nations, as a mediator. 
7.2 About Oman 
Before 1970, Oman was an isolated state452. Sultan Sa'id refused to enter into any type 
of diplomatic relations with other foreign states. His relations were limited to Great 
Britain and India. During this period, Oman did not participate in any regional or 
451 Riphenburg, C. J op.cit, 1998 ,p.185. 
452 AI-Hammami, H., Education for the 21 Century: General Education Reform in the Sultanate of 
Oman: Motives, Nature and Strategies of Implementation, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis: the University 
of Birmingham, 1999 p. 92 
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international organizations. The Sultan followed the events in the world from his radio 
in his isolated residence. Although he appointed his uncle Shihab as the minister of 
foreign affairs, in reality he did not rely on him. He was the man who ran the ministry. 
In 1948 he appointed Woods Ballard, who was a British expert, to be the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. In 1953 he replaced him with Neil Inez, also an expert from Britain. 
When the present Sultan took over power, he adopted an opposite strategy. Qaboos 
opened the country to the world. For example, Oman began to establish diplomatic 
missions in various countries; engaged itself in various bilateral and multinational 
relations; got involved in regional and international organisations; acted as a mediator 
in problems concerning the Gulf States, and the Arab World; and made great efforts to 
find ways to a better future for the people of the Middle East. 
In order to blunt the edge of enmity, Oman showed magnanimity towards its past 
enemies. AS early as the 1970s, it succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with 
Iraq, Kuwait, the USSR and South Yemen. This step helped to reduce the circle of the 
State's enemies. Oman understood exactly the geopolitical situation of the region. This 
understanding reinforced its relations with the West and the main powers in the region 
such as Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. 
Oman has tried to use regional developments to enhance national security. The 
establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council is a prime example. The establishment 
of this body helped greatly in ending the complex border disputes between Oman and 
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its neighbours. Oman, for the first time in its history, established political and 
legislative agreements which were recognized by the international community453. 
Oman declared that its international relations should be based on: "mutual respect" and 
"common interests", "non-interference in internal affairs" and "compliance with 
international and regional charters and treaties,,454. It sought to enhance relations with 
the Arab states, establish good relations with other countries in the world, provide 
assistance with African problems and support the Southern Mrican freedom 
struggle 455. 
In the 70s of the last century, Oman tried to focus on regional politics and adopted 
policies which avoided any clashes which would create further enemies. At that time, 
Oman faced a number of problems such as border disputes, the desire to obtain 
recognition from regional and international organisations, and economic problems. 
After the ending of these problems, Oman started to embark on unique policies 456. 
Historically, Oman had a deep interest in the Indian Ocean. When Omani merchants 
wanted to go abroad, they would invariably go to India. The sea links between the two 
nations were very ancient. Nevertheless, from 1970, Oman started to be closer to the 
453 AI-Mowafy, A., columnist in Oman news, Interview, [20- 9- 2002]. 
454 http//www.omantcomlMsi forhtm [1-6-1998]. 
455 Humoody, H, Al-Fiker Al-Siasy Al-Omani (The Omani Political beliefs, 1992) p.386. Oman has a 
special historical linkage with Africa. 
456 AI-Mowafy, A., columnist in Oman news, Interview, [20- 9- 2002]. 
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Arab World. For example, Oman allied itself with the Gulf States, made remarkable 
progress in mutual trade, and established excellent relations with Egypt and Jordan. 
Oman's relations with other Arab countries improved greatly. In the past, the Arab 
world caused problems for Oman as emigrants from Oman created security problems 
to the country, but now the situation has changed457. 
In 1996, the Basic Law of the Sultanate of Oman published by a Royal Decree defined 
basic Omani principles. Foreign policy was to "strengthen Oman's international 
position and its role in establishing the foundations of peace, security, justice and co-
operation between different States and peoples,,458. 
7.3 The Effect of Location on Omani Foreign Policy 
Oman overlooks the Straits of Hormuz, through which a high percentage of world oil is 
currently carried by ships. It also overlooks the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Gulf and the 
Gulf of Oman. Geographical location has had an important influence in shaping the 
state boundaries and subsequently creating international links by air, sea and land459. 
This fact gave Oman international interests, especially in relation to the main powers. 
For example, the European countries obtain around 70 percent of their oil requirements 
through Hormuz and the United States of America obtains around fifty percent460. On 
4th June 1980, Oman signed an agreement with the United States called the United 
States-Omani Facilities Agreement. The aim of this agreement was: 
457 Ibid. 
458 http://www.uni-wuezburg.de/law/muOOOOO_.html[27 -6-2002]. 
459 Miraan, T.,op.cit. 1996. 
460 AI-Harassi, op.cit, 1994, p62 . 
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"To enhance the capability of Oman to safeguard its security and territorial 
integrity and to promote peace and stability". 
At the same time Oman paid attention to the regional powers, especially Iran461 . Its 
location compelled Oman to be an active player in the international community. 
The location gave the opportunity to Oman to encourage internal industrial sectors and 
to build important ports in the region, such as the port of Salalah, with the specific aim 
of creating links with North America, Europe and Asia and also India and Africa462• 
Oman inherited many unsettled borders with a number of states. This is a very sensitive 
issue. Many political and legal problems between countries are related to border 
disputes. Therefore, Oman under the current leadership decided to settle the border 
disputes with the neighboring countries to avoid any further problems. Oman was 
concerned that this type of dispute might be used as a card by any party that wished to 
create problems for Oman463 • For this reason, Oman started to end its differences with 
Saudi Arabia in May 1991, with Yemen in October 1992, and with the United Arab 
Emirates in 1993. Also, with respect to the maritime boundaries, Oman ended its 
disputes with Iran in 1975464 and Pakistan in June 2000. Oman now does not have any 
461 AI-Mowafy, A., columnist in Oman news, Interview, [20-9-2002]. 
462 Oman Daily, [27-12-1997]. 
463 AI-Harthy, A., The Chief of the Arabian Department, Interview, [20- 9-2002]. 
464 Oman News Agency, [1-21-2000]. 
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border disputes with any country465. This is a remarkable achievement indeed, when 
compared with the half-a-century old border disputes of India and Pakistan, and India 
and China. 
Historically speaking, the Sultanate during the last thirty years went back to the Omani 
foreign policy which had been applied in the 19th century. At that time, Oman kept 
good relations with the major powers in the world such as the USA, Great Britain, 
Holland and France. 
Oman concentrates on peace efforts and international legitimacy as basic principles for 
the regime at the present time. From this understanding, Oman seeks to become an 
active member of the international community, and it participates in any efforts directly 
regarding the region. It has strengthened its relations with the Arab League and the 
Committee of the 77, and involved itself with issues to which the United Nations gives 
major importance, such as the environment, climate and nuclear weapons. It is party to 
a number of weapons agreements. It has also been a non-permanent member of the 
Security Council and has paid attention to the problems of the African continent. It has 
mediated in a number of problems in the Gulf States and the Arab world. 
Unlike other Gulf States, Oman remained neutral during the Iraq-Iran conflict. 
Furthermore, along with the other Gulf States, Oman took a position under the 
465 AI-Harthy, A., the Chief of the Arabian Department, Interview [20- 9- 2002]. see also AI-Harassi, 
op.cit ,1994, pp. 91-92. 
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umbrella of the UN against Iraq during the 1990-91 crises. Oman may be said to have 
acted responsibly in both situations. 
7.4 The Important Players in Oman's Foreign Policy 
The foreign policy of a state is shaped or influenced by factors from within (the 
domestic environment) and from without (the external environment). The domestic 
environment includes the major institutions of the country. Foreign policy may be 
affected by the interactions among these institutions, and the interactions of these 
institutions with the state 466. Also included in the domestic environment are factors 
such as the physical environment, population, the economy, the role of the military, 
and type of govemment467• Relations and interactions with other states and their 
institutions provide the external environment. External policies and internal policies 
may follow similar patterns 468. 
Decision-making in Oman is a process controlled by the head of state, Sultan Qaboos, 
in conjunction with his Ministers. As regards foreign affairs, the Minister of Foreign 
Mfairs, his two advisers -the General Secretary and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs-
ambassadors in the ministry and in the missions and their staff, share responsibility. 
Their roles include collecting information and conducting analysis on strategic matters, 
organising consultations and agreements on world events, developing relations 
between Oman and other countries, sending representatives to Embassies abroad, 
466 Brown, c., Understanding International Relations, London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997. 
467 Miraan,T., The Lectures of Course no 16 untitled, The Omani Diplomatic Institute, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Oman Press, 1996. 
468 Brown, op.cit, 1997. 
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liaising on Oman's behalf with other ministries or institutions internationally and, 
finally, communicating and negotiating on behalf of the Sultanate on issues relating to 
treaties and agreements. In order to achieve better cooperation, the ministry decided in 
the year 2000 to gather the Omani ambassadors who represent the Sultanate in the 
missions and give them an opportunity to meet with the ministers of the government 
and their under secretaries. The aim of this meeting was to discuss various areas which 
would help to develop the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to be aware of the 
latest developments which occurred in Oman. As for matters of Defence, the Sultan is 
also the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces while the Defence Council is 
responsible for maintaining security469. 
As we saw in chapter six, public opinion has an important role to play in decision-
making processes concerning domestic and foreign policies. Opportunities are made 
available to the public to make representations to the Ash-Shura and to the Al-Dwalah 
Council and Sablat Alarab website. The opinions of the commercial sector are 
transmitted through the Chamber of Trade and Industry and Businessmen's Council, 
which raises their proposals before the appropriate Ministry. A number of decisions 
have been influenced as a result of the latter efforts of the latter institutions.47o. 
During the 70s and the 80s, the work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs relied on men. 
However, the situation changed in the 90s. The ministry started to open the door for 
women to participate in this field. Now, the number of women is increasing year by 
469 Royal Decree, 1996. 
470 AI-Alawi, Y., Omani speech to the United Nations, 1997. 
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year. Furthermore, women have reached high positions such as ambassador. For 
example, the current Omani ambassador in Holland is a woman. 
The role of women in the past was as wives of diplomats who organised social events 
for the diplomats. Now, women work alongside men in the ministry, enjoy the same 
level of education, the same level of opportunity in the training in the Omani 
diplomatic institute, and the same level of trust from the ministry. As a result, women 
can negotiate with other foreign delegations for the Omani interests in different issues 
such as politics, economics and bilateral and multilateral issues. 
7.5 Maintaining Arab and Islamic Identity 
From ancient times, Oman has played an important role in the pan-Arab world. Also, in 
common with many neighbouring Arab states throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa, and in common with some non-Arabic states, such as Turkey and others 
throughout the world, the Omani people have adopted the mantle of Islam. This dual 
Arab/Islamic identity has been defended. An example, as we have seen in Chapter 
Four, was the famous battle against the Portuguese in the 17th century. The racial and 
religious make-up of the people is an influential factor, therefore, not only in the 
shaping of domestic affairs, but also in the shaping of international relations with other 
similar countries. 
Oman is an essential part of the Arab World. However, it differs from most Arab states 
in one important way. Oman does not adopt the full Arab strategy and desires to be 
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more open to and interactive with foreign countries. To illustrate that, Oman has trade 
relations with Israel, whereas most Arab countries, such as Syria, still do not accept 
any kind of relations with Israel. Oman also is a founder of the Indian Ocean 
Association, of which all other Arab countries are not yet members. 
The movement in every state in its contacts with other states depends on its historical 
heritage. Oman used to have contact with Arab and non-Arab countries. At that time, 
as we have seen in the previous chapter, most of the Arab countries were under the 
control of foreign Empires and there was no Arab system. On the other hand, Oman 
was a quasi-independent state, and it dealt with other authorities on an equal footing. 
Therefore, in modem political life, Oman took the initiative to establish the Indian 
Ocean Association. The aim of this step is to establish economic cooperation. The 
countries involved have a growing population and this step will open the door for 
I . . 471 C oser economIc cooperatIOn . 
Oman also has a traditional relationship with India. The relationship has ancient origins 
in the voyages of Omani merchants, for whom India was an important meeting point 
and strong post for their further trade to other parts of the world. Other countries, too, 
recognised India as an important market for trade for example, in spices. Oman now 
insists on improving relations with India because it is a neighbouring country, which is 
important in terms of mineral resources, and has the second largest population in the 
world after China. India, too, is keen to improve relations. Oman takes an impartial 
position in the problems between Pakistan and India and has tried to help both sides to 
471 AI-Harthy, A., the Chief of the Arabian Department, Interview [20- 9- 2002]. 
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find a solution in the border disputes over Jammu & Kashmir. There are various 
cultural, economic, trade and even social links with India 472. 
7.6 Relationships with other countries and Regional and International 
Organisations 
According to Frankel (1984), the foreign policy of a country may be judged according 
to the range of its relations with other countries. As far as Oman is concerned, it may 
be said that the country has taken a position of strength with regard to other countries, 
both in terms of building peaceful links of friendship and economic co-operation, and 
in terms of acting firmly and responsibly in time of conflict and crises among its 
neighbours. 
7.6.1 Regional and International Organisations 
7.6.1.1 Membership of the United Nations 
Membership of international organisations IS a very important aspect of the 
contemporary world473, and Oman is a full participant in many world associations. For 
example, it joined the United Nations in 1971. The involvement in the United Nations 
opened the door to the world. Firstly, the Omani civil war was discussed in the United 
Nations. This gave international recognition to the Omani authorities and thus 
strengthened their position in the internal conflict. Secondly, the United Nations was an 
important forum for effective political communications with countries such as the 
former Soviet Union and Israel. Relations with Israel led to the creation of the trade 
472 AI-Tubi, H, the chief of Asian department, Interview [20-9-2002]. 
473 Light, op.cit. 1994. 
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office in both countries after the Madrid Accord. Thirdly, the UN helped to expose 
Oman and its culture, its role, and activities to the world. Finally, it represented an 
important umbrella in the international community, to stop any foreign aggression474. 
Oman has gained international respect for responsible actions and contributions in 
recent events. Its status was confirmed when it was elected to the United Nations 
Security Council in January, 1994. 176 countries participated in the vote475 • As a 
responsible member of the UN and other organizations, Oman demands aid for 
refugees and proposes strategies to protect the environment particularly the local desert 
environment476• As regards peace issues, Oman declared before the United Nations 
(Conference 51t77 in favour of an agreement on weapons proliferation. Oman in 
principle would like to lend weight to such international agreements478 • Oman's 
involvement in organizations such as the UN has encouraged stability and rapid growth 
within the country. 
7.6.1.2 Gulf Co-operation Council 
In order to exert political and economic influence, states need to create alliances. A 
major benefit of Oman is involvement with other groups has been greater recognition. 
Oman was the first country in the Gulf which called in 1975 for a committee involving 
474 AI-Mowafy, A., columnist in Oman news, Interview, [20- 9- 2002]. 
475 Miran, T., op.cit, 1996. 
476 AI-Alwai, A., op.cit, 1997 
477 This speech was delivered by Yousif Al-alwai, the Omani Minister of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of 
Sultan Qaboos the in the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1996. 
478 Ibid. 
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the Gulf States, Iran and Iraq. These countries agreed to hold a meeting of foreign 
ministers in Oman to discuss how they could cooperate to establish better security and 
stability in the area. Such a move was a pioneering initiative. Although the meeting 
failed to achieve much, as a result of this step, the voice of Oman started to gain 
respect in the international community479. 
In the second stage, Oman and five other small countries in the South East of the 
Arabian Peninsula felt the need to secure their sovereignty against external and internal 
threats480• Firstly, the Islamic Revolution in Iran had announced that it was desirous of 
expanding its own experience to other parts of the Muslim world. Secondly, the war 
which erupted between Iraq and Iran affected the stability in the region. Thirdly, the 
price of oil fluctuated, so that these countries needed to consult to protect their citizens 
from harmful effects. They felt that collective economic projects might help to 
diversify the income of these states, and that collective security would preserve their 
territorial integrity 481. 
The principles of good neighbourliness and respect for international law and traditions 
were clearly defined by Sultan Qaboos, in the celebration of the national Omani Day. 
He stated that Omani policy had the aim of 
479 AI-Harthy, A., the Chief of the Arabian Department Interview [20- 9- 2002]. 
480 Cooperation Council For The Arab States, (Riyadh, Secretariat General, 1991) p.3. 
481 Lonney, R., "The Gulf Cooperation Council's cautious Approach to Economic Integration", Jornal 
of Economic Cooperation, vol. 24, 2003. 
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"strengthening the co-operation between the Gulf states, fortifying 
relations with other Arab countries, as well as supporting issues of 
importance in the Arab world, enhancing Islamic co-operation, supporting 
just causes, exploring all avenues for increased co-operation with the 
European Union and other international bodies, following a policy of non-
alignment, and the establishment of cordial relations with all friendly 
countries" . 
On 25th May 1981, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates 
and Qatar established the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). The GCC excludes Iran 
and Iraq, because they do not have similar regimes. The aim of the GCC was to 
strengthen co-operation in areas such as economy, finance, trade, customs, tourism, 
legislation and administration, as well as fostering scientific and technical progress in 
industry, mining, agriculture, water and animal resources, establishing scientific 
research centres, setting up joint ventures, and encouraging cooperation of the private 
sector482• 
The Council has achieved remarkable co-operation in various areas, but the most 
important are in politics, security and the economy. In terms of politics, these countries 
were able to consult, discuss and unite their position on political events. Members hold 
regular summit-level and ministerial-level meetings, for example, in the Arab League, 
and, during conferences and meetings which are held at the international level, the 
members of the GCC meet to unify their position. 
482 http://www.gcc-sg.org!Foundations.html [1-3-2003]. 
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The leaders or ministers of foreign affairs issue statements to represent the position of 
the Gee toward any regional or international issue. During the last two decades, the 
members were able to act collectively on a number of issues, such as the problem 
between Iraq and Iran, the UAB and Iran, and the disputes between the Arab states and 
Israel. 
In tenns of security, the Members believe that any aggression against one country 
means aggression against all. Most of these countries feel that they are not secure 
because they are oil-wealthy, with small populations and weak annies. At the same 
time, they are close to Iraq and Iran, both of which have ambitions to dominate the 
area. This fact forced the countries to co-operate. In order to achieve practical self 
defence, Sultan Qaboos suggested creating one anny for the six members. The 
countries are still discussing this suggestion. He also suggested the establishment of a 
strong force which would include one hundred thousand soldiers, drawn from all the 
members. Every country at the same time would enhance its relations with the main 
powers in the world such as the USA and UK, and the main powers in the region such 
as Egypt. This step would help achieve not only stability in the Gee but also world 
stability, and would decrease expenses on weapons483 . Another example of the co-
operation between these countries is that the members created the peninsula shield 
force in 1982484• This force participated during the war against Iraq in the second Gulf 
War and is ready to prevent any threat facing the Gee states. 
483 AI-Harassi, H., op.cit, 1994, p.55. 
484 http://www .gcc-sg.orgl cooperation.html [1-2-2004]. 
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In economic terms, the Gee desires to achieve economic integration. In 1983, for 
example, the members discussed areas such as a free trade zone, according to which 
goods from member nations are exempted from customs tariffs. Some argue that the 
Council was established as a result of external problems, rather than internal demand 
and pressure 485. The external threats to these states such as the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran did lead these countries to co-operate, but later this union encouraged further co-
operation, and improved internal integration. 
This cooperation does not mean that these countries act as one in all economic, security 
and political affairs. There are issues in which every country takes its own decisions. 
Oman, for example, because it looks over the Strait of Hormuz, takes an especially 
international approach. Most of the world's oil passes through this Strait. This resource 
is important not only for the Gee but also to the international community. Moreover, 
although most states in the Gee depend on oil, Oman has less income from that 
source, so it needs to diversify its income. That is why Oman decided to establish an 
alliance with other countries which overlooked the Indian Ocean. Another difference is 
that Oman, compared with other Gulf states, has taken greater steps in the democratic 
process. 
Saudi Arabia is a very influential country in the Gee council, but the other party 
which balances it is Oman. The reason is that Oman is the second largest country in the 
Gulf States and it is the oldest country which has political and civil life in the Gulf 
485 AI-Busaid, K., op.cit., 1995, p. 52. 
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States. Other places in the Gulf were founded on the tribal system. Oman is the only 
country which has a wider political and diplomatic history. The Saudis understand this 
point and take it into account when making any suggestion.486 Also, Oman can join 
with two or more states to create a balance. 
In order to develop a level of consultation in the region, the Gee states established in 
1998 a consultative association under the Secretariat General. Oman offered to host the 
headquarters of this association and the Gee states accepted this proposal in 2003. 
Oman's aim in this step was to strengthen the role of the consultative association. A 
number of suggestions along thses lines have been made to the council of ministers of 
the Gee, notably, that the association should be separated from the Secretariat General 
of the Gee and become independent487. Up to now, unlike the European experience 
with consultative institutions the Gee consultative association has had only limited 
authority. 
The establishment of the Gee enhanced consultation among all Arabs. The Gee states 
provide mature opinions to the Arab states, because they are more settled in terms of 
wealth compared to the other Arab states. The Gee countries mostly consult before 
they talk to other Arab countries. This collective alliance strengthens Oman's position 
at the regional and international levels. On the political side, Oman has a respected 
voice in the Gee. This has secured the area from two important wars. From the 
economic point of view, the situation is advantageous: the Gee has reached a number 
486 AI-Mowafy, A., columnist in Oman news, Interview, [20- 9- 2002]. 
487 AI-Muskary, Member of the Consultative Association of the GCC states, Interview [4- 12- 2003]. 
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of economic agreements on matters such as economic relations and mutual trade. It 
includes a number of mechanisms. Secondly, the members have agreed to unify 
customs duties for the Gee states from the year 2003. This will help to improve the 
liberalisation of trade between these countries. Thirdly, a study is underway with a 
view to unifying the currency from 2010488• This step will bring benefits for the 
member states. Finally, there is also a desire to depend on internal workers from the 
Gee instead of foreigners. 
7.6.1.3 The Arab League 
The Arab League was established in 1945489 to achieve political, economic, cultural, 
and social programmes. The Arab League plays an essential role as a link between the 
populations of its members. The latter prefer to call it the "House of the Arabs", and it 
is involved in settling Arab problems. For example, it helped to solve the 1958 
Lebanese civil war. It has helped shape school curricula, and preserve manuscripts and 
the Arab cultural heritage. Furthermore, the Arab League has launched literacy 
campaigns, and reproduced intellectual works, and translated modem technical 
terminology for the use of member states. Other areas in which the League has been 
active are fighting crime and drug abuse, labour, cultural exchanges, youth and sports 
programmes, the role of women in Arab societies and child welfare activities. The 
488 AI-Harthy, A., the Chief of the Arabian Department, [20- 9- 2002]. 
489 Tahri, S., On this Volume, in Biat Alarab (The House of Arab) , The Arab League Cairo, The 
Arab League, Marsh, 1995, p.6. 
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members established a joint defence council, an economic council, and a permanent 
military command.490 Oman has benefited from most of the League's programmes. 
The Arab League represents an essential political forum where the Arab states meet 
and discuss their problems. Politically, it involves a group of states linked now as one 
unit to achieve political and economic interests in international politics. This 
strengthens Oman's political and economic position. Oman plays a role in terms of 
organising the work inside the Arab League, for example, Arab summits. Whereas 
meetings in the past were held on an adhoc basis, meetings now are held regularly491. 
Oman's a tribal culture, Omanis believe that human strength lies first at in the level of 
family, then in the tribe, then the state, and finally, the international community. The 
power of the state is increased according to its circle of the friends in the world. From 
this perspective, Oman has a great interest in promoting its relations with the Arab 
League and creating a place for itself in development efforts in the region 492. Oman, 
with other Arab states, is pursing economic cooperation in the context of the Arab 
League, with the ultimate aim of establishing an Arab common market 493. It is also 
hoped to establish an Arab free trade zone by the year 2007, but this step requires 
improvement in the market system of the market inside state. The economies of Arab 
countries close to the Soviet Union used to be centrally controlled. This created 
barriers for economic cooperation especially between individuals. A free trade zone 
490 http://www.arabji.comlArabGovtlArabLeague.htm [27- 8- 2002]. 
491 AI-Harthy, A., the Chief of the Arabian Department, Interview [20- 9- 2002]. 
492 Ibid. 
493 Ibid 
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would remove state interference in the economy and encourage states to switch 
economic activities from the public to the private sector494• 
Involvement in the Arab League is very important to Oman. For example, during the 
internal war in Oman, there was a movement to split Oman into two states. The 
Imamate sought become a member of the Arab League and to establish a separate state, 
but the success of the Omani government in joining the Arab League limited any such 
attempt to weaken the state. Oman at the beginning faced opposition from Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen, but then these countries agreed to accept Oman. This involvement 
was an important step toward creating a united political state in Oman495 . 
Oman thus started to present itself as a united state for all political purposes. This 
meant that the opponents represented an illegal movement and the state had the right to 
stop them. In the next step, Oman started to playa role in some committees inside the 
Arab League, such as the legal and administrative committees. Then, Oman started to 
feel that it should involve itself in Arab problems. This would help Oman to strengthen 
its position among the Gulf States and other Arab countries. That is why it ended all its 
differences with Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and started to be active with 
other Arab states. And that is why, up to the present, Oman is very serious about 
fulfilling its commitments to the Arab League. Oman does not house any of the 
associations or organisations of the Arab League. However, there are some other Arab 
494 Ibid. 
495 AI-Mowafy, A., columnist in Oman news, Interview, [20- 9- 2002]. 
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countries which also do not house them 496. Oman is active in other ways, for example, 
it tried to mediate between the Arab countries which supported Iraq in its invasion in 
Kuwait, such as Jordan, Yemen and the Palestinian authority. In 1994, Oman played 
host to the king of Jordan, the President of Yemen and the Chief of the Palestinian 
th . 497 au onty . 
7.6.1.4 Damascus Declaration 
Oman is also a member of the Damascus Declaration, which was established in 1991. 
It includes the GCC plus Egypt and Syria. It was established after the occupation of 
Kuwait by Iraq. The declaration was to enhance economic and defence co-operation 
between the members. However, the GCC did not desire to strengthen this new alliance 
as they felt that it might not be welcomed by Iran498• For this reason the activities on 
this Declaration are currently suspended. 
7.6.1.5 Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
This was established in 1969 after the burning of al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. In 
total, fifty- five states are members in this conference. All of them are Islamic 
countries. They aimed to: 
496 Ibid. 
497 AI-Harassi, op.cit, 1994, p. 90 
498 Ibid. p.55 
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"Consult together with a view to promoting close cooperation and mutual 
assistance in the economic, scientific, cultural and spiritual fields, inspired 
by the teachings of Islam,,499. 
Members gather regularly at heads of government and foreign minister level to 
discuss the position of the members from Islamic perspective. The area of 
discussion has been enlarged to include any development in the world politics. 
7.7 Economic and other aspects of co-operation between Oman and World 
Organisations 
Foreign policy analysis has evolved in the present time to embrace economIC 
considerations, and not only diplomacy and the use of force500. Oman is aware of the 
need to develop potential in the national and international sectors. Consequently, it has 
made significant contributions, such as organising an international conference to 
prepare for the year 2020, signing a number of agreements with Asian countries to co-
operate in gas production, and participating in the World Trade Organisation. One 
important group in which Oman is involved is the Indian Ocean Association (lOA), 
which includes 29 countries in the region with a membership covering 31 % of the 
world's population. Among its many objectives, the lOA aims to benefit the welfare 
and development of nations, improve living standards, draw up a special programme 
for economic co-operation, investment, trade, science and technology, and lastly 
499 http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/oic.htm [27,8,2002]. 
500 Light, op.cit 1994. 
, 
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implement anti-terrorist measures. Most of the objectives of the lOA are along similar 
lines to other world groupings such as the European Union (EU) and Asia- Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), which have become powerful associations in the 
international economy. 
7.8 Relationship with Arab Countries 
Because Oman is economically independent, it can afford to make its own decisions. 
Sometimes these are made in solidarity with the Arab League. But at other times Oman 
has made its own decisions. An example of solidarity was the Gulf War in 1991. 
Because it was opposed to Iraq's violation of the Charter of the Arab League it joined 
the military alliance to defeat the Iraqi anned forces. 
The efforts of the present government have succeeded in reducing the differences with 
other countries. For example, Saudi Arabia refused at the beginning to recognise the 
state of Oman. In 1972, Sultan Qaboos visited Saudi Arabia. This historic event 
changed the Saudi position. The two countries agreed to establish diplomatic relations 
and exchange diplomatic missions at ambassador level. However, the two countries 
remained at odds because Saudi Arabia gave shelter to some Omani religious 
opponents when the disputes over the borders were still not settled. At the end of the 
1970s and the beginning of 1980s, especially after the announcement of the Gulf Co-
operation Council, new relations started to be established between these two countries. 
Representatives of both countries started to meet and cooperate on various issues, 
providing opportunities to settle most of the problems. In 1990, both sides signed a 
border agreement. After the events of 11 th September, Saudis started to come under 
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severe attack from some politicians in the United States, who accused Saudi Arabia of 
being behind the incidents of 11 th September and claimed that the regime could do 
nothing to control religious fanatics. In the light of this development, no doubt the 
Saudis will need to strengthen their relations with the other Arab states, including 
Oman501 • 
7.9 Relations with Iran 
The Omani policy regard to Iran came from the fact that any revolution, at the 
beginning, takes an extreme path. Later it starts to stabilise, and perhaps its ideological 
fervour becomes diluted. The Islamic revolution in Iran shocked all liberal states. 
America, for example, attempted to squeeze Iran and change its policy by means of 
information propaganda and sanctions. The evidence shows, however, that the Islamic 
Revolution is itself ending in response to internal demcands. 
Oman also has good relations with Iran. The diplomatic relationship was started in 
1972, but the root of this relationship runs deep in history. Relations have been 
harmonious at some times and conflictual at others. Iran, for example, tried on various 
occasions to occupy Oman or interfere in its internal issues; Oman has also occupied 
Iranian lands. However, most of the time, the two countries cooperate and benefit from 
each other, especially in trade and cultural matters. 
501 AI-Harthy, A., the Chief of the Arabian Department, Interview [20- 9- 2002]. 
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Iran supported Oman in its war against the rebels in Dhofar between 1964 and 1975502. 
At that time, Oman failed to receive Arab support to stop this aggression. Other Arab 
states justified their lack of support by claiming that while countries strove for 
independence, Oman opened its gate for imperialism. Only the Shah of Iran sent troops 
and equipment to stand by the Omani troopS503. This support was instrumental in the 
Omani victory. The relations between the two leaders were very strong. Sultan Qaboos 
visited Iran in 1971 to attend the Iranian celebration on the occasion of the 2500-year 
anniversary of the Persian Empire and in 1975 Qaboos visited Iran again504.This visit 
was an occasion to thank Iran for its help against the rebels. 
At the beginning of the Islamic revolution in Iran, there were a number of Iranian 
troops in Oman. Both countries reached an agreement to let these troops fly back 
home. In the early stages of the revolution, relations between the two states were 
uncomfortable. The new regime in Iran could not trust any regime which had built 
good relations with the Shah. Oman was one of these countries. But Oman stressed that 
the relationship with Iran was strategic and it should be naturalised. It maintained 
contact with Iran at various levels. Oman thought this strategy would help to improve 
relations with Iran, and restore relations to the level enjoyed before the revolution505. 
Therefore, Oman was the first country in the Gulf States to send a delegation to Iran to 
congratulate the new regime. This mission was at the level of the Under-secretary of 
502 Kechichian, J., op.cit 1995, p.99. 
503 AI-Harthy, A., the Chief of the Arabian Department Interview [20- 9- 2002]. 
504 Kechichian, J., op.cit.1995, p.99. 
505 Miller, J., op.cit. 1997. 
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Foreign Affairs, who was the second most important figure in this ministry. Step by 
step, Omani efforts helped to improve relations with Iran. To illustrate, during the Gulf 
War between Iraq and Iran, which lasted eight years, Oman remained close to Iran. 
This strengthened the Omani position with Iran. Iran saw Oman in that period as a 
means of enhancing its relations with other parts of the world. This gave Oman an 
opportunity to play an important role to restore relations with Iran, as one of the most 
important countries in the area. Oman believed that stability in Iran would bring 
stability for the entire region506• 
Iran's relations with the Gulf States have improved. Only the Islands problem remains, 
but the Omani position is very clear507. The Gee states believe that these Islands are 
part of the United Arab Emirates. Despite the Iranian efforts to find support from the 
Gee, it understands the Omani position with the UAB, and Iran's political leaders do 
bl 0 £ . .. 508 not arne man or Its pOSItion . 
506 Al-Harthy, A., op.cit, 15, 9, 2002. 
507 In 30 November 1971 Iran occupied three Islands. These are Abu Mosa, Tanab Alsogra and Tanab 
Alkubra. Britain and America supported Iran's occupation of these islands. At that time, Britain had left 
the area and Iran was the best ally which might protect the sea route from any the threat from the Soviet 
Union. The UAE refused this occupation for many reasons. Firstly, historically, the islands are part of 
the UAB. Secondly, they are located on the route which conveys most of the oil to the world. Thirdly, 
from these islands the coast of Saudi Arabia is visible. In 1992, Iran announced the full occupation of , 
these islands and it forced the Arabs to leave. Cited 
http://www.albayan.co.ae/albayanl2001l12/111mhl/41.htm [20- 10- 2002]. 
508 Riphenburg, C., op.cit, 1998, p.182. 
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from 
At the level of bilateral relations, there are a number of mechanisms which link the two 
countries. There is a desire on both sides to establish a strategy to enlarge the level of 
cooperation. For example, there are three committees. These are: 
1. The Common Committee at the level of the ministries. The aim is to study how 
to promote and enlarge the economic, investment and trade relations between 
both countries. 
2. The Mechanism of Political Cooperation at the level of foreign affairs 
ministers. The committee meets regularly in the capitals of both countries. 
3. The Anny Friendship Committee. The aim of this committee is to exchange 
opinion. Iran is desirous of selling Iranian weapons to Oman 509. 
Iran invests in Oman through 12 companies, with a total capital of 1,356, 000 Omani 
rials. Furthermore, there are a number of branches of banks and insurance companies 
such as Mily Bank, the Iranian Export Bank and the Iranian Insurance Company. Iran 
accounts for around 8.9% of all total Omani exports and around 4% of all Omani 
imports 51 o. 
So it can be said that the Islamic revolution in Iran did not harm the relations between 
the two countries. Both countries look over the straits of Hormuz. Both of them 
cooperate to protect the area from conflicts. Both countries are aware that there are 
some differences on some regional and international problems, but each country 
respects the position of the other. Therefore, these differences have not led to further 
509 AI-Harthy, A., the Chief of the Arabian Department Interview [20- 9- 2002]. 
510 Ibid. 
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disputes. Both countries trust each other and have created bilateral committees to 
consult on various issues such as political, trade and economic subj ects. Both countries 
exchange formal visits at civilian and military levels. 
In contrast with other countries in the Middle East, Iran became an attractive example 
of democracy with the election of Khatami. Once democratic elections were known as 
the source of political authority, then the focus of attention shifted to jostling amongst 
the various political parties. Political parties have moved towards being seen as the 
most suitable institutions for absorbing and representing the highly politicised demands 
of people in Islamic countries. The recent multiparty election in Iran is a landmark 
example in this regard. Although democratic systems in Islamic countries still leave a 
great deal to be desired in terms of freedom and contribution, from Algeria to 
Indonesia there is a widespread attempt to maintain and improve multiparty political 
systems 511. 
7.10 International Relations 
Historically speaking, Oman has had strategic relations with the UK. Oman's 
relationship with the United Kingdom is unique. In the past, Britain supported the 
Omani Sultans, and during the civil war Britain supported Oman with troops, 
equipment and expertise. In the present time, relations with Britain have expanded to 
include aspects such as politics, culture, technology, and education. Also, Oman has 
received military and political training programmes. There are media links with the 
establishment of a BBC station in Msaera Island, subsequently shifted to the village of 
511 http://www.fas.orglmanldod-10l/ops/war/iran-iraq.htm. 
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Asilah. The British Council in Oman plays an important role in developing the 
relations between the two countries512• Britain provides help to Oman with weaponry. 
Britain has also provided subsidies to Oman, but it has stopped doing so now, because 
it believes that Oman has reached a stage at which it can be self- reliant, but Britain is 
willing to send experts in different fields. There is a committee which was established 
in 1976 called the Omani Britain Committee based in Oman and there is also the 
British Omani Committee based in Britain. Both of them arrange lectures discussing 
how the two countries can enhance and improve their bilateral relationship. There are a 
number of missions from both sides exchanging visits513 • Britain takes Oman's advice 
on issues regarding the Middle East. British and American firms have subsequently 
developed the oil and other industries. In the late 1990s the Foreign Secretary in the 
United Kingdom described the relationship as "excellent", and stated that the British 
government would work tirelessly to further the partnership. Oman obtains technical 
help from the United Kingdom particularly in regard to the forward-looking 2020 
programme514• Oman has enjoyed good relations with both the Conservative and 
Labour parties515 • 
In addition to Britain, Oman has had a long standing relationship with the USA. Oman 
was the first Arab country to establish diplomatic relations with the United States in 
512 Al-Harthy, S., the Desk Officer of London, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sultanate of Oman 
Interview [20- 9- 2002]. 
513 Ibid 
514 Gulf News, op.cit. [2-5- 1997]. 
515 Al-Alawi, Y., op.cit, 1997. 
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1840516• That was before Oman's period of isolation, which continued until the reign of 
Sultan Qaboos. Today, Oman is an important country as a consequence of its strategic 
position over-looking the straits of Hormuz and the Indian Ocean. The US military has 
been able to use facilities there since the second Gulf War517• In 2003 President Bush 
praised Oman for the democratic steps that it had taken; citing it as an example of the 
political for democratisation among Islamic countries, a major focus of his post Iraq 
C' l' 518 lorelgn po lCy . 
7.11 Dealing with international Crises 
A country's relations with other countries and membership of international 
organisations are important features of peace-time policy-making and long-term co-
operation. Equally important, or perhaps much more important, is a country's ability to 
act responsibly in times of international crisis. The following sections describe in more 
detail Oman's role in recent events. 
7.11.1 Development of the Palestinian Problem and its Impact on Oman 
The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 has been a determining factor in the 
development of the Middle East. At that time, all Arab states were weak because they 
were newly independent or they were still under occupation. Only Translordan was 
able to defend a significant portion of Arab Palestine, the West Bank or Ariha. The 
Arabs fought with Israel in 1948, 1956 and 1967 to liberate Palestine, but they lost 
516 Al- Kalbany, http//www.oman cornlMsi for htm [1-5-1998]. 
517 Miraan, T., op.cit, 1996 
518 http:// Japan.usembassy.gov [26-2-2004] 
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these wars, and as a result, more Arab land came under Israeli occupation. At that time, 
cities such as Baghdad, Cairo and Khartoum were disrupted by demonstrations. Oman 
failed to react due to the following reasons. Firstly, it was isolated by the previous 
Sultan. Secondly, the state faced internal conflicts as a result of religious and tribal 
conflicts. Thirdly, the media was backward; Omani people did not get access to the 
media since there was no electricity. Fourthly, the economy was weak; thus, Oman 
could not afford to provide financial support or hospitality. Finally, the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation and its remaining Arab supporters were on the left of Arab 
political opinion, supporting the opposition movement within Oman. 
But then, the Sultanate of Oman changed. When Sultan Qaboos came to power, Oman 
became a strong champion of peace in the Middle East. Oman actively supported the 
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, when most other Arab countries objected to it 
and imposed sanctions against Egypt. In addition, Oman has participated in all 
multilateral negotiations between the Arabs and Israel. 
After the end of the Cold War in 1991, the world changed dramatically. Firstly, 
America became the strongest country in the world; secondly, bilateral differences 
between Arab states appeared because Iraq occupied Kuwait; thirdly, Iraq became 
weak when America forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and fourthly, the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) also became weak because Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
stopped their financial support to Yasser Arafat, who supported Saddam Hussein 
against Kuwait. In this climate, the Arab countries accepted the mediation offered by 
the United States of America to end the conflict in the Middle East. Oman and the 
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other Arab states started to believe that they could not defeat Israel in a war because of 
Israel's military superiority and lack of support from Egypt. Israel also was weary of 
continued wars with Arabs. However, the United Nations resolutions such as 242 were 
never implemented by Israel and were not enforced upon it by the UN Security 
Council519 • 
Therefore Oman among the other Arab states agreed to negotiate a peace treaty with 
Israel, only an condition that Israel should withdraw from all the Arab land which it 
occupied in the year 1967. This suggestion received public support from the Omani 
public opinion, the muslim world and the international community. The Israeli side 
was not however, prepared to withdraw from the land which was occupied in 1967. 
Nevertheless, Oman felt that despite the failure of the Oslo and Madrid conferences in 
achieving any agreement, they were useful in that it reopened the doors for bilateral 
negotiations between Israel on the one hand, and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the 
Palestinians on the other520• 
A new meeting was held, in 1992 between Palestinian and Israeli delegations. The 
Palestinian delegation proposed a new suggestion. The Palestinian side would accept 
self-rule and elect a Palestinian Legislative Council, but the agreement should be based 
on the UN resolution 242, which entails the right of self-determination of the people 
519 Said, E Culture and Imperialism, London, Chatto and Windus Ltd, 1993. 
520 Walad Abah, A., Mustakbal AI-Taswiah Al-Shurk Awsatiah min Al-Mundoorin AI-Arabi Wal 
Israeli ( the Future of Settlement of the Middle East; from the Arab and Israeli Perspective) The Omani 
Diplomatic institute, Muscat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Course no 20 in the Omani diplomatic 
institute, Oman press, 2000, P. 99. 
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and establishment of an independent state521 • Israel again rejected the suggestion. 
Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel during that time, suggested that there should be two 
steps. Firstly, there should be a transitional phase that would last for five years. During 
this stage, the Palestinian people should have administrative government linked with 
Jordan and Israel. After three years, the two sides would start fresh negotiations for the 
permanent agreement based on the UN resolution 242. This project was rejected by the 
Palestinian side522• Oman welcomed the agreement which was signed on 13 September 
1993, between Israel and the Palestinians in the White House in Washington. This 
agreement included details about the aim of the negotiations, the relationship between 
the two sides, the mechanism for solving problems, the prospects of an election inside 
Palestine, the withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip and Ariha, the co-operation 
between two sides and the economic and development programmes. The agreement 
gave fonnal recognition to the PLO in parts of Palestine, and paved way for further 
negotiations between the two sides523 • In 1995 Oman opened trade offices in Tel Aviv 
and Israel opened a similar office in Muscat. 
Oman believes that there is a broad international consensus that the Palestinian people 
should have an independent state of their own524• Despite the opposition of powerful 
fundamentalist elements in Israel, who are able to exploit Israel democracy to block the 
path to a settlement, it is likely that Israel will be forced to accept a peaceful solution 
that includes the creation of an independent Palestinian state. 
521 Walad Abah, A., op.cit. p.lO 1. 
522 Dunbabin, J., op.cit, 1994, pp.337-339. 
523 Ibid, op.cit. p.101. P. 100. 
524 AI-Busaid, B,. The Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Interview [15-9- 2002]. 
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Modem Omani relations with Egypt started after the Camp David pact and Baghdad 
Summit. There was an awareness by the Omani leadership of the necessity of good 
relations with Egypt, the most powerful Arab state in the region. Its pro-Western stance 
since the 1970s also made the two countries natural associates525 . 
Although Oman faced internal crises during the 70s and was preoccupied in internal 
development in the 80s, it paid attention to the situation of Palestine, and made contact 
with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Oman recognised the state of Palestine 
directly after its announcement in 1988. Since 1987, Oman has supported the 
Palestinian Intifadah. Oman opened a mission in the Gaza strip in 1997 and Palestine 
opened an embassy in the same year. Yasser Arafat made four visits to Oman up to 
The peace process with Israel was approved by the Arab states and the Gulf 
Cooperation states. This was seen as the only the way to bring back the occupied lands 
from Israel after the Camp David Accord. The same strategy was pursued in 1991 with 
reference to the Madrid Pact, Oman was one of those countries which agreed to enter 
into the Peace Conference527• But Oman believes that the Arab states should deal with 
Israel on the same level and no state should go further in the negotiations with Israel 
unless the other parties achieve the same progress. This means these countries should 
525 AI-Mowafy, A., columnist in Oman news, Interview, [20- 9- 2002]. 
526 AI-Harthy, A., the Chief of the Arabian Department Interview [20- 9- 2002]. 
527 Miller, 1, op.cit 1997. 
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take a united stance. But one should take into account the circumstances in every state. 
The Omani position is to support peace in the Middle East on the basis of a partition of 
Palestine on the pre- 1967 borders. 
After the Oslo pact, the establishment of the Palestinian Authority with free elections 
and the foundation of the administration authority, a number of countries from the 
Arab world started to negotiate with Israel. This was a step to encourage Israel to go 
forward. Oman felt that this step would help the Palestinians, Lebanon and Syria to 
obtain the return of their lands. Oman during that period received Rabin in 1994 and 
Shimon Peres in 1996528 But when the peace process was destroyed and it appeared 
that there was no hope of negotiation so long as the Israeli right remained in power, 
Oman declared therefore that it would close the Israeli trade office and would stop any 
formal negotiation with Israel529• 
On an informal level, unlike before, Omani citizens are organising demonstrations 
supporting Palestinian people and expressing their anger against Israel; also they send 
subsidies to the Palestinian people. Furthermore, the Palestinians are authorized to visit 
Oman and work. It is important therefore that the Omani government reflects the 
popular views in its policies. 
7.11.3 The Omani position Towards the Water Question in the Middle East 
528 AI-Mowafy, op.cit. p.127. 
529 Ibid. 
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The Middle Eastern countries share a common problem, shortage of water or disputes 
over rivers. The inhabitants of the Middle East represent 5% of the total world's 
population, but the region contains only 0.9% of global water resources. The number of 
states which are water-scarce in the Middle East and North Africa had increased from 
three in 1955 (Bahrain, Jordan and Kuwait) to eleven by 199053°. Those included in the 
list are Algeria, Israel and the Occupied Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, 
Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Seven other states might also face this 
problem by 2025. These are Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Oman and Syria. 
At the same time the population is estimated to reach 423 million by the turn of the 
century (and double that, 25 years thereafter), creating further difficulties for the 
region531 • The water in many places is polluted532. There is a significant expansion in 
the agricultural and industrial fields. The usage of water per person in the Middle East 
is the lowest in the world, representing only around 3% of Asian and 15% of African 
levels. Countries such as Oman depend on desalinated water533 • Since these countries 
already expend huge sums on water for domestic use, it will be difficult to use it also 
for agriculture purposes. 
In Oman among other countries in the Middle East, it is being increasingly recognized 
that many of the current and prospective conflicts result from the lack of natural 
530 Betman, 1., and Michael, P.,The New Politics of the Middle East 
http://www.iasps.org.il/strategic/water.htm. [3-2-2003]. 
John Pike, http://www.fas.org!manldod-l01lops/war/iran-iraq.htm [21-12-1999]. 
531 Ibid. 
532 Ibid. 
533 Ibid. 
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resources and their inequitable distribution. Environmental degradation, climate change 
and water scarcity are the issues that underline most of these conflicts. The patterns of 
conflict and political instability are visible at the local, regional, and interstate level. In 
the Middle East, environmental degradation, lack of water resources, growing 
population and territorial disputes are intricately linked to each other and create serious 
challenges for regional stability. Furthermore, Middle Eastern leaders, both past and 
present, have stated that water is the factor most likely to lead to war. The link between 
environmental degradation, water scarcity and violent conflict is a serious threat. Even 
the most peaceful neighbours could go to war over water disputes. For the sake of the 
region, it is crucial that water scarcity and environmental degradation be dealt with in a 
manner that will ensure that essential water demands are met sustainably534. In the 
Middle East there are three main rivers, the Tigris-Euphrates, Nile and Jordan River 
systems. These rivers create conflict between the states in the Middle East, for 
example, disputes between Turkey and Syria over the water of the Tigris and Euphrates 
rivers; in the Jordan River Basin between Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan; 
among Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia over the Nile River. Some claim that the Iran-Iraq 
War flamed from disputes over water claims and availability. But sometimes rivers 
help states to enhance co-operation with other states. For example, Jordan and Israel 
signed a bilateral agreement in 1994535. 
534 Charrier, B, and Dinar, S., Water, conflict resolution and environmental sustainability in the Middle 
East, http://ag.arizona.eduiOALS/ALN/aln44/charrier.html [3, February 2002]. 
535 Bennan, I., and Michael, P., op.cit. 
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Oman encouraged the other states of the Middle East to enter dialogue and cooperative 
work. In 1994, Oman hosted the meeting of the Multi-party committee responsible for 
investigating about the beat method of find water in the region, in order to end the 
disputes. It also agreed to host the Research Centre for Water Desalination, in which 
Israel is a participantS36• The founders of this centre were the Sultanate of Oman, the 
State of Israel, the United States of America, Japan and the Republic of Korea. The 
European Commission was invited as a founding member of the councils37 • The 
members believe that one of the serious problems in the Middle East is the scarcity of 
water, which could be a source of instability in the future. Because Oman is one of the 
countries which faces the challenge of scarce water resources, it played an important 
role to encourage the Middle East peace process. Hence, the members decided to 
choose the Sultanate of Oman to establish the centre. The aim was to achieve two 
main objects. These were firstly, to support the peace process in the Middle East and 
secondly to create communication between technical experts from developed and 
developing countries. Water shortage is a common problem in the area and represents a 
threat to the stability in the region. If the people get access to drinking water at a low 
price, the Middle East will be more stable. The Omani idea received unanimous 
support from the members who attended the working group. Every founder agreed to 
pay three Million dallers. The Centre provided a number of studies in this field, but it 
has recently faced a critical time, as it is not able to pay its expenses. The members 
stopped paying their commitment as they are awaiting developments in the peace 
process. Furthermore, a number of Arab countries forced their experts to end their 
536 http//www.omanetcomlmsifor.htm [1- 6- 1998]. 
537 http://www.medrc.org.om [2-6-1999] 
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involvement with this centre. Up to now there is no final decision whether to close the 
Centre or to continue. The members hold two meetings every year, but at the level of 
administration and experts in European countries, not in Oman538• 
7.11.3 The Omani Position Towards the War Between Iran and Iraq 
Oman felt the War which erupted between Iran-Iraq in 1980, changed many things in 
the Middle East539• Firstly, the Gulf States spent huge sums of money to support Iraq 
against Iran. Secondly, the war destroyed the power of two of the most important 
countries in the Islamic world, which had provided a balance to the power with Israel. 
Thirdly, the United States of America was afraid that the peaceful flow of oil to 
America was in danger. Fourthly, the Islamic revolution in Iran encouraged individual 
fundamentalist groups in the Middle East, those such as in Egypt and Algeria, to fight 
to establish Islamic states. Finally, the trust between Iran and other Gulf states was 
breached. 
Iran is an important country for the all Gulf States including Oman. All these states 
depend on oil. For example, the efforts of Iran in the world markets strengthen the oil 
price, and the power of Iran decreases the aggression of Israel. So, the states of the 
region need to take practical steps to end their differences and achieve co-operation. 
No doubt there are widespread differences between these countries, but there is further 
space for co-operation. For example, the relations between the United Arab Emirates 
538 AI-Musolhi, K,coordinater of the Middle East Desalination Research Centre Interview, [Muscat, 
28, 9, 2003]. 
539 Amin, S., Political and Strategic Issues in the Gulf, Royston Ltd. 1984.p.54. 
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and Iran are unique. Despite the fact that Iran occupied a number of the Emirates 
islands, the trade relationship between two countries is not affected by the political 
disputes. Such steps can promote peace and create better chances of co-operation for 
the Middle East. For example, Iran is rich in water and labour resources, while the Gulf 
countries face shortage of water and labour. Also, Iran needs to re export goods from 
the Gulf. Furthermore, any further link with Iran means internal stability. In every 
country in the Gulf, including Oman, there is a significant Shia minority. In terms of 
ideology, Shias support Iran. When these Shias feel there is harmony between Iran and 
other Gulf States, they will be loyal to their respective states. Secondly, the main tenet 
of American strategy is that there is no permanent friendship in American policy but 
there are permanent interests. This suggests that if American interests are better 
rewarded by favouring the Muslim world, democratic or not, then the US will align 
with the latter. 
Even today, the key security considerations in the Middle East are Iran-Iraq relations, 
potential threats to oil rich weaker Gulf states from Iraq or Iran, and the threat of an 
arms race that could lead to a war threatening the world's access to oil resources. After 
the second Gulf War, Iraq was devastated economically and weakened militarily, 
making it difficult to pose any threat to its neighbours, let alone assume regional 
leadership. With Iraq's defeat, Iran emerged more powerful and is the strongest 
regional actor. Though it suffered huge losses during the Iran-Iraq war, its might is 
increasing. 540 
540 Riphenburg c., op.cit. 1998 .. p.203-204. 
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The Omani vision toward Iraq was that, firstly, there would be a day when the war 
between Iraq and Iran would end. Secondly, both sides would be losers, because of the 
heavy causalities, suffered on both sides. Therefore, Oman refused to get involved in 
this war. It remained impartial. Oman's neutral position protected the Gulf States, a 
number of which almost entered the war on the side of Iraq541. The clarification of the 
Gulf position through the Omani side persuaded Iran to not escalate the war. After the 
end of the war, Oman's role was very important. Oman was instrumental in persuading 
both sides to adhere to the UN Resolution 598 which called for a cease fire and 
withdrawal to recognised boundaries542 • The Omani position led both sides to respect 
Oman. This also reflected public opinion in Oman. The government gained further 
trust from the nation. Oman's formal position protected Oman's permanent interests 
and, unlike other states in the Gulf which provided financial support to Iraq, Oman 
saved the resources for internal use. Omani magazines and newspapers published 
during that period reflect public support for the regime in its policy stance. 
7.11.4 The Second Gulf War 
One of the most significant developments in the recent history of the Middle East 
during the ruling of Sultan Qaboos was the second Gulf War, which was a result of 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. This incident seriously undermined the Pan-Arab solidarity 
and altered the nationalistic perception of the Middle East from an Arab identity to 
identities developed along state loyalties. 
541 Ibid. 
542 gopher: I Igopher.undp.org/00/undocs/scdlscouncills87 15 [20,10,2002]. 
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Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 clarning that Kuwait was part of Iraqi 
territory543. After the occupation, Saddam Hussein announced that Kuwait would be 
known as Iraq's 19th province. Iraq argued that Kuwait had been under Ottoman rule 
and that Iraq was the Ottomans successor in the region and thus had the right to rule 
Kuwait after the Ottomans. The second argument was that the borders between the two 
had never been agreed upon. Iraq also obj ected to overproduction of oil in Kuwait. 
Further, Iraq also accused Kuwait of illegally pumping oil from Iraq's North Rumaila 
oil field544. 
While Kuwait claimed that the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri Sa'id, had recognised 
Kuwait through his letter to the British High Commissioner for Iraq, Sir Francis 
Humphrys, on July 21, 1932 the Iraqi side claimed that this letter did not represent a 
formal recognition and that the letter was signed because Iraq was under a League of 
Nations mandate, with Britain controlling its foreign affairs: the letter was not therefore 
binding on the independent Iraqi State545. 
The occupation of Kuwait in 1990 coincided with new developments in the world 
politics. For the first time during the 20th century, the most of the countries plus Oman 
were unanimously in favour of using force to stop the aggression from one state against 
the other. Even Russia, the close ally of Iraq, supported this step. A total of 56 Security 
Council resolutions concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait was passed in 
543 http://www.infoplease.comlce6/history/A0838511.html). 
544 Ibid. 
545 AI-Nahi, H., History background about The Identity of Kuwait and its effects toward the future of 
Iraq Alqudes Alarabi, London dates 13, 14, 15, 16, October 1996. 
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the period up to January 2001 546• A coalition against Iraq was fonned by 32 nations 
including the United States, Britain, Egypt, France, Syria and Saudi Arabia. On 28 
February, 1991, Iraq lost the war against the US and its allies547• 
The implications of the Gulf War went beyond the liberation of Kuwait. The 
international community also focused on the dangers of the weapons of mass 
destruction that were owned by Iraq and posed a threat to world peace. It also led to a 
growing concern for the rights of groups who were abused by Saddam, such as the 
Kurds in the North, Shias in the South, and other opponents of Saddam's regime. This 
event set a precedent for UN involvement in the protection of the rights of its people 
within sovereign states. 
After thirteen years of the sanctions which were designed to pressurize Iraq into giving 
up its weapons of mass destruction, the world found that the innocent Iraqis were the 
real victims of those sanctions548• The regime remained in power, but the Iraqi people 
suffered from poverty, health problems and the lack of educational facilities. The 
occupation of Iraq in third Gulf war led to the end of the sanctions which imposed by 
the United Nations. But many problems in Iraq need solutions. 
546 http://www.un.orgIDocs/sc/committees/IraqKuwaitlIraqResolutionsEng.htm. [1-10-2002]. 
547 AI-Busaid, B,. The Under Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Interview [15-12-2002]. 
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Oman feels that he three Gulf Wars have been not solved the problems in the Gulf 
States549 Although Hussein has been defeated the country is highly unstable with a 
political vacuum, its future is uncertain and. The area needs practical steps to build 
trust between the counters in the region. 
Oman was the first state from the GCC that expressed its opposition to the occupation 
of Kuwait. When, under the umbrella of the United Nations, Kuwait was liberated from 
Iraqi aggression, Oman was on the side of both the coalition and the UN. This is 
because Kuwait is a member of the GCC and any aggression on any member states 
means aggression against all states in the Council. But Oman did not end its diplomatic 
relations with Iraq, as Oman on principle wishes to maintain political relations with all 
countries. Oman faced pressure to end relations but refused to agree. It believed that 
such relations should remain to pave the way for negotiations which would be useful in 
future550. Such behaviour may appear to be over-optimistic, but actually was based on a 
realistic understanding of the regional situation, and its implications for peace in the 
Middle East. A high ranking foreign ministry official of Oman explained this in an 
interview on 08 February 1994: 
"We may not pursue a certain policy which may have negative 
repercussions in the future. We did condemn the occupation, and we spare 
no efforts in supporting Kuwait. In the meantime, we have not overlooked 
Iraq as a people and as a state. In consideration of the fact that we have to 
549 Lawrence Potter, op.cit. p. 231. 
550 AI-Harthy, A., the Chief of the Arabian Department Interview [20- 9- 2002]. 
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deal with Iraq and co-exist together, it is only wise to keep open all 
channels of communications with it". 551 
Again, government gained the support of public opinion. People admired the role 
of the government in maintaining relations with the Iraqi nation, for the benefit of 
the future. 
7.11.5 Iraq in Crisis with the United Nations 
Iraq supported the rebellions in Dhofar between 1970 and 1975, but this fact did not 
bar Oman from establishing diplomatic relations with Iraq in 1976552. During the 
1990s, Oman followed with special attention the crises between Iraq and the United 
Nations. It was happy to further co-operation between the two sides, but it thought that 
Iraq should respond in a positive way towards the international community. It should in 
particular take action as regards certain specific issues, such as the release of Kuwaiti 
prisoners, the return of stolen Kuwaiti possessions, compensation for damaged 
property (machinery, etc) and the verified removal of weapons of mass destruction. 
The efforts made by the United Nations and Iraq failed to end the problem 
between the international community and Iraq. America, with the alliance of 
Britain, decided in late 2003 to wage war against Sadam. Oman did its best to 
avert the war, which it thought would create instability in the region. Sadam was 
ultimately captured and his rule ended. Now Oman asks the United States to 
search for the best solution to create stability in Iraq and give further authority to 
551 Quoted in Al-Harasssi, H., op.cit. (1994), p.49. 
552 Riphenburg., C, op.cit. (1998) p.208. 
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the United Nations as a step to allow to the Iraqi people to rule themselves, but 
without leaving the country in a chaos553 • 
7.12 Conclusion 
Most of the literature on foreign policy derives from the European or American 
experience, rather than that of a developing country like Oman. Discussion of foreign 
policy with reference to Oman is restricted to a few authors such as Miraan and Joseph 
Kechichian. An analysis of Omani foreign policy suggests that decision making is 
concentrated in an elite group including the Sultan and his close advisers, although 
businessmen, the military, and public opinion are also consulted. 
Foreign policy decisions reflect Oman's changing position over the past three decades, 
from one of isolation to involvement. The specific security structure of the Gulf and 
Oman's strategic position in the region allow Oman to pursue a more independent 
foreign policy than other Gulf neighbours. At the same time, interestingly, Oman has 
stood somewhat apart from other Gulf states. It has followed a more consistent and less 
nervous path both in tenns of regional relations and in its dealing with the west. 
Almost immediately at the start of the current regime, Oman began diplomatic relations 
with Egypt and nowadays plays a valuable role in regional, Arabic, Islamic, and 
international issues. 
553 AI-Busaid, B. The Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, [7-1-2004] 
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At the economic level of Omani foreign policy, Oman hopes to achieve long-term 
objectives through membership of other organisations such as the Indian Ocean 
Association. Many of the countries involved are still growing and developing. Oman is 
favourably positioned to help create links between these countries, which ultimately 
will strengthen Oman's hand in terms of negotiations with other countries. 
Finally, Oman's foreign policy successes have to be seen in the context of state-
building. In the wake of the pursuance of the foreign policy, the Sultan defined most of 
Oman's borders, adopted pragmatic policies, and entered into alliances without 
neglecting its regional responsibilities. In short, Oman forged a role for itself, replacing 
a fledgling state with a secure one. It was thanks to Oman's consistent foreign policy, 
as we have described above, that the 'Idea of Oman' as a key regional power has been 
well understood. Nothing illustrates better the links between foreign policy and 
domestic legitimacy than the following observation: 
"There was a realisation that the country must survive and forge a stable 
life for its citizens, an awareness that the government ought to regain full 
control over its destiny, and a desire to adopt independent measures as 
soon as possible to restore its standing on the Arabian Peninsula".554 
Oman, historically, has suffered greatly due to the lack of unity as a nation, caused, 
among other reasons, by inter-tribal warfare, religious conflicts, undefmed borders and 
repeated foreign invasions. Today's Oman, under the leadership of Sultan Qaboos, has 
successfully put all those historical troubles to rest, and has emerged as a united nation 
554 Kechichian op.cit., 1995, p. 257. 
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with high regional and international prestige. To the West, Oman is the main balancer 
in the Arabian Peninsula, which is a major achievement for Oman as a nation. In 
achieving this, the independent foreign policy of the country which is mature, realistic 
and consistent, has been the main instrument. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATISATION IN OMAN 
This thesis has studied the political changes in Oman from 1970 with the focus on the 
transition towards democracy. The argument of the thesis is that the approach of the 
previous Sultan, Said ibn Taymur, who oppressed people and banned development, 
failed. Sultan Qaboos launched a coup against his father on 23 July 1970, then adopted 
a very different style of rule and succeeded in ending the internal civil war and the 
external threats to Oman. If Said ibn Taymur had remained in power using his strategy, 
Oman might have collapsed. Sultan Qaboos practised a successful policy. He united 
the citizens under a single government, encouraged them to run a modem state without 
discrimination and used foreign aid to achieve stability. At the same time, he developed 
a successful form of state government. Unlike some kingdoms in the Arab world such 
as Saudi Arabia, where members of the royal family make decisions independently 
from each other, power in Oman has seen concentration in the hands of Sultan Qaboos. 
Also, he transferred the loyalty of the citizens from their tribes to the state. Thus, Oman 
differs from Yemen, where political decisions are tribally based. Furthermore, the 
existing development occurred due to the wisdom and personal character of Sultan 
Qaboos, whose charisma is reflected in the trust and the loyalty of the citizens. 
Therefore, decisions made by the government generally fmd the support of the nation. 
In addition, under his rule, Oman has seen massive development in areas such as 
education, health, economy, income, infrastructure and other services. This has 
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enhanced the internal support for the Sultan. Moreover, Sultan Qaboos endorsed a 
number of steps toward democracy. Omani citizens can now criticise the role of the 
government and participate in decision making. Finally, in tenns of foreign policy, 
Oman is now well-known as a mature state. This reality has brought Oman the respect 
of the international community and improved the standing of Oman among the citizens. 
This is important because, as identified in Chapter 2, democracy is a value rather than a 
tool. There are criteria of democracy such as; free elections, the right to run for office, 
freedom of speech, freedom of infonnation, development of social institutions and 
insurance regarding human needs. Democracy requires training and social 
development. These features defme democracy and the foregoing discussion explains 
Oman's significant progress in all these aspects. 
The second chapter demonstrated the popularity of democracy as a fonn of government 
has been growing across the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, 
states in the South face difficulties in tenns of the fonnal and infonnal practices of 
state and society, as a result of their economic, political and social problems. It is 
important to remember that democracy is not a system that can be created quickly. It 
requires time to allow people to understand and learn about the new style of 
government. This is particularly true of Oman, which for decades suffered from 
authoritarian rule. Western style democracies have developed in one part of the world, 
but it is inappropriate to assume that other models of representation and participation 
cannot work equally well in other parts of the world. There is no rule that says the 
states of the South must follow the Western style of democracy in all its aspects in 
order to become authentic democracies themselves. All states contain various cultures; 
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democracy should reflect the progress and the development of the country in its own 
way. This is not to say that governments can ignore the basic principles of democracy, 
such as the accountability of the government to the people, the holding of free elections 
and respect for human rights, but there is more than one way of creating an elected, 
accountable institution that satisfies a people's demand for democratic representation. 
The states of the South should be free to fmd a way of developing their own 
democratic institutions. If there is one expectation that everyone should have, North or 
South, it is that the human rights of the citizen be respected, whether they are the 
majority of the population, or minorities. But it should be stressed that when Westerns 
encourage democracy in the South, often it is to guarantee security for themselves. 
Generally, although the trend in international relations is toward greater democracy, it 
is a difficult process in the South where politicians are forever searching for ways of 
establishing their legitimacy. 
The Middle East, which was considered in chapter three, is one region that has not 
experienced widespread democracy, but it was shown that democracy, or democratic 
change, is an important agenda item of most of the rulers of the region, and people talk 
about democracy seriously. There are interesting aspects of the popular attitude to 
democracy in the Arab world. The particular difficulties for the Middle East are 1) low 
growth rates in the economy, 2) slow social progress, 3) authoritarianism and 
fundamentalism. If there is a difference between Oman and other Middle Eastern 
countries, it is due to its historical legacy, quite different from that of other Arab states, 
and its culture. Also, in Oman the IMF and the World Bank have tended to have had a 
beneficial influence on economic growth. In practice, the role played by the monarchy 
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IS considerable in the development of Oman, compared to other monarchies. 
Furthermore, the Omani monarchy is not an absolute monarchy, because by long 
tradition it is involved in the practice of Shura. This means that the monarchy in Oman 
is uniquely well placed to play a leading role in the development and extension of 
Omani Shura practices into political institutions with a democratic character. The speed 
of social change in Oman has taken the older generation by surprise, while the younger 
generation has not known anything else. The generation that lived under the 
authoritarian regime of Said ibn Taymur became used to his authoritarian style of rule. 
The relative liberalisation that has taken place under Sultan Qaboos has meant that, for 
example, women have entered public and political life (as members of the Councils) in 
a way that the previous generation did not know. Finally, whereas before, there was no 
public discussion of government policy or other public issues, these are now a part of 
daily life through the media. For some of the older generation, these changes have 
taken place very quickly, and they have found it difficult to adjust to modem life. 
Islam can work with democracy; given the right circumstances and lack of external 
interference, Muslim societies can adopt democracy. India's case is an example, which 
could be repeated in other countries as well. The exact form and structures of 
democracy will vary, depending on the unique circumstances of the countries 
concerned, but elements of democracy have always existed in Muslim societies, and 
they can be successfully revived with imagination and a strong sense of purpose. 
Oman as a united political, economic and social quasi-state has existed for more than a 
thousand years without losing its Islamic, Arab identity. As shown in chapter four, 
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Oman benefits from its deep and rich history as a semi-democratic system. Oman has 
been an Ibadhi state for more than one thousand and three hundred years. The culture 
of this sect depends on the election (biah) of the imam and his accountability. The first 
political split in Oman allowed the Portuguese to occupy Oman and the second internal 
conflict led to Persian occupation. But, when an external enemy tried to occupy Oman, 
the population united to repel the foreign enemy by adopting the biah system. 
The Revolution in Iran was a significant milestone in the history of the Middle East. It 
signalled a renewed sense of independence and resistance in the foreign policy 
orientation of the Middle East states, which were greatly under the influence of former 
colonial powers and the USA. The neighbouring countries in the Middle East have no 
reasons to be afraid of Iran, for two reasons: firstly, Iran has now embarked upon a 
path of refonns, and secondly, the trade ties with rest of the states in the Middle East 
are significant enough to avoid any unnecessary conflict. In the short term, the Iranian 
revolution created a division between the Arab countries and Iran. However, over time, 
it is being recognised by the Iranian leadership that animosity with the rest of the Arab 
countries is futile and steps have been taken to enhance co-operation and create a 
peaceful environment. The Iranian revolution also created instability for other Middle 
Eastern countries with significant Shia minorities. The revolution emboldened the Shia 
minorities within these countries, whose loyalty to the new Islamic regime in Iran came 
in conflict with their loyalty to their respective national governments. Shia in Iraq, 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are a few of the examples of this resurgent Shia identity 
conflicting with the national interests. However, Oman was able to achieve a balance 
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among the various ethnic and religious groups. This avoided a clash between the 
government and Shias, in contrast to what happened in other countries. 
The fundamentalist leaders in Israel, such as Netanyahu and Sharon, will lose popular 
support among the new Israeli generation. The role of fundamentalists in Palestine will 
decrease if the Palestinian people feel that the Israelis are willing to live in peace with 
Palestinians. The main interests of America in the Middle East are to guarantee a cheap 
supply of oil to the world markets, achieve peace between Israel and Arabs, protect the 
friends of America in the area and protect the sea routes in the area. These factors will 
compel the US to lead both sides toward a peaceful solution. So far, however, one of 
the important points in the Middle East is the absence of political progress and 
diplomatic contacts between the Arab states and Israel. Israel has improved its nuclear 
weapons capability and the countries in the area are trying to own these weapons in 
order to create a deterrent against Israel. These circumstances will lead Oman and other 
countries in the Middle East for better practice of democracy. 
Oman over-looks some of the main shipping channels in the world and is located at the 
end of the Arabian Peninsula as a link between the West and the East. Therefore, Oman 
has remained an important player in the world. The stability of Oman means the 
stability of the world. Its strategic location attracted foreign powers to occupy Oman, 
but the desire to survive encouraged Oman to develop its defence capability and 
expand Omani territory to other parts of the region. Oman was known in the 19th 
century as an imperial state as a result of its expansion to East Africa and East Asia. 
The Al-Yarobah dynasty strengthened the Omani state. For example, they ended the 
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occupation of the Portuguese in 1650, and then they defeated them in East Africa and 
East Asia, so that those regions became a part of the Omani empire. They built many 
important castles and falajs which remain till now, representing the glory of their 
period in Oman. 
Under the Al-Yarobah dynasty (1624-1741), and the first century of the Albu-Sa'id 
(1741-) dynasty, the Omani navy challenged the Portuguese, Dutch, British, and 
French, while extending its authority to the coast of Iran, the Gulf and East Africa. But 
then Oman lost its power. Internal problems and external interference led to division 
among the Omanis. The problem remained until the current Sultan came to power. He 
learned from history to avoid the mistakes that had been made by the previous leaders. 
Oman has seen the "interaction of economic and political development", as seen in 
chapter five. It is important to recognise the link between the domestic and external 
environments. Looking inwards, the state has seen rapid expansion as a result of oil 
revenue. This has enabled the country to modernize its hospitals, build roads, and 
generally develop the infrastructure. The policy makers in Oman are eager to enhance 
the level of education. That is why they listen to the advice given by the people. There 
are particular programmes on Omani television and radio in which specialists discuss 
freely issues related to the social infrastructure and provide suggestions for further 
reforms. Also, there are articles published from time to time in newspapers and 
magazines that criticize the ministries. Furthermore, several writers have strongly 
attacked the government. These pressures prompted the development of further 
facilities in the country. The Omani government wishes the media to support the efforts 
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that it has made to achieve development and to spread awareness among the citizens in 
different sectors. Any new idea that helps Oman in its struggle to emerge from a 
backward era is welcomed. 
For such a small country, demographically speaking, there is considerable oil wealth to 
enjoy. Further substantial discoveries of oil and minerals have recently been made in 
Oman, and this wealth is a key factor in helping to achieve social and economic 
development and progress. At the same time, Oman, along with other oil-producing 
nations in the Gulf, is aware of its role as a key element in the world economy and thus 
oil is highly influential in determining both internal and foreign policies. The Omani 
government is sensibly seeking to diversify sources of income, and encourages and 
supports non-oil industries. 
"Steps toward Democracy in Oman", was the title of chapter six. Democratisation in 
Oman is part of the same process that has begun in Jordan, Yemen and Kuwait, but it 
has its own character. Some liberalisation has also taken place in Qatar in recent years. 
Why is Oman's experience of democratisation different from that in Jordan Yemen and 
Kuwait? In the first place, recent democratisation in Jordan and Yemen was begun in a 
period of economic crisis. Also, democratisation in Jordan was one way that King 
Hussein maintained the loyalty of his subjects, after he broke his connections to the 
occupied territories. In Kuwait women failed to reach Parliament. However, in Oman, 
there have not been economic or political crises behind reform. Rather, the major 
changes that have modernised Oman in such a short time have led to a need for public 
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discussion on what development is taking place. In other states in the South, rapid 
modernisation has led to great instability, but not in Oman. In the early period of 
modernisation, there was no growing division between the very rich and very poor. The 
benefits of modernisation were spread across society. In recent years, a gap has begun 
to appear between the rich and poor. This feature might create tensions in the future. 
But, as Oman develops toward democratic institutions, and maintains a level of 
investment, such problems can be openly discussed with the aim of fmding solutions. 
The process of democratisation in Oman indicates that it is possible for political 
reforms to take place at the same time as economic and social change, and for the 
reforms to improve the access that people have to decision makers. In their tum, 
members of the government are conscious of the fact that they may have to appear on 
television to explain a policy in front of an audience, and have their decisions reported 
on and debated in the Consultative Council and the State Council. A wider 
representation of society, particularly women, is taking place in formal and informal 
democratic institutions, so that one can say that democracy is growing all the time, and 
that this is a process that will not suddenly be stopped. Oman, indeed, offers an 
example of how the traditional monarchies might consider opening up their political 
systems to democratisation. In Oman, the Ibadhi traditions of elected representation 
may have made the process easier, but in Islam generally, the concept of consultation 
or Shura is undeniably a democratic feature of political debate. In the end, each state 
must try to find the system that suits it best. In Oman, a process has begun that, with its 
special Omani features, could develop into a democracy as mature and representative 
as any found in Western Europe or North America. 
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There are similarities in the Constitutional development of Oman. Oman has a long 
tradition of choosing its leaders. In Britain, Charles I stood in the way of constitutional 
development, but Sultan Qaboos has been facilitating the process by the introduction of 
proto-democratic institutions in Oman. In England it took over 500 years to move from 
personal rule to democracy. In the case of Oman, particularly given the pace of 
political changes that have been taking place, it might take a shorter time to establish 
democracy. One major cultural factor that has promoted rather than hindered the 
'democratic process' in Oman is its Ibadhi tradition of Islam which prescribed that the 
religious leader (Imam) should be elected. This is perhaps akin to the role of 
Protestantism in the spread of democracy in Britain. 
During the 70s, 80s and the beginning of the 90s, the Law in Oman was not complete. 
From 1996 onwards this field has seen dramatic development. Theoretically, we can 
say that the foundation of Law in Oman has been set, but practically it needs time to be 
adopted precisely. In order to ensure solid democracy in Oman, there should be an 
effective Law to present elites using democracy as a tool of control. Islamic law does 
not hindere democracy. Indeed. Islam might play an essential role in strengthening it. 
For example, Islam provides rules which protect the rights of people, society and state. 
It also organises the relations between people and suggests solutions for those who face 
disputes. The principles of religion can thus be used as the basis for social and legal 
relationships in a democratic setting, as the principles of Christianity do in Western 
countries. A good sign of the development of law in Oman is that the loyalty of people 
has shifted from tribes to the state. This switch would not have happened if there were 
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no effective law to protect the rights of individuals. Loyalty now involves all people 
whatever their tribe or ethnic group. 
In terms of Omani foreign policy - chapter seven-, from 1970 to 1975, Oman worked 
to end its isolation from the Arab states and the other states in the world. Oman, during 
that time, succeeded in obtaining foreign recognition and internal support to end the 
civil war in the South, achieved internal consolidation and attracted skilled labour to 
Oman to build up the economic infrastructure. Then, from 1975 until now, Oman 
moved to playa regional and international role. Its policy is one of enhancing global 
and regional peace and prosperity and as such it, has developed good relations with 
other countries, giving special attention to the GCC states. For example, it supports the 
Middle East peace process; the Omani position has not changed from the Camp David 
pact and the Oslo agreement to the present time. Most Arab states, with the exception 
of Oman and two other Arab countries have boycotted Egypt then changed their policy 
towards Egypt. Secondly, while most Arab states ended their relations with Iran during 
the Iran-Iraq war, only Oman kept good relations with Iran; now, most Arab states 
have resumed their relations with that country. Thirdly, during the Iraqi aggression 
against Kuwait, most Arab states ended their relations with Iraq; however, Oman did 
not do so, because it believes in contacts, not isolation. This shows that Oman has 
mature political principles and there is no place for emotion, in its policies. Omani 
foreign policy has helped the growth of popular trust in the democratic political 
system. 
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Oman has managed to maintain its independent position, and to play the role of a 
balancer in the Middle Eastern conflicts without taking any openly defInite side with 
the super powers. Oman does not interfere in the affairs of others and it takes strong 
steps to avoid external interference from others, for example, Saudi attempts to occupy 
Albu-Raime and the attempts by the Islamic Revolution in Iran to switch the loyalty of 
a number of Omani Shias. During that time, a number of Arab states tried to destabilise 
Oman. Therefore, Oman took strong measures to protect itself. Nevertheless, in terms 
of security, Oman did not interfere in the affairs of others, in contrast to what has been 
done by other countries in the Arab world, such as Iraq, Syria and Egypt during 
Nasser's regime. It concentrates on local purposes to achieve internal security. Its 
political maturity led Oman to receive remarkable respect in terms of external 
legitimacy and this further increased the regime's intemallegitimacy, which became 
stronger as a result. 
Oman is part of the Gulf Cooperation Council, but since the establishment of this 
Council, these states have failed promote a democratic council similar to the one in the 
European Union, even though the situation in the Gulf is more favorable for such a 
move than in Europe. Unlike Europe these countries share the same language, history, 
culture, and style of leadership. But the fact is that there is no dynamic cooperation in 
the Gulf, similar to that in Europe. In Europe, for example, there is an elected 
Parliament, a single currency, united political decision making and a strong economy. 
In contrast, every single state in the Gulfhas its own policy and its own alliances. 
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Oman has been able to end the border disputes with its neighbours through a pragmatic 
policy, is a member in most of regional and international organizations, has enhanced 
its relations with most countries in the world, signed agreements with allies and plays 
an important role in the region. All these efforts gave Oman further stability and 
contribute to the development and prosperity of the nation and the state. In such 
circumstances, democracy might find better conditions to flourish. 
The tribal system and the family system create a situation where people know the 
capability of individuals and vote for them accordingly. The danger is that tribal 
alliances may divide the council into sectional warring factions. 
Recommendations: 
The changes that have taken place so far will lead to further changes. People now have 
access to communications and a number of them have lived in different Western 
countries. In order to achieve stability, the government should study carefully their 
demands and respond positively, otherwise the ruling party will face a new crisis. 
Omani citizens belong to a historical culture which emphasises elections and the 
accountability of the leaders. 
The Omani constitution, which was issued in 1996, provides for a prime minister, but 
from that time, this position has remained vacant. The importance of the prime minister 
comes from the fact that urgent matters occur in government which need a quick 
solution. The prime minister would be accountable to the Sultan and the nation. 
Therefore, the work of the government would be more efficient. Also, it is vital that the 
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government be responsible to parliament rather than merely to the Sultan. This would 
give the royal family further legitimacy inside and outside Oman, as criticism will be 
focused on the government instead of the monarchy. 
Further freedom of speech and development of the media will help to expose the 
weaknesses of the government, will avoid corruption and will open the door for the 
political competition. The state, at present, is strong, so the authorities should listen 
even to severe criticism. Oil will not be the main resource for ever. In the future, the 
government will not be able to continue to afford to provide free services in areas such 
as education, health and other facilities. In order to keep the support of the nation, the 
government should allow further democratic evolution. This will keep the support of 
the nation for the royal family. 
Hence, we have seen the pattern of issues that might engulf the region in the near 
future. The peace and prosperity of the Middle East depend not only on the successful 
resolution of current conflicts, but also on the ability of the leaders to anticipate and 
pre-empt conflicts that are looming large on the horizon. It is time to concentrate and 
resolve these issues peacefully to ensure a better future for the region. I believe that 
further democratisation in Oman and the Middle East in general will help by creating a 
more open space for discussion. Oman should participate in most conferences and 
meetings related to the peace process in the Middle East. 
As a result of the lack of democracy in the Middle East, these countries pay large sums 
of money for security purposes. If these countries enhanced their experience of 
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democracy, they would be able to end their problems with the neighbouring states 
through dialogue instead of war. Then, the money currently expended on weapons 
could be used for development. The Middle East can learn from the experience of Iraq, 
which brought instability for the region and for the Iraqi people. 
Tribes could form the basis for the elections in the Middle East. Through tribes, people 
can establish various parties. Citizens would offer their votes for those who understand 
their demands and needs. Tribes might protect the rights of individuals. Women in 
some countries such as Oman need further protection for their rights. For example, to 
begin with, they should be guaranteed a certain number of seats in the Parliament. The 
reason for this suggestion is that society in the Middle East is controlled by men and, 
even in elections, women mostly do not vote for women, because they are controlled 
by men. It should be remembered that democracy is not only a matter of election. 
Human rights should be respected and equal chances for all people should be 
guarantee. 
The American example of democracy is not the sole model to be imposed on others. 
American experience in technology, economy, education, industry, culture and 
tradition cannot be found in other parts of the world. Americans have their 
understanding and citizens of other states have theirs. After its triumphs in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, America seems set on changing the Middle East; its goal is to create a new 
form of ruling system in the area. I doubt that America will succeed in achieving this 
aim. It should not interfere in the sovereignty of others by forcing them to switch to 
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American-style democracy. Such action is likely both to sow the seeds for 
fundamentalist to attacks on America and create instability through the Muslim World. 
The Indian experience and Indian experiment of democracy suggest that Islam is not 
incompatible with democracy. Rather, cultural and historical factors play a very 
important role. India's experience as a secular state is unique in its own way. Western 
secularism functions within communities that are more or less religiously uniform, 
whereas, in India, the size of minority communities is considerable, making it all the 
more complex for a secular framework with people from other religious communities. 
Pluralism in India is the ground on which a democratic state is structured. 
Rapid democratisation in a country such as Oman might bring instability. Oman is 
composed of various tribes, different branches of Islam, haves and have- not, elites and 
those who used to be slaves, and populations of North and South. The eruption of 
differences between all these branches might bring instability. Democracy is a process 
which needs time until people learn how to deal with it. 
The Parliament represents the first step towards democracy, but not democracy itself. 
To enhance the role of the Parliament in Oman, it might be good idea for the 
Consultative Council to elect the chairs of the council. Also, it could issue weekly 
publications and use the Internet for communications with the Omani people. An 
information strategy like those in the UAB and Kuwait is also desirable as a source of 
independent opinion. Oman might benefit from the experience of mature democracies 
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such as those in Europe. The time allocated for questions and meetings with ministers 
could be increased. 
Candidates for the positions of ministers and under secretaries in the government might 
be referred Oman Council, which includes the State Council and Ash-Shura Counil, for 
their comments. Their advice is not compulsory but it would help to review the 
curriculum vitae of the candidate. The aim of this step is to expand the level of 
consultation and to appoint the best candidate To ensure the independence of both 
councils, the chiefs of these Councils should be elected by the members, not imposed 
by the government. Attendance at meetings for questioning government representatives 
at the Ash-Shura Council should be limited to the relevant committee, rather than 
including all members of the Council. Questioners should sit on the same physical 
level as the members. 
Oman could establish a new Council made up of well-educated and distinguished 
Omanis. The aim of this Council would be to study ways of enhancing democratic 
institutions in Oman, make suggestions for reforms based on earlier experience and 
evaluate progress. They should be independent, not receiving subsidies from the public 
or private sector. Their suggestions could be forwarded to the minister of Interior, then 
to the Sultan. 
Oman should further develop its economy. It must continue to diversify its income in 
areas such as the industrial sector and build commercial links with the rest of the 
309 
world. Membership of international organizations is highly important for the 
maintenance of standards in all aspects, from the economy to health and the 
environment. It may be hoped that the recent rise to a position of stability and influence 
in international affairs may continue under the current regime, which has inspired a 
sense of peace, progress and confidence among its people. Education will continue to 
be the top priority, as part of the wider issue of human resources development. Oman 
cannot indefmitely remain dependent on expatriate labour. Furthermore, as the skill 
level of the Omani workforce rises, so its social and political culture will develop and 
benefit compared to other countries in the region. That said, looking at the 
development figures, for example, as given by the UNDP in the annual World 
Development Report, Oman's progress compares favourably. 
Oman should decrease expenditure on weapons. Development, evolution and 
modernisation are more important for citizens than weapons. Security can be achieved 
through alliances with strong powers. Past experience shows that the Arab countries 
failed to protect themselves from neighbouring threats if they did not link with 
international powers. The help received from alliances would protect the area, so that 
the money which might otherwise be used for security could be transferred to other 
uses for the prosperity of the nation. 
Oman should work hard to achieve real success in the vision of 2020. This means 
Oman will achieve balance between revenues and expenditure, decrease inflation, 
improve the economy, diversify its income, enhance privatisation, further develop 
education and encourage internal and external development. 
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Oman should depend on the local workers. Currently, foreigners represent around 25% 
of the total population. At the same time, the number of unemployed is increasing. If 
the government works hard with new programme, which aims to place Omanis in 
positions currently filled by expatriates, this will enhance the stability of Oman. 
Oman is well on the way to becoming a democratic country. It has capitalised on its 
own traditions to develop a distinctly Omani version of democracy. Although far from 
perfect, the current situation in Oman provides a firm foundation to the further 
developments set out above. The writer hopes that he has explained how the solidity of 
the foundations that have already been laid may offer lessons in how democracy may 
develop strong roots in a superficially hostile environment. 
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APPENDIX 
Adopted on: 6 Nov 1996 
Adopted by: Royal Decree No. 101196, issued on 6 Nov 1996 by Qaboos Ibn Said 
[Preamble] 
On the Issue of the Basic Law of the State We, Qaboos ibn Said, Sultan of Oman, In confirmation of the 
principles which have guided State policy in various fields during the past period, and in asserting our 
determination to continue efforts to create a better future characterised by further achievements which 
will bring benefits to the Country and its Citizens. And in our determination to strengthen Oman's 
international position and its role in establishing the foundations of peace, security, justice and co-
operation between different States and Peoples. 
And in accordance with the exigencies of the public interest, have decreed the following: 
The issue ofthe Basic Law of the State in accordance with the attached form of words. This Decree shall 
be published in the Official Gazette and shall come into force with effect from its date of issue. 
Part One The State and the System of Government 
Article 1 [Sovereignty] 
The Sultanate of Oman is an independent, Arab, Islamic, fully sovereign state with Muscat as its capital. 
Article 2 [Religion] 
The religion ofthe State is Islam and the Islamic Shariah is the basis oflegislation. 
Article 3 [Language] 
Arabic is the official language of the State. 
Article 4 [Symbols] 
The law shall determine the State's Flag, its Emblem, its decorations and medals and its National 
Anthem. 
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Article 5 [Form of Government] 
The system of government is an hereditary Sultanate in which succession passes to a male descendant of 
Sayyid Turki ibn Said ibn Sultan. It is a condition that the male who is chosen to rule should be an adult 
Muslim of sound mind and a legitimate son of Omani Muslim parents. 
Article 6 [Succession] 
(1) Within three days of the position of Sultan becoming vacant, the Ruling Family Council shall 
determine upon who will succeed to the Throne. 
(2) If the Ruling Family Council does not agree upon a successor, the Defence Council shall confirm the 
appointment of the person designated by the Sultan in his letter to the Family Council. 
Article 7 [Oath of the Sultan] 
Before exercising his powers the Sultan shall swear the following oath at a joint session of the Oman and 
Defence Councils: 
''1 swear by Almighty God to respect the Basic Law of the State and the Laws, to fully protect the 
interests and freedoms of the citizens, and to preserve the independence of the country and its territorial 
integrity. 1/ 
Article 8 [Continuous Government] 
The Government shall continue to conduct its business as usual until the Sultan is chosen and begins to 
exercise his powers. 
Article 9 [Substantive State Principles] 
Rule in the Sultanate shall be based on justice, Shura Consultation, and equality. Citizens shall have the 
right to take part in public affairs - in accordance with this Basic Law and the conditions and 
circumstances defined in the Law. 
Part Two Principles Guiding State Policy 
Article 10 [Political Principles] 
The political principles are: 
_ Preserving the State's independence and sovereignty, protecting its security and stability, and defending 
it against all forms of aggression. 
_ Reinforcing co-operation and reaffirming ties of friendship with all States and peoples on a basis of 
mutual respect, common interest, non-interference in internal affairs, compliance with international and 
regional charters and treaties, and the generally recognised principles of international law, in a manner 
conducive to the promotion of peace and security between States and Peoples. 
_ Laying suitable foundations for the establishment of the pillars of genuine Shura Consultation, based 
on the national heritage, its values and its Islamic Shariah, and on pride in its history, while 
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incorporating such contemporary manifestations as are appropriate. 
- Establishing a sound administrative system that guarantees justice, tranquillity and equality for citizens, 
ensures respect for public order and safeguards the higher interests of the country. 
Article 11 [Economic Principles] 
(1) The economic principles are: 
- The basis of the national economy is justice and the principles of a free economy. Its chief pillar is 
constructive, fruitful co-
operation between public and private activity. Its aim is to achieve economic and social development 
that will lead to increased production and a higher standard of living for citizens, in accordance with the 
State's general plan and within the limits ofthe Law. 
- Freedom of economic activity is guaranteed within the limits of the Law and the public interest, in a 
manner that will ensure the well-being of the national economy. 
- The State encourages saving and oversees the regulation of credit. 
- All natural resources are the property of the State, which safeguards them and ensures that they are 
properly utilised while taking into account the requirements of State security and the interests of the 
national economy. No concession may be granted, nor may any of the country's public resources be 
exploited, except in accordance with the Law and for a limited period of time, and in such a manner as to 
preserve national interests. 
- Public property is inviolable. The State shall protect it, and citizens and all other persons shall preserve 
it. 
- Private property is protected. No-one shall be prevented from disposing of his property within the 
limits of the Law. Nor shall anyone's property be expropriated, except for the public benefit in those 
cases defined by the Law and in the manner stipulated by the Law, and on condition that the person 
whose property is expropriated receives just compensation for it. 
- Inheritance is a right governed by the Shariah of Islam. 
_ Confiscation of property is prohibited and the penalty of specific confiscation shall only be imposed by 
judicial order in circumstances defined by the Law. 
_ The basis of taxes and public dues shall be justice and the development of the national economy. 
_ The institution, adjustment and cancellation of public taxes shall be by virtue of the Law. No one may 
be exempted from payment of all or part of such taxes except in circumstances defined in the Law. 
(2) No tax, fee or other entitlement of any kind may be applied retrospectively. 
Article 12 [Social Principles] 
The social principles are: 
_ Justice, equality and equality of opportunity between Omanis are the pillars of society, guaranteed by 
the State. 
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- Co-operation, compassion, strong ties between citizens, and the reinforcement of national unity are a 
duty. The State shall prevent anything that could lead to division, discord, or the disruption of national 
unity. 
- The family is the basis of society, and the Law regulates the means of protecting it, safeguarding its 
legal structure, reinforcing its ties and values, providing care for its members, and creating suitable 
conditions for the development of their aptitudes and capabilities. 
- The State guarantees assistance for the citizen and his family in cases of emergency, sickness, 
incapacity and old age in accordance with the social security system. It also encourages society to share 
the burdens of dealing with the effects of public disasters and calamities. 
- The State cares for public health and for the prevention and treatment of diseases and epidemics. It 
endeavours to provide health care for every citizen and to encourage the establishment ofprivate 
hospitals, clinics and other medical institutions under State supervision and in accordance with the rules 
laid down by Law. It also works to conserve and protect the environment and prevent pollution. 
- The State enacts laws to protect the employee and the employer, and regulates relations between them. 
Every citizen has the right to engage in the work of his choice within the limits of the Law. It is not 
permitted to impose any compulsory work on anyone except in accordance with the Law and for the 
performance of public service, and for a fair wage. 
- Public employment is a national service entrusted to those who carry it out. The State employees while 
performing their work shall seek to serve the public interest and society. Citizens are considered equal in 
taking up public employment according to the provisions of the Law. 
Article 13 [Cultural Principles 1 
The cultural principles are: 
- Education is a fundamental element for the progress of society which the State fosters and endeavours 
to make available to all. 
- Education aims to raise and deVelop general cultural standards, promote scientific thought, kindle the 
spirit of enquiry, meet the needs of the economic and social plans, and create a generation strong in body 
and moral fibre, proud of its nation, country and heritage, and committed to safeguarding 
their achievements. 
_ The State provides public education, combats illiteracy and encourages the establishment of private 
schools and institutes under State supervision and in accordance with the provisions of the Law. 
_ The State fosters and conserves the national heritage, and encourages and promotes the sciences, 
literature, and scientific research. 
Article 14 [Security Principles 1 
The security principles are: 
_ The State's goal is peace, and safeguarding the country's security is a duty entrusted to every citizen. 
_ The Defence Council studies matters concerning the maintenance of the Sultanate's security and its 
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defence. 
- It is the State alone that establishes the Armed Forces, public security organisations and any other 
forces. They are all the property of the nation and their task is to protect the State, safeguard the safety of 
its territories and ensure security and tranquillity for its citizens. No institution or group may set up 
military or paramilitary organisations. The Law regulates military services, general or partial 
mobilisation and the rights, duties and disciplinary rules of the Armed Forces, the public security 
organisations and any other forces the State decides to establish. 
Part Three Public Rights and Duties 
Article 15 [ Citizenship] 
Nationality is regulated by the Law. It may not be forfeited or withdrawn except within the limits of the 
Law. 
Article 16 [Deportation, Right of Entry] 
It is not permitted to deport or exile citizens, or prevent them from returning to the Sultanate. 
Article 17 [Citizen Equality, No Discrimination] 
All citizens are equal before the Law, and they are equal in public rights and duties. There shall be no 
discrimination between them on the grounds of gender, origin, colour, language, religion, sect, domicile 
or social status. 
Article 18 [Personal Freedom] 
Personal freedom is guaranteed in accordance with the Law. No person may be arrested, searched, 
detained or imprisoned, or have his residence or movement curtailed, except in accordance with the 
provisions of the Law. 
Article 19 [Imprisonment] 
Detention or imprisonment is not permitted, except in the places designated for that purpose in the prison 
laws, which provide for health care and social welfare. 
Article 20 [Personal Integrity] 
No person shall be subjected to physical or psychological torture, enticement or humiliating treatment, 
and the Law lays down the punishment for anyone who is guilty of such actions. No statement shall be 
valid if it is established that it has been obtained as a result of torture, enticement or humiliating 
treatment, or threats of such measures. 
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Article 21 [Criminal Punishments] 
There shall be no crime and no punishment except in accordance with the criteria of a Law, and there 
shall be no punishment except for actions cognisable in Law. Punishment is personal not transferable. 
Article 22 [Presumption of Innocence, Due Process, Personal Integrity] 
An accused person is innocent until proven guilty in a legal trial which ensures him the essential 
guarantee to exercise his right of defence according to the Law. It is prohibited to harm the accused 
either bodily or mentally. 
Article 23 [Right to Counsel] 
The accused has the right to appoint a person who has the ability to defend him during the trial. The Law 
defines the circumstances which require the presence of a lawyer on behalf of the accused and 
guarantees those without the financial capacity, the means to resort to justice and the defence of their 
rights. 
Article 24 [Arrest] 
Anyone who is arrested shall be notified of the causes of his arrest immediately and he shall have the 
right to contact whoever he sees fit, to inform them of what has taken place or seek their assistance, in 
the manner regulated by the Law. He must be informed promptly of the charges against him, and he and 
his representative shall have the right to appeal before the judicial authorities against the measure which 
has restricted his personal freedom. The Law regulates his right of appeal in a manner which ensures that 
a judgement will be issued on it within a specified period, failing which he must be released. 
Article 25 [Right to Litigation] 
The right to litigation is sacrosanct and guaranteed to all people. The Law defines the procedures and 
circumstances required for exercising this right and the State guarantees, as far as possible, that the 
judicial authorities will reconcile the litigants and settle cases promptly. 
Article 26 [Personal Integrity Against Experiments] 
It is not permitted to perform any medical or scientific experiment on any person without his freely 
given consent. 
Article 27 [Home] 
Dwellings are inviolable and it is not permitted to enter them without the permission of the owner or 
legal occupant, except in the circumstances specified by the Law and in the manner stipulated therein. 
Article 28 [Religion] 
The freedom to practise religious rites in accordance with recognised customs is guaranteed provided 
that it does not disrupt public order or conflict with accepted standards of behaviour. 
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Article 29 [Expression) 
Freedom of opinion and expression, whether spoken, written or in other fonns, is guaranteed within the 
limits of the Law. 
Article 30 [Communication) 
Freedom of postal, telegraphic, telephonic and other forms of communication is sacrosanct and their 
confidentiality is guaranteed. Hence, it is not permitted to monitor or inspect them, reveal their contents, 
or delay or confiscate them except in circumstances defmed by the Law and in accordance with the 
procedures laid down therein. 
Article 31 [Press) 
Freedom of the press, printing and publication is guaranteed in accordance with the conditions and 
circumstances defined by the Law. It is prohibited to print or publish material that leads to public 
discord, violates the security of the State or abuses a 
person's dignity and his rights. 
Article 32 [Assembly] 
Citizens have the right of assembly within the limits of the Law. 
Article 33 [Association] 
The freedom to form associations on a national basis for legitimate objectives and in a proper manner, in 
a way that does not conflict with the stipulations and aims ofthis Basic Law, is guaranteed under the 
conditions and in the circumstances defined by the Law. It is forbidden to establish associations whose 
activities are inimical to social order, or are secret, or of a military nature. It is not permitted to force 
anyone to join any association. 
Article 34 [Petition, Public Affairs] 
Citizens have the right to address the public authorities on personal matters or on matters related to 
public affairs, in the manner and on the conditions laid down by the Law. 
Article 35 [Rights of Foreigners] 
Every foreigner who is legally resident in the Sultanate shall have the right to protection of his person 
and his property in accordance with the Law. Foreigners shall have regard for society's values and 
respect its traditions and customs. 
Article 36 [Asylum] 
Extradition of political refugees is prohibited. Extradition of criminals is subject to the provisions of 
international laws and agreements. 
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Article 37 [Territorial Integrity, Military Duty] 
Defence of the homeland is a sacred duty, and rendering service in the Armed Forces is an honour for 
citizens regulated by the Law. 
Article 38 [National Unity, Duty of Citizens] 
Preserving national unity and safeguarding State secrets is a duty incumbent upon every citizen. 
Article 39 [Taxes] 
Payment of taxes and public dues is a duty in accordance with the Law. 
Article 40 [Observance ofthe Law] 
Respect for the Basic Law of the State and the laws and ordinances issued by the public authorities, as 
well as observance of public order and public morals, is a duty incumbent upon all residents of the 
Sultanate. 
Part Four The Head of State 
[Section 1 The Sultan] 
Article 41 [Head of State, Commander-In-Chief] 
The Sultan is the Head of State and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. His person is 
inviolable and must be respected and his orders must be obeyed. The Sultan is the symbol of national 
unity as well as its guardian and defender. 
Article 42 [Functions] 
The Sultan discharges the following functions: 
- preserving the country's independence and territorial integrity and assuring its internal and external 
security, maintaining the rights and freedoms of its citizens, guaranteeing the rule of law, 
and guiding the general policy of the State. 
- taking prompt measures to counter any threat to the safety of the State or its territorial integrity, the 
security and interests of its people, or the smooth running of its institutions. 
- representing the State both internally and externally in all international relations. 
- presiding over the Council of Ministers or appointing a person to serve in that position. 
- presiding over the Specialised Councils or appointing chairmen for them. 
- appointing and dismissing Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and those of their rank. 
- appointing and dismissing Under-Secretaries, General Secretaries and those of their rank. 
- appointing and dismissing senior judges. 
- declaring a state of emergency, general mobilisation, or war, and making peace in accordance with the 
provisions of the Law. 
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- issuing and ratifying laws. 
- signing international treaties and agreements in accordance with the provisions of the Law (or 
authorising a signatory to sign them) and issuing decrees ratifying them. 
- appointing and dismissing political representatives to other States and international organisations 
according to the limits and circumstances laid down by the Law. Accepting accreditation of 
representatives of States and international organisations. 
- waiving or commuting punishments 
- conferring honours, decorations and military ranks. 
Article 43 [Assisting Function of Council of Ministers] 
The Sultan shall be assisted in drafting and implementing the general policy of the State by a Council of 
Ministers and Specialised Councils. 
[Section 2] The Council of Ministers 
Article 44 [Functions] 
The Council of Ministers is the body entrusted with implementing general State policies. In particular it 
shall: 
- submit recommendations to the Sultan on economic, political and social, as well as executive and 
administrative matters of concern to the Government, and propose draft laws and decrees. 
- foster the welfare of citizens and ensure the provision of health and other essential services in order to 
improve the quality of their life socially and culturally as well as economically. 
- formulate aims and general policies for economic, social, and administrative deVelopment and propose 
methods of implementing these policies which will make the best use of financial, economic and human 
resources. 
- discuss developmental plans prepared by the relevant departments, submit them to the Sultan for 
approval, and follow up their implementation. 
- discuss proposals by Ministries in their fields of executive jurisdiction and make appropriate 
recommendations and decisions in this regard. 
- oversee the smooth running of the State's administrative apparatus, follow up its performance of its 
duties, and co-
ordinate the activities of its different departments. 
_ monitor the implementation of all laws, decrees, ordinances and decisions, as well as treaties and 
agreements and court judgements, in a manner that will ensure that they are complied with. 
_ discharge any other competencies vested in it by the Sultan or conferred upon it by the provisions of 
the Law. 
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Article 45 [Chairmanship of Sessions] 
The Head of the Council of Ministers shall preside over the Council's sessions and has the right to 
entrust the chainnanship of sessions, which he does not attend, to one of the Deputy Prime Ministers. If 
the Prime Minister and his Deputies are absent, the Sultan will authorise whoever he sees fit to chair the 
sessions. 
Article 46 [Quorum, Secrecy, Majority] 
Meetings of the Council shall be quorate with the attendance of a majority of its members. Its 
deliberations are secret and its decisions are issued with the approval of a majority of those present. 
Article 47 [Standing Orders, General Secretariat] 
The Council of Ministers shall draw up Standing Orders including its Rules of Procedure. The Council 
shall have a General Secretariat which will be provided with a sufficient number of staff to assist it in 
carrying out its work. 
[Section 3] The Prime Minister, His Deputies and Ministers 
Article 48 [Appointment] 
If the Sultan appoints a Prime Minister, his competencies and powers shall be specified in the Decree 
appointing him. 
Article 49 [Qualifications] 
It is a prerequisite that whoever is appointed as Prime Minister, his Deputy, or a Minister: 
a) Shall be originally of Om ani nationality in accordance with the Law; 
b) Shall be aged not less than 30 years of the Gregorian calendar. 
Article 50 [Oath of Ministers] 
Before assuming their powers the Prime Minister, his Deputies, and Ministers shall swear the following 
oath in the presence of the Sultan: 
"1 swear by Almighty God that 1 shall be faithful to my Sultan and my Country, that 1 shall respect the 
Basic Law of the State and its implementing regulations; that 1 shall uphold at all times the integrity of 
the State and the security of its territories, and shall work to promote fully its interests and the interests 
of its citizens, and that 1 shall discharge my duties truly and honestly." 
Article 51 [Ministries] 
Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers shall supervise the affairs of their Ministries and Organisations, 
and implement the general policy of the Government therein, as well as drawing up future guidelines for 
their Ministries and Organisations and following up their implementation. 
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Article 52 [Responsibility] 
Members ofthe Council of Ministers are politically collectively responsible before the Sultan for 
carrying out the general policies of the State, and each is individually responsible before the Sultan for 
the discharge of his duties and the exercise of his powers. 
Article 53 [Economic Incompatibility] 
Members of the Council of Ministers shall not combine their Ministerial position with the chainnanship 
or membership of the Board of any joint stock company. Nor may the Government departments of which 
they are in charge have dealings with any company or organisation in which they have an interest, 
whether direct or indirect. They should be guided in all their actions by considerations of national 
interest and public welfare and should not exploit their official positions in any way for their own benefit 
or for the benefit of those with whom they have special relations. 
Article 54 [Remuneration] 
The emoluments of Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers, during their tenn of office and after their 
retirement, shall be determined in accordance with the directives of the Sultan. 
Article 55 [Ministers] 
The provisions of Articles 49,50, 51, 52, 53 and 54 shall apply to all those with the rank of Minister. 
[Section 4] Specialised Councils 
Article 56 [Establishment] 
The Specialised Councils shall be established, their powers defined and their members appointed in 
accordance with Royal Decrees. 
[Section 5] Financial Affairs 
Article 57 [Financial Laws] 
The Law specifies the provisions concerning the following matters and the bodies responsible for them: 
_ collection of taxes, revenues and other public monies, and measures for their disbursement.. 
_ maintenance and administration of State property, the conditions of its disposal, and the limits within 
which a part of this property may be assigned. 
- the general State budget and the final account 
- the autonomous and supplementary budgets and their final accounts 
- control of State finances 
- loans extended by or obtained by the State 
- currency and banking, standards, weights and measures 
_ salaries, pensions, indemnities, subsidies and gratuities charged to the State Treasury. 
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Part Five The Oman Council 
Article 58 [Composition] 
(1) The Oman Council shall consist of: 
- The Shura Council 
- The Council of State 
(2) The Law shall specify the powers of each of these Councils, the length of their terms, the frequency 
of their sessions, and their rules of procedure. It shall also specify the number of members of each 
Council, the conditions which they must fulfil, the method of their selection and appointment, the 
reasons for their dismissal, and other regulatory provisions. 
Part Six The Judiciary 
Article 59 [Rule of Law, Impartiality] 
The sovereignty of the Law is the basis of governance in the State. Rights and freedoms are guaranteed 
by the dignity of the judiciary and the probity and impartiality of the judges. 
Article 60 [Independence of the Courts] 
Judicial power is independent and vested in the Courts of Law, of whatever type or status, which issue 
judgements in accordance with the Law. 
Article 61 [Independence of Judges] 
There is no power over the judges in their rulings except the Law. Judges can only be dismissed in cases 
specified by the Law. No party may interfere in a law suit or in matters of justice; such interference shall 
be a crime punishable by law. The Law shall specify the conditions to be fulfilled for those 
administering justice, the conditions and procedures for the appointment of judges, their transfer and 
promotion, the security offered to them, the cases in which they are not liable for dismissal, and other 
relevant provisions. 
Article 62 [Organization, Military Courts, Martial Law] 
The Law shall regulate the Law Courts of whatever type or status and shall specify their functions and 
competencies. The jurisdiction of Military Courts shall be restricted to military crimes committed by 
members of the Atmed Forces and the security forces and shall only extend to others in the case of 
martial law and then within the limits laid down by the Law. 
Article 63 [Publicity] 
Court hearings are public except when the Law Court decides to hold the case in camera in the interests 
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of public order or public morals. In all cases pronouncement of finding and sentence shall be in open 
seSSIOn. 
Article 64 [Public Prosecution, Attorney General] 
The public prosecution shall conduct legal proceedings on behalf of the community, shall oversee 
matters of judicial prosecution and shall be vigilant in the application of the penal code, the pursuit of 
the guilty and the execution of court judgements. The Law shall regulate the public prosecution and its 
competencies and shall specify the conditions and security applicable to those who discharge its 
functions. In exceptional cases, Public Security departments may be legally empowered to conduct 
proceedings in cases involving misdemeanours, in accordance with the conditions laid down by the Law. 
Article 65 [Legal Profession] 
The legal profession shall be regulated by the Law. 
Article 66 [Higher Council] 
The judiciary shall have a Higher Council, which shall oversee the smooth running of the Law Courts 
and auxiliary bodies. The Law shall specify the powers of this Council with regard to the functions of 
the judges and the public prosecutor. 
Article 67 [Administrative Courts] 
The Law shall adjudicate in administrative disputes through a Special Administrative Causes Court or 
Department, whose organisation and mode of procedure shall be specified in Law. 
Article 68 [Jurisdiction Disputes] 
The Law shall adjudicate in disputes over jurisdiction between judicial departments and in cases of 
conflict of judgements. 
Article 69 [Ministerial Opinions] 
The Law shall define the competencies of the department which expresses legal opinions to Ministries 
and other Government departments and formulates and revises draft laws, regulations and decisions. The 
Law shall also specify the mode of representation of the State and other public bodies and organisations 
before the Departments of Justice. 
Article 70 [Judicial Review] 
The Law shall stipulate the judicial department concerned with settling disputes arising from the 
incompatibility oflaws and 
regulations with the Basic Law of the State and ensuring that the latter's provisions are not contravened, 
and shall define that department's powers and procedures. 
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Article 71 [Judgements] 
Judgements shall be issued and executed in the name of His Majesty the Sultan. Failure or delay in 
executing these judgements on the part of the concerned public officials shall be a crime punishable by 
law. In such a case the judgement beneficiary has the right to bring a criminal action directly to the court 
concerned. 
Part Seven General Provisions 
Article 72 [Treaties) 
The application of this Basic Law shall not infringe the treaties and agreements concluded between the 
Sultanate of Oman and other States and international bodies and organisations. 
Article 73 [Martial Law) 
None of the provisions of this Basic Law shall be suspended except in the case of martial law and within 
the limits laid down by the Law. 
Article 74 [Publication) 
Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette within two weeks of the day of their issuance. Laws will 
come into force from their date of publication unless they stipulate another date. 
Article 75 [Retroactive Law] 
Provisions of laws shall only apply from the date of their coming into force; whatever happens before 
that date is of no consequence, unless the text specifies otherwise. Excluded from this exception are 
penal laws and laws concerning taxes and financial dues. 
Article 76 [Ratification] 
Treaties and agreements shall not have the force oflaw until they have been ratified. In no case maya 
treaty or an agreement contain secret conditions which contradict its declared conditions. 
Article 77 [Old Laws] 
Everything stipulated by laws, regulations, decrees, directives and decisions in force on the date of this 
Basic Law becoming effective shall remain in force, provided that they do not conflict with any of its 
provisions. 
Article 78 [Required Laws) 
Laws which are not yet in existence but are necessitated by this Basic Law shall be promulgated by the 
competent departments within two years of its coming into force. 
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Article 79 [Supremacy of the Constitution] 
Laws and procedures which have the force of law must conform to the provisions of the Basic Law of 
the State. 
Article 80 [Executive Bound By Law] 
No body in the State may issue rules, regulations, decisions or instructions which contravene the 
provisions of laws and decrees in force, or international treaties and agreements which constitute part of 
the law of the country. 
Article 81 [Amendments] 
This Basic Law can only be amended in the same manner in which it was promulgated. 
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